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Abstract
Charles Peirce’s thought on the relationship between theory and practice has two
seemingly inconsistent thrusts. On one hand, Peirce draws theory and practice
together. He understands theory as a particular form of practical interaction with
the world. On the other hand, he pulls them apart. He seems to insist that the-
oretical inquiry is not to affect, or be affected by, our other practices. This thesis
uses Peirce’s habit-based account of human activity to show that the two sides
of his thought are not inconsistent. Rather, Peirce’s apparent division of theory
from practice is a consequence of his understanding of theory as a practice.
Peirce often appeals to a habit-based account of human activity. However,
this account is not developed in detail in any one text. The first task of this thesis
is to gather together Peirce’s remarks on habit and human activity into a single
coherent picture. According to this picture, we are made up of a body of habits
which is constantly developing as we interact with the world. This body of habits
is only partially subject to self-control, but we use this small window to direct
ourselves towards our purposes. That in our body of habits which is subject to
control is called the ‘foreground’ and that which is not is called the ‘background’.
Agents are said to be ‘in harmony’ with their environment when their habits al-
low them to achieve their purposes. In the course of articulating this picture
points of critical contact with recent philosophy of action are noted.
The second task of this thesis is to show that Peirce understands theoretical
inquiry on this model. Theoretical inquiry is the practice directed to the discov-
ery of truth, where truth is understood as ultimate harmony between beliefs (a
kind of habit) and the world. It depends on a background of mostly-instinctive
habits, including a collection of indubitable common-sense beliefs, and an at-
tunement with the world that enables us to generate explanatory hypotheses.
The third task is to show that Peirce’s division of theory from our other prac-
tices is a consequence of his understanding of the special character of truth. Ac-
cording to Peirce the discovery of truth is a ‘long-run’ goal, which demands very
different treatment from the ‘short-run’ goals of our other practices. To allow the
needs of other practices to interfere in theoretical inquiry would be to take us
off the path of truth. On the other hand, to allow theoretical results and reason-
ing to directly control our other practices would be to substitute reliable instinct
for highly fallible reason. In sum, Peirce insists on the autonomy of theory and
practice from one another.
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Introduction
This thesis concerns Charles Peirce’s account of the relationship between theory
and practice. Its primary challenge is to harmonise two seemingly-inconsistent
aspects of Peirce’s thought. On one hand, he calls himself a ‘pragmatist’, and so
claims that ‘what we think must be interpreted in terms of what we are prepared
to do’ (EP2, p. 142).1 In this and other contexts he prioritises practice to theory.
On the other hand, Peirce claims that theory and practice must be held apart.
According to Peirce, theoretical results should not be directly applied in practice,
and practical concerns are not to motivate theoretical inquiry. He ‘[condemns]
with the whole strength of conviction the Hellenic tendency to mingle Philo-
sophy and Practice’ (EP2, p. 29). This has been taken by some commentators to
imply a ‘fundamental dualism’ (Stuhr, ‘Rendering. . . ’, p. 9), or a ‘rigid distinction’
(Ayim, ‘Theory, Practice. . . ’, p. 51) between theory and practice. This thesis will
argue that Peirce is, instead, acknowledging the autonomy of both theory and our
other practices.
In order to show that these two aspects of Peirce’s thought are consistent, I at-
tempt a ‘ground up’ articulation of his account of the relationship between the-
ory and practice. I begin with Peirce’s most basic characterisation of the inter-
action between a creature and its environment: his account of habits and their
development. Habits are, on this account, irreducibly general ways of behaving
which develop in response to experience. When these habits allow the creature
to flourish in their environment, the creature is said to be ‘in harmony’ with their
environment.
1A full list of the abbreviations used in my citations can be found on page 107.
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These materials are used to create an account of human practice according
to which we are made up of a body of habits. The vast majority of these habits
are outside of our control. They form a ‘background’ which we rely on in our
deliberate, controlled, activity. Moreover, our deliberate activity is itself a form
of habit development. Through it we attempt to shape our habits in order to
achieve our purposes. According to Peirce, theoretical inquiry is no exception.
It is the practice in which we attempt to attain ultimate harmony between our
beliefs, which are a form of habit, and the world. This is the sense in which Peirce
prioritises practice to theory.
Given that Peirce understands theory as a kind of practice, his suggestion that
they should not ‘mingle’ is initially puzzling. If his suggestion implies a rigid dual-
ism between theory and practice, then the two thoughts seem to be inconsistent.
I argue that, rather than being inconsistent, Peirce’s apparent division between
theory and practice is a consequence of his prioritisation of practice. More spe-
cifically, it is a consequence of the special character of truth as the purpose of
theoretical inquiry. Truth is a ‘long-run’ purpose, and, as such, requires very dif-
ferent treatment from the ‘short-run’ purposes of our everyday life. So, while
theoretical inquiry is a practice, its particular purpose means that it must be car-
ried out on its own terms; it requires autonomy from the demands of our other
practices. Likewise, the purpose of theoretical inquiry means that its results are
not directly applicable to our other practices; they require autonomy from the
results of theoretical inquiry.
Theory and Practice as a Philosophical Topic
The key terms in the claims that I am defending in this thesis: ‘practice’, ‘the-
ory’, ‘prioritise’, and ‘autonomy’ are, by themselves, vague. But, as Peirce often
says, vagueness can be useful.2 The primary value of vague claims about the re-
2Peirce suggests that vagueness can be useful in a few contexts. For instance, he says that
the vagueness of vernacular terms is part of their function (CP, 6.494). He also suggests that our
common-sense beliefs, for instance, that there is some regularity in the universe, only maintain
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lationship between theory and practice is to point to broad similarities between
philosophies and to general philosophical strategies. This point is best made by
considering some examples.
The relationship between, and relative value of, theory and practice was an
important issue to the ancient Greeks. Aristotle illustrates the distinction by say-
ing that the theorist is like one who goes to a festival at Olympus simply to watch,
whereas the practical man is either like the athlete who competes for glory or
the merchant who attends for material gain (in Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth,
p. 18).3 This example suggests that theory is contemplative, passive, and disinter-
ested; and practice is active, engaged, and directed towards instrumental ends.
This agrees with the present use of the distinction in folk-wisdom. In theory we
step back and think, in practice we do.
The general strategy of prioritising practice to theory is on display, in dispar-
ate ways, in the work of many philosophers. The later Wittgenstein’s famous in-
sistence that we go ‘back to the rough ground’ is an appeal to practice (Philo-
sophical Investigations, p. 46; pt.1 par.107). One might also cite philosophers like
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, who in their distinct ways explore the ‘lebenswelt’,
the world of our everyday life (Beyer, ‘Edmund Husserl’, §7; Merleau-Ponty, Phe-
nomenology of Perception vii-viii). This general strategy has been called ‘funda-
mental pragmatism’ by Robert Brandom (Perspectives of Pragmatism, pp. 9–11),
and it is indeed hard to see how a philosopher could deserve the title ‘pragmatist’
without carrying it out in some sense.
On the other hand, many philosophers have attempted the opposite strategy;
putting theory before practice. Descartes’ famous declaration that he is essen-
tially a thing that thinks reflects this strategy (Descartes, ‘Meditations on First
their truth because of their vagueness (CP, 5.522).
3Nightingale notes that this image appears earlier in the work of Heraclides of Pontus (Nightin-
gale, Spectacles of Truth, p. 18). She also notes the interesting reasons why Heraclides attributed
it to Pythagoras, namely, that the Fourth Century figures who introduced the idea of theoret-
ical contemplation aloof from practical engagement wanted to project this image back onto the
thinkers of the past (Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth, pp. 24–5). That is, theoretical inquiry had
only just appeared as a self-conscious and distinct form of human activity, and needed to defend
itself by creating a history for itself.
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Philosophy’, p. 19; AT28). Descartes attempts to reason from this position to se-
cure knowledge of an external world. That is, he attempts to deploy his powers of
theoretical reflection to secure his relationship with the external world in which
he acts; theory comes before practice. On some interpretations Kant prioritises
theory to practice by accounting for the structure of the world in terms of the con-
cepts which we must use in order to think about it at all.4 This general strategy
can be called ‘intellectualism’.
While the examples I have just introduced are all historical, both strategies are
pursued today. For example, intellectualist strategies are prominent in contem-
porary analytic philosophy of action,5 and in recent arguments, due to Stanley
and Williamson, that ‘knowledge-how’ is a variety of ‘knowledge-that’.6 In the
former actions are defined in terms of consciously apprehended beliefs and de-
sires. In the latter knowledge that propositions are true is given priority over our
knowing how to perform tasks. Both of these examples will be returned to, in
passing, as the thesis proceeds.
Two ways of denying the autonomy of theory from practice are, first, the claim
that theory should be carried out for the purpose of political or social change,
and second, the claim that it should be directed to narrowly utilitarian, or in-
strumental, outcomes. An example of the former is the idea, stressed by some
Marx-inspired philosophers, that the success of a theoretical development is to
be measured by its ability to ameliorate perceived social ills.7 An example of the
4This is true, for example, of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Kant in his Phenomenology of
Perception (x-xi).
5More specifically, the family of views in the philosophy of action called ‘the standard story of
action’ by Michael Smith (‘The Structure of Orthonomy’, p. 165) and Jennifer Hornsby (‘Agency
and Actions’, p. 1).
6Their joint article is ‘Knowing How’. The arguments are further developed in Stanley’s ‘Know-
ing (How)’ and Know How. Note that the word ‘intellectualism’ is used in a more strict way in
the discussion that these articles engendered. Following Ryle, Stanley and Williamson use ‘intel-
lectualism’ to refer to the claim that knowledge-how is a variety of knowledge-that (c.f. Ryle, The
Concept of Mind, pp. 27–30).
7I do not know whether this view is fairly attributable to Marx. However, examples can be
cited of self-avowedly Marxist philosophers taking such a position. One dramatic example is the
division of the Sydney University Philosophy Department over this issue in the 60s (Franklin,
pp. 281–312). It is possible to see how this view of the relationship between theory and practice
could be derived from Critical Theory, with its emphasis on the potential of theory for ‘human
emancipation’ (Bohman, ‘Critical Theory’, Introduction).
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latter is the subordination of theoretical research to technological progress.8 On
the other hand, the autonomy of practice from theory can be denied by radic-
ally reforming our practices on the basis of theoretical inquiry. Dunne provides
an interesting example of the attempt to reform education through the ‘behavi-
oural objectives model’, which promised to replace the ‘wooly-mindedness and
muddle’ of traditional teaching practices with a framework based on strictly-
defined learning objectives (Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground, pp. 1–8).
Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 begins the ‘ground up’ articulation of Peirce account of theory and
practice by introducing his account of habits and their development. Peirce did
not put forward this account in any one text, so in Section 1.2 I gather together
Peirce’s various characterisations of habit into a single coherent picture. In Sec-
tion 1.3 I turn to habit development. I introduce a ‘cycle of habit development’,
according to which habits are subject to development when they ‘clash’ with ex-
perience. I conclude by considering Peirce’s account of self-control as a form of
habit development. I emphasise his view that our most advanced forms of self-
control develop from, and depend on, more basic forms of habit development.
In Chapter 2 I articulate Peirce’s conception of practice in terms of his ac-
count of habits and their development. The organising idea of this chapter is
the distinction between the ‘background’ and the ‘foreground’ of our practices.
In Section 2.2 I introduce the former. I argue that the background represents
an ‘attunement’ with the world, which we rely on in order to act deliberately.9 I
also emphasise the role of instinct. Section 2.3 deals with the foreground. It in-
troduces Peirce’s conception of our deliberate activity as purpose-directed habit
8This tendency is commonly on display in arguments over the public funding of scientific
research. For example, one can imagine someone attempting to defend the funding of pure
mathematics purely by invoking examples of its eventual and unexpected practical uses, some
of which are interestingly adduced by Rowlett (‘The Unplanned Impact of Mathematics’).
9The language used in this chapter is heavily indebted to Vincent Colapietro, especially his
‘Habit, Competence, and Purpose’.
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development.
In Chapter 3 I show that Peirce understands theory as a form of practical in-
teraction with the world. That is, that he prioritises practice to theory. Section 3.2
takes up Peirce’s account of theoretical inquiry as the search for truth without ul-
terior motive, of beliefs as a form of habit, and of experimentation. In Section 3.3
I consider the dependence of the experimental method on the inquirers back-
ground attunement with the world. I pay particular attention to a set of indubit-
able ‘common sense’ beliefs and to our instinctive ability to generate explanatory
hypotheses.
Chapter 4 considers Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice. It be-
gins, in Section 4.2, by introducing Peirce’s most extreme statement of the dis-
tinction and its reception in the work of some recent commentators. I emphasise
two claims: the ‘no-instinct thesis’, and the ‘no-belief thesis’. The former suggests
that there is no role for instinct in theoretical inquiry, and the latter that theoret-
ical inquiry has nothing to do with beliefs. Section 4.3 is devoted to showing that
both theses, when Peirce’s underlying arguments are considered, are only super-
ficially in tension with Peirce’s prioritisation of practice. I then, in Section 4.4,
reformulate Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice using the termin-
ology developed in the previous chapters. I show that the special character of
truth means that theoretical inquiry is a practice with a unique relationship to
time, instinct, and doubt. Further, I show why, given this distinction, theory and
our other practices must maintain their autonomy from one another. I conclude,
in Section 4.5, by reflecting on the Peirce’s overall conception of the relationship
between theory and practice and suggest some questions for further research re-
garding its ‘long-run’ development.
Chapter 1
Habits and Their Development
1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces Peirce’s conception of the most basic form of interaction
between things: his account of habits and their development. It pays particu-
lar attention to the interaction between human agents and their environment.
According to Peirce, habits are ways of acting that cannot be reduced to any par-
ticular collection of acts. They are enduring behavioural regularities that can be
possessed by a vast range of entities. Habits are subject to development when
they cause their possessor to clash with their environment. Most forms of habit
development happen below the level of consciousness and control. But in the
human case we can take some control over the development of our habits. This
account provides the basic materials for the chapters that follow. It is the ‘ground’
from which the ‘ground-up’ account of the relationship between theory and prac-
tice begins.
In Section 1.2 I introduce Peirce’s notion of habit. I begin, in Section 1.2.1, by
gathering together Peirce’s various characterisations of habit into a single defin-
ition. I emphasise the irreducibility of habits to particular acts, their role in de-
termining those acts, and the wide applicability of Peirce’s account. Section 1.2.2
heads off some tempting misinterpretations of habit. In particular, ‘habit’ often
carries negative connotations that do not apply to Peirce’s notion. It can sug-
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gest, for instance, addictions or other compulsive behaviours. On Peirce’s ac-
count these are examples of habits, but they do not exhaust its meaning and they
are not his central examples.
In Section 1.3 I introduce Peirce’s account of habit development. Firstly, in
Section 1.3.1, in its most general form, showing how habits develop in a continual
cycle of interaction between the possessor of the habit and their environment.
Then, in Section 1.3.2, I consider the special case of human habit development,
which is characterised by a high levels of self-control. I introduce Peirce’s account
of self-control, and show that it makes self-control a form of habit development.
I emphasise Peirce’s claim that the most advanced forms of human self-control
develop in degrees from more basic forms.
1.2 Habit
1.2.1 Characterising Habit
What Peirce means by ‘habit’ can be characterised as follows:
A habit is anything that determines its possessor to respond in gen-
erally specifiable ways to generally specifiable situations.1
Note that this is not an analytic definition. It does not define ‘habit’ in terms that
do not themselves involve habit. On Peirce’s view, for there to be generally spe-
cifiable ways of responding and generally specifiable kinds of circumstance there
must be some regularity in our environment and responses. This regularity will
itself satisfy the characterisation of habit. In other words, Peirce thinks of habits
as irreducible features of reality. One might protest that habits can be defined in
1This gathers together the key features of Peirce’s various descriptions of habit. The import-
ance of generally specifiable actions and circumstances is made clear at CP 2.148; 5.480; 5.538;
and EP2, pp. 401–2; p. 413. The importance of the habit determining the kind of action is made
clear at CP 8.361; EP1, p. 198; p. 202; and EP2, p. 269; pp. 401–2. I have used the word ‘respond’
rather than ‘act’ to avoid confusion about the various kinds of habit that Peirce recognises. These
include: habits of action (CP 5.538), habits of expectation (CP 2.148; 5.539), and habits of feeling
(EP2, pp. 377–8).
Habit 9
terms of some collection of particular responses, or some particular arrangement
of matter. This is not Peirce’s approach.2
Some features of the above characterisation of habit require further clarifica-
tion. In particular Peirce’s emphasis on generality, and the varieties of response
which the characterisation invokes. Moreover, there are some features of Peirce’s
use of ‘habit’ that are not completely in line with the everyday meaning of the
term.3 Most importantly, Peirce’s willingness to ascribe habits to a wide range of
entities.
The irreducibility of habit is a manifestation of Peirce’s realist account of gen-
erality.4 Peirce holds, against nominalism, that a general is something over and
above the collection of its particular instances (CP, 4.172).5 On this view, the gen-
erally specifiable situations in which the habit is in effect and the generally spe-
cifiable responses that the habit determines are not exhausted by any collection
of particular situations or responses. Consequently habits can not be completely
captured by collecting up the particular occurrences which are their issue (EP2,
pp. 401–2); they are irreducibly general.
One important consequence of the irreducible generality of habits is that they
always refer to the future. The past is a collection of actual occurances, so, since
2This feature of Peirce’s account of habit is captured at a more abstract level in his system of
universal categories. In this system the category of Thirdness, of which habit is a paradigmatic
example, is not reducible to Firstness and Secondness, of which feelings and acts are, respectively,
examples. For Peirce’s discussion of the categories see, for example, ‘On a New List Of Categories’
(EP1, pp. 1–10), or the second and third of his 1903 Harvard Pragmatism Lectures (EP2, pp. 145–
178). The categories have been widely discussed in the secondary literature (e.g. Hookway, Peirce,
pp. 80-117; Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, pp. 65–86; Krausser, ‘The Three Fundamental Structural
Categories of Charles S. Peirce’).
3Peirce acknowledges that he is expanding the term in a few places. For instance, in his com-
ments on Royce’s use of the idea of purpose (EP2, pp. 430–431).
4Peirce describes his position on the reality of generals as a kind of scholastic realism (EP1,
p. 53; EP2, p. 339). Peirce’s affinities with scholastic realism have been explored by Boler (Charles
Peirce and Scholastic Realism) and Mayorga (From Realism to “Realicism”).
5Peirce took nominalism to have very wide-ranging and troublesome consequences. He says,
for instance, that ‘[t]he question whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals,
is the question whether there is anything of any more dignity, worth, and importance than indi-
vidual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life’ (CP, 8.38). It is clear from his other
writings that Peirce thought both that nominalism requires a negative answer to this question,
and that a negative answer has terrible consequences for human life (e.g. EP1, pp. 352–8). For a
recent work exploring Peirce philosophy from this perspective see Paul Forster’s Peirce and the
Threat of Nominalism.
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a habit is more than any collection of actual occurrences, it is not exhausted by
the past. On the other hand, the future is potential. So Peirce holds that the
habit must always refer to the future; its ‘mode of being’ is ‘esse in futuro’ (CP,
2.148). This kind of generality is also called, by Peirce, ‘conditional generality’
(CP, 1.427).6 So to ascribe a habit to something is to make claims about its po-
tentials for future behaviour and to have a habit is to be such that you will act in
certain ways if put into certain situations.7 If I have the habit of drinking whisky
before bed then predictions can be made about my behaviour in possible future
situations, and in various counterfactual situations. Given that there is a whisky
bottle in my cupboard now it can be predicted that I will have a glass of whisky
when I get home tonight. It could also be predicted that, if I were out of whisky,
had sufficient money in my bank account, and was aware of these facts, then I
would stop at the bottle store on my way home.
It worth emphasising that Peirce’s realism about generals implies that habits
are active powers.8 As the characterisation of habit offered above says, habits
really determine the behaviour of their possessors. The habit is not simply a con-
venient way of noting correlations between certain kinds of situation and certain
6This ‘conditional generality’ of habit can also be understood in terms of Peirce’s contrast
between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ generality (CP, 1.427). Positive generality is the same thing as
conditional generality. A thing has positive generality if the fact that it applies to multiple cases is
part of its nature. Habits have positive generality because it is part of their nature that they apply
to an inexhaustable range of potential circumstances. On the other hand, a thing has negative
generality if it can be instantiated multiple times in experience, but does not in itself refer to any-
thing outside of itself. A particular shade of a colour has negative generality; it can be instantiated
in experience multiple times, but in itself it is a particular quality and does not refer to anything
outside of itself. This distinction is discussed by Short (Peirce’s Theory of Signs, pp. 78–80).
7Peirce’s thought on potentialities, and particularly, about when it is appropriate to ascribe
potentialities to things, developed over his career. In his famous early paper ‘How to Make Our
Ideas Clear’, he claimed that there was no fact of the matter about whether or not we should say
an unscratched diamond is hard (EP1, pp. 132–3). Later on he revised this view, holding that it
was too nominalistic (EP2, pp. 354–7). In his later writings he endorses the view that I have just
sketched (e.g. EP2, pp. 456–7). See Potter, Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals, pp. 52–67 for a
discussion of this progression in the wider context of the development of Peirce’s formulations of
the pragmatic maxim.
8Peirce holds that ‘a habit is a rule active in us’ (CP, 2.643). In other contexts Peirce uses the
word ‘determine’ to characterise how habits relate to the particular actions which they result in
(eg: EP2, p. 269; p. 347). Peirce’s understanding of habits as active is also emphasised in Shapiro’s
study of his theory of habit (‘Peirce’s Theory of Habit’, p. 23).
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kinds of action.9 This is an essential aspect of the reality of habits. If habits did
not have the potential to really determine events then, on Peircean principles,
they would not be truly real. In other words, the habit does not simply mark the
connection, it makes the connection.
In the characterisation of habit I introduced above I used the term ‘respond’
rather than ‘act’. This is because habits of action, while of central importance,
are not the only kind of habit. Peirce also mentions, amongst others, habits of
feeling and habits of expectation.10 Habits of feeling are important in part be-
cause of their role in the affective dimension of our experience. For instance,
on the Peircean model the affective responses that accompany our experience of
various objects is largely constituted by habits of feeling. It can be predicted that
when reading a news story about a serious crime the reader will, depending on
the particular habits of feeling they have, feel nauseous, depressed, or exhilar-
ated. This is, according to the characterisation of habit given above, enough to
say that there is a habit involved. In this case the responses are feelings, so we
can call the habit a habit of feeling.
These various kinds of response highlight another important aspect of this
account of habit. That is, that the habit must always have something other than
itself to control.11 One aspect of this is that control implies the being of some-
thing to be controlled. In the case of habits of action, it is, obviously, actions that
are being controlled. The thing to be controlled is always in some sense compuls-
ive. For instance, the existence of some particular feeling, or occurrence of some
particular action. Now this is not only important as a requirement for the being
of a habit, it is also important for the development of habits. In the next section I
9Of course, such correlations will be important when we attempt to learn what habits a certain
thing possesses.
10Peirce uses habits of feeling in his later account of the normative sciences. Esthetics is, in his
later Monist papers, the science of habits of feeling (EP2, pp. 377–8). This point is emphasised and
placed in the context of Peirce’s developing accounts of the normative sciences in Potter, Charles
S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals, pp. 50–51. Peirce sometimes uses habits of expectation to account
for the meanings of our scientific beliefs (see e.g. CP 5.539–41).
11Peirce makes the point in the language of his universal categories when he says that Thirdness
cannot be ‘prescinded’ from Secondness and Firstness (CP, 1.353; EP2, p. 177; EP2, p. 270).
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introduce the idea that the growth of our habits requires external compulsion.
The final point that needs to be made explicitly is that habits can be pos-
sessed by a wide range of entities. Human beings are the primary example, but
Peirce shows that an analysis of our habit-governed activity can have wider ap-
plication.12 The analysis is easily extended to non-human animals. It also applies
to everyday objects.13 Even nature itself can take habits; Peirce characterises the
laws of nature as habits of nature (CP, 1.409). That the agent’s environment has
habits is a central part of Peirce’s account of habit development.
1.2.2 Misinterpreting Habit
The word ‘habit’ has some unfortunate connotations, which, if not noted, might
encourage misinterpretations of Peirce’s account. Peirce acknowledges that his
use of the word diverges from common usage (e.g. CP, 5.538). In common speech
habits are often associated with compulsive and unwanted behaviour. For in-
stance, drug addictions, regular overeating, or obsessions. These are compul-
sions that can prevent us from behaving in the way that most attracts us on re-
flection. They are, it seems, largely outside of our control. Often they are also
highly stereotyped, or mechanical. For example, one might have an unshakable
compulsion to have a cigarette every morning. Perhaps these negative connota-
tions are behind the tendency of analytic philosophy of action to ignore habitual
behaviour.14 One of the organising questions of that discipline is the question of
12Peirce explicitly starts one of his late accounts of pragmatism with examples of human habit
(EP2, pp. 411–2), and then lets his analysis apply more widely (EP2, p. 418). Shapiro emphasises
the fact that this is the direction that Peirce’s analysis moves in. He suggests that this is an applic-
ation by Peirce of his anthropomorphism Shapiro, ‘Peirce’s Theory of Habit’, pp. 47–9.
13I take this to be the meaning of Peirce’s claim that all objects are ‘quasi-selves’ (EP2, p. 268).
That is, according to Peirce habits are necessary for thing-hood. Without habits matter would
be ‘utter nothingness’ (CP, 1.218). For example, I carry around a reusable rubber coffee cup. My
coffee cup is such that, if I squeeze it in the middle the lid will pop off, and such that if I turn it
upside down when it has coffee in it, then it will make a mess. More basically, it has the habit of
enduring in the same form from one moment to the next. Without habits of this sort it would not
have any integrity as an object. These regularities are, on Peirce’s creatively-extended account,
habits. Since Peirce takes human habits to be the central examples of habit, anything that has
enduring habits can be described as a ‘quasi-self’. My coffee cup is a ‘quasi-self’.
14This diagnosis of the place of habit in recent philosophy of action is defended by Pollard (‘Ha-
bitual Action’). It is worth noting some exceptions. For example, Peter Railton’s work on ‘fluent
agency’ (‘Practical Competence and Fluent Agency’), where he focusses attention on the well-
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what counts as action, and what is merely behaviour (Stout, Action, pp. 3–4). Or
in other words, the question of what events are manifestations of agency. Since
the behavioural compulsions described above are not clearly controllable, they
seem closer to ‘mere behaviour’ than to action.
It is important to note that these examples do count as habits on Peirce’s
definition. For instance, to be a heavy smoker implies that you smoke with a
high degree of regularity. This behavioural regularity is, by definition, a habit.
But these examples are not typical examples of habit in Peirce’s sense. Peirce
spends more time considering habits of ‘deliberate conduct’. That is, a habits
which come into effect when we are ‘acting deliberately’ (c.f. EP2, p. 12). We will
soon see that Peirce’s conception of habit encompasses creative and flexible be-
havioural dispositions. He attempts to capture the skill of, for instance, the great
musician, athlete, or scientist, within the habitual dimension.
On Peirce’s conception habits are not merely, as Ryle suggests, ‘one track dis-
positions’ (Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 42–5). That is, habits need not be mech-
anical relationships between a tightly circumscribed antecedent condition and a
highly stereotyped response. There are many examples of such behaviour in the
animal kingdom. Daniel Dennett often invokes the behaviour of Sphex wasps
(e.g. Elbow Room, pp. 10-14; Freedom Evolves, p. 198). After successfully hunting,
these wasps return to their nest with their prey. However, before bringing their
prey into the nest they enter solo to determine if everything is in order. If their
prey is moved a small distance while they are inspecting their nest, then when
the Sphex wasp emerges it will collect its prey, place it at the entrance of the nest,
and reenter the nest solo to check it again. If one then moves the prey again the
entire cycle can be repeated. One investigator repeated this loop fourty times!15
On the definition given above this kind of behaviour is a form of habit, but not all
habits are like this. In the case of the Sphex the response, and the situation which
developed abilities of agents, noting, for instance, that much of it occurs without any need for
conscious prompting. Stout’s focus on real dispositions and potentialities is also suggestive of
Peirce’s conception of habit (e.g. Stout, Action, pp. 94–5).
15Woolridge, cited at Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 11.
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elicits it, are tightly circumscribed.
Peirce’s definition of habit does not require us to specify every detail of the
kind of response and the kind of situation that elicits it, it allows for general ‘ways
of responding’, to highly general kinds of circumstance. According to Peirce, hu-
man habits are not, for the most part, a matter of mere ‘slothful repetition’ (NM4,
p. 143). We can describe them as automatic, rather than mechanical (c.f. Railton,
‘Practical Competence. . . ’, pp. 104–6; Brett, ‘Human Habits’, p. 357). They do
not require conscious prompting, but they allow for intelligent and creative re-
sponses to experience. Imagine, for instance, a proficient cyclist rushing to the
library to return some books before they incur a fee. The cyclist can avoid pot-
holes, stray children, and car doors, without any conscious prompting or mental
recitation of how to avoid the coming obstacles. Rather, they can rely on their
developed habits. Moreover, their responses to these situations will not be ste-
reotyped. For instance, the cyclist does not necessarily swerve whenever a child
crosses their path. They might break, turn, shout at the child, or ring a bell. The
cyclists response will be highly sensitive to their particular circumstance. That all
this can happen automatically is one of the advantages of habitual behaviour.
One might still worry that habits are, even if not mechanical, not subject to
our control. If we do not control them, then it would be strange to say that they
are reflective of our agency. However, this is not Peirce’s conception, he holds
that ‘[e]ach habit of an individual is a law; but these laws are modified so easily
by the operation of self-control’ (CP, 1.348). Peirce’s account of self-controlled
habit development is the topic of Section 1.3.2.
1.3 Habit Development
In this section I introduce the main features of Peirce’s account of habit develop-
ment. I will do this in two stages. The first introduces habit development in its
most general form. On Peirce’s account an entity’s habits develop in the direc-
tion of greater ‘harmony’ between the entity and its environment. This account
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applies to anything that can take habits, which we saw above is a very wide class.
I then turn to characteristically human forms of habit development. Here we
must account for the high degree of self-control that we can exhibit. In partic-
ular, we take an active interest in the cultivation of our habits, and attempt to
control and criticise even the norms by which we evaluate our habits. On the
Peircean account this is a special case of the more general form of habit develop-
ment since, as we will see, it also depends on environmental constraint. In other
words, Peirce understands each further degree of self-control as opening us up to
a wider environment, which includes ideas and ideals as well as physical objects.
Before putting forward Peirce’s account of habit development I need to ac-
count for the way I am drawing together Peirce’s work on this topic. The first
important issue is to introduce the various terms that Peirce uses when discuss-
ing how our habits change over time. Peirce uses the terms habit ‘acquisition’
(EP2, pp. 412–3), ‘habit-change’ (CP, 5.477), and habit ‘development’ (CP, 8.318;
EP2, p. 435). Because Peirce’s thought on habit was worked out in many different
philosophical contexts over a long period of time we should not expect uniform-
ity in his language. For instance, sometimes by ‘habit’ Peirce means those dispos-
itions which we have acquired (EP2, p. 413), and sometimes he means disposi-
tions in general (CP, 5.533). In this thesis I will use the term ‘development’. The
kind of habit development which is of most interest in this thesis is that which
tends towards to greater and greater success, so the term ‘development’ is bet-
ter than the more neutral ‘change’.16 However, in putting forward what I take to
be Peirce’s mature view on habit development I will cite passages which use the
terms ‘change’ and ‘acquisition’ amongst others.17
16This is not to say that habit development cannot go wrong. I introduce an example of this in
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 where I discuss the habit change brought about in someone as a result
of their being electrocuted.
17One might complain that the acquisition of a new habit is very different from the develop-
ment of an older one. However, as far as I can see there is no clear division between these cases.
This seems to be analogous to the problem of deciding when a new concept has been introduced
to a field or an old concept has been developed. Sometimes there are no clear criteria for de-
termining which has happened. In this connection it is also worth pointing out that Peirce does
not support any kind of blank slate account of human nature (e.g. EP2, pp. 153–4). According
to Peirce we are born with instincts and dispositions, so the idea that all of our habits might be
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Finally, Peirce sometimes offers a physiological account of habit develop-
ment.18 This is not the kind of account which is of interest for this thesis. When
dealing with the philosophical issues that we are here concerned with, Peirce
does not think any appeal to the results of the natural sciences is appropriate.
For example, he holds that the account of habit that underlies his pragmatism is
not a result of ‘scientific psychology’ (EP2, p. 412). Peirce makes the more gen-
eral claim about the relationship between the ‘special sciences’ and philosophy
in many places, mostly in connection with his hierarchy of the sciences (e.g. EP2,
p. 146; pp. 258–9; pp. 458–9).19
1.3.1 The General Form of Habit Development
Peirce’s most general account of the dynamics of habit development has a few in-
gredients: the habit under development, the possessor of the habit,20 the envir-
onment in which the agent acts, and the habits of that environment. The habits
of the agent, when well developed, are in harmony with the habits of their envir-
onment. This development occurs as a result of interaction between the agent
and its environment.
This general account of habit development can be introduced by means of
an example. Peirce dedicated much of his philosophical work to describing the
development of our beliefs by means of scientific inquiry. On Peirce’s account
beliefs are a kind of habit, and his account of experimentation is a special case
of his account of habit development.21 The development of our beliefs follows a
‘belief – surprise – doubt – inquiry – belief’ cycle (Misak, ‘Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839–1914)’, p. 11). Our theoretical beliefs are, Peirce says, primarily habits of
acquired from scratch is not available within the Peircean framework.
18For instance, his account of the acquisition of habits in terms of ‘nervous discharge’ (EP1,
pp. 200–201).
19Shapiro has also emphasised that this is important for our understanding of Peirce’s account
of habit (Shapiro, ‘Peirce’s Theory of Habit’, pp. 36–8).
20For ease of reading I will use the term ‘agent’ rather than ‘possessor of the habit’ for the rest
of this section. This extends the meaning of the term somewhat, since, on the Peircean account,
such a wide class of things can possess habits.
21Both of these claims are taken up in Chapter 3. The former in Section 2.2, the latter in Sec-
tion 2.3.
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expectation (CP, 5.539). We expect that certain things will happen when certain
conditions are met. For instance, my beliefs about the moon are responsible for
my expectation that, given the chart I read in the newspaper this morning, the
moon will rise at a certain time tonight. However, our expectations are frequently
unfulfilled. In the Peircean framework this is the element of surprise. I am sur-
prised that the moon is already high in the sky when I expected it to be on the
horizon. This surprise causes doubt, which Peirce understands to be an uneasy
state (CP, 5.510). I now doubt the beliefs that have resulted in my expectation
about the moon’s position. The uneasiness of doubt causes us to attempt to cor-
rect our, clearly inadequate, beliefs. This is the activity of inquiry (EP2, p. 336).22
In inquiry we experiment, by various methods, to resolve our doubts. In this case
I test various hypotheses about the moon’s current position, perhaps the moon
has drastically shifted position, but this seems highly unlikely. Alternatively, per-
haps I read the wrong newspaper this morning. It turns out that this hypothesis
is validated when I return home and see that I have last week’s newspaper on my
desk. This brings my doubt to an end, and corrects the flaw in my beliefs, namely,
my belief in the appropriateness of the chart I read in the newspaper this morn-
ing.
I want to note three further features of this process before generalising it to
all habits. Firstly, inquiry of the sort I have just sketched depends on there being
some kind of regularity governing the subject matter in question. Peirce holds
that the belief that there is some real regularity in the universe is an indubit-
able common-sense belief, and further, that it is a presupposition of science (CP,
5.522). Peirce argues that a complete absence of regularity would be a complete
absence of things (EP2, p. 324). These regularities, given the wide definition given
in the section above, are habits.
Secondly, if our inquiry has been successful our beliefs will produce expecta-
tions which are less likely to result in surprises. Our beliefs, as habits of expect-
22Doubt is not, for Peirce, simply an attitude to a proposition, it is a motive for inquiry (TRP,
p. 251).
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ation, are in this sense in greater harmony with the habits of the external world.
That is, our habits of expectation in some sense match the habits which govern
whatever the subject of our expectations is. Returning to our example, I will have,
having realised my mistake, developed habits of expectation that are in greater
harmony with the behaviour of the moon. For instance, I will not be surprised by
the moon’s position in any video footage from last week that I might come across
in the future.
Thirdly, the interaction with our environment necessary for the development
of our beliefs occurs at two phases of the cycle: first, when we are surprised;
second, when we are engaged in inquiry. Surprise, in Peirce’s sense, always in-
volves struggle between the ‘ego’ and the ‘non-ego’ (EP2, pp. 154–5); we cannot
surprise ourselves by an act of will (EP2, p. 348). We form expectations and the
world responds. Similarly, when engaged in inquiry we test hypotheses against
the world, trying to make it constrain our beliefs in an appropriate way. This in-
volves activity on our part and responses from the world to that activity. These
responses are, we hope, sufficiently determined by some habit for us to come to
a reliable conclusion.
The example of belief development can be extended to cover the more gen-
eral form of habit development. This more general cycle of habit development
can be described, mimicking Misak’s description of the cycle of inquiry, as a
‘habit – surprise – disruption – experiment – habit’ cycle. The agent’s habits,
along with some motive or desire, cause activity. In my example of belief de-
velopment the activity was of a quite passive sort, merely having an expectation.
The formation of expectations is so automatic that the motivational element is
almost invisible. For instance, it is hard to point to a particular desire that leads
me to form expectations about the position of the moon. The deployment of
habits of action tends to involve more obvious motives. My desire for a coffee
is a motive that sets off a collection of habits, for instance of filling the jug if the
water is below a certain level, or cleaning out the coffee press if it has been used
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recently. These habit-governed activities can be more or less successful. If they
are not successful the agent is, in Peirce’s sense, surprised and put into a state of
unease. This unease will motivate experimentation. If my attempts to fill the jug
from a particular tap are frustrated I will, circumstances depending, either try to
determine why the tap no longer works or to find another source of water in my
environment. If successful my coffee making habits will be improved.
As above, interaction is vital. It is the constraint imposed by the agent’s envir-
onment that allows for habit development. The agent acts, the world responds,
the agent responds with further action, and so on. When the agent’s habits are
such that they tend to the satisfaction of the agent’s desires then they are, in the
sense introduced above, in harmony with the habits of their environment.23
Biological evolution can be worked into this model and provides a good ex-
ample of a kind of habit development quite different from the usual examples
from human life. We can describe a species as having a particular set of habits.24
These will be dispositions to forage in certain areas, or to grow a certain kind
of leaves at a given time etc. These dispositions have a motive built in, namely,
reproductive success.25 Now, these habits can be more or less successful and
sometimes previously successful habits no longer function in a new environ-
ment. When the habits of the species are no longer working, new forms of be-
haviour are necessary. On this model of habit development this is the surprise
and disruption phase. This serves to emphasise that ‘surprise’ and ‘disruption’
are being used in slightly peculiar ways. Surprise is simply the moment at which
the habitual response has ceased to function properly. Disruption is a state in
which new forms of response are needed. In any case, in Darwinian evolution
23The notion of harmony between agent and environment I am using here is thus relative to the
agent’s desires. This kind of harmony need not imply a richly ethical or sustainable relationship
between agent and environment. Or at least, it need not for our purposes. As Potter makes clear,
Peirce extends this account of habit development into an account of aesthetics and ethics (Potter,
Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals, pp. 45-51). This might result in a more demanding account
of harmony with the world. However, Peirce’s account of the normative sciences is outside the
scope of this thesis.
24Here I am interested in the habits shared by each individual member of a given species rather
than some habit attributable to the group but not to the particular individuals that make it up.
25On Peirce’s model a motive need not be a psychological state.
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the required novel forms of response are introduced by genetic mutations. Some
of these novelties will be describable as adjustments to the former habits. If the
adjustment puts the creature in greater harmony with its environment then the
possessors the new habit will have more reproductive success, and the new habit
will propagate throughout the species in question.
To summarise, Peirce general account of habit development holds that habits
develop in a process of interaction between the agent and their environment.
This interaction follows a ‘habit – surprise – disruption – experiment – habit’
cycle The agent’s habits are maximally developed when they are in harmony with
the habits of the agent’s environment. This harmony is demonstrated by our ef-
fectively achieving our purposes. I now turn to the further specifications required
in order for us to capture characteristically human levels of self-control within
this story.
1.3.2 HumanHabit Development and Self-Control
The examples used to illustrate Peirce’s account of habit development above all
involved a fairly clear sense in which the agent was interacting with the world.
But this is not obviously true of many examples of human habit cultivation. In
particular, we humans have the ability to control our habits in terms of ideas and
ideals. For instance, we can cultivate habits of action whose main goal is the
expression of ideas. Such habits are involved in, for example, particular forms
of dance or ritual behaviour. We also criticise our habits of action in terms of
moral ideals, and endeavour through self-control to live up to our ideals. This
kind of habit development might seem to take us away from the kind of interact-
ive cycle described above. But this is not the case on Peirce’s account. The key
point in applying the general account to characteristically human forms of habit
development is that each additional level of self-control introduces a new kind of
constraint. We are never completely free from constraint.26 In fact, on this model
26This notion would, Peirce thinks, introduce an infinite regress. Assuming that each exercise of
self-control is a distinct effort the claim that we could control everything about our action would
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you can describe our high level of self-control as opening us up to wider envir-
onments with which to interact. Certainly, Peirce thinks of ideas as things which
can have compulsive power over us and which can be embodied in habits (EP2,
pp. 122–3).
It is worth working through these ideas in more concrete detail. Some of the
degrees of self-control are set out clearly by Peirce in a draft towards his series of
articles on pragmatism for The Monist (1905–1907).27 If the kind of habit devel-
opment unlocked by our high degrees self-control can’t be captured by this gen-
eral account of habit development, then Peirce’s analysis of habit cannot be used
as the central principle of an account of human practice. Our cultivated practices
are, if they are anything, achievements of these high degrees of self-control.
Peirce sketches a few grades of self-control, from ‘inhibitions and coordin-
ations that entirely escape consciousness’, to the control exhibited by the per-
son who can ‘exercise control over his control of control’ (CP, 5.533). Peirce
cites three grades of self-control before any imaginative experimentation is in-
troduced. These grades of self control are: inhibitions that escape conscious
awareness, instinctive self-control, and then control by means of external train-
ing. The last of these grades introduces the idea of a rule; a form of behaviour, i.e.
a habit, that the trainee is being conditioned to accurately reproduce. The self-
control exhibited by a dog that is being trained to sit might be an example of this
grade of self-control.28 The trainer can be thought of as altering the habits of the
trainee’s environment so that the trainee will develop the desired habit. This ex-
ploits the tendencies and desires that the trainee already has – often, in the case
of domestic animals, the desire for treats. These desires, and the influence of the
trainer on the trainee’s environment constrain the development of the trainee’s
result in the claim that an infinite number of distinct efforts could be performed in a finite time.
This, says Peirce, would be impossible (CP, 5.157).
27Neither Peirce’s list, nor the subset of it that I am introducing, are supposed to be a complete
enumeration of the degrees of self control. This passage is also discussed at Potter, Charles S.
Peirce on Norms and Ideals, p. 125.
28I would not be comfortable attributing this exact view to Peirce. He seems to hold that the
mental life of animals, and in particular dogs, is more complex on this score (EP2, pp. 467–8).
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habits. These degrees of self-control can be unproblematically understood in
terms of the general account of habit development.
The next grade of self-control requires the agent to have a more sophisticated
mental life.29 It requires us to be able to perform experimentation in our imagin-
ation. This grade of self-control allows the possessor of the habit to become ‘his
own training-master’ (CP, 5.533). This means, amongst other things, that we can
start to develop our habits by practicing in our imagination. At this stage the rule
is still given to us and received uncritically. But once the rule is understood, we
can imagine the actions required by it and drill them in our imagination.30 At this
grade of self-control we require the ability to imagine situations sufficiently like
those that we will actually encounter, it also requires that we can at least partially
determine whether our imagined actions would really satisfy the rule if carried
out. The ultimate measure of our success will be our actual deployment of the
developed habit. So at this stage of self-control habit development is constrained
by the rule, by our imaginative abilities, and by the eventual deployment of our
habits in our interaction with our environment.
Peirce introduces two further grades of self-control. First, we might decide to
criticise the rule which we are training ourselves by. If we are training ourselves
we must have some ‘moral rule’ in mind (CP, 5.533). That is, from the previous
stages, the rule, or habit, which we are attempting to gain. For example, imagine
a bassoonist attempting to learn a particular arpeggio. Understanding, through
the influence of a teacher, the particular fingerings required, she can now prac-
tice the actions in her imagination. Her bassoon practice is an attempt to de-
velop a habit, and in this case the rule is the habit which she is attempting to
attain. This is, of course, a much extended notion of a ‘moral rule’.31 This will in-
29This is the first grade of self-control which we can describe as ‘deliberate’. This will become
very important in Chapter 2. I will return to it then.
30As an example of the effectiveness of imaginary practice, Peirce offers a childhood story about
his younger brother Herbert, who, purely by imagined practice, prepared himself to act promptly
when a lady’s dress caught on fire at a dinner party (EP2, p. 413fn; CP, 5.538).
31In this passage Peirce says that whenever we train ourselves we must have some moral rule
‘in view’. I cannot see what other ‘rule’ could be appropriate to this example. Normally in these
contexts Peirce uses the term ‘ethical’ rather than ‘moral’, which is perhaps better suited to this
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volve, says Peirce, some kind of ‘moral principle’, which is used to judge whether
the habit she is working towards is in fact a good one. ‘Moral principles’ that she
might use to criticise her bassoon arpeggios include considerations of ergonom-
ics, or tone. For instance, if she were to adjust some fingering she would be more
comfortable, or if she were to manage her breathing in a different way the tone
would be more satisfactory to her or her audience. These principles are again,
constraints; they are features of our environment. This extended environment
can surprise us, generate unease, and motivate experimentation just as much as
the environments considered in the previous section.
Finally these moral principles can themselves be criticised, Peirce says, by
means of an esthetic ideal, a conception of ‘what is fine’ (CP, 5.533).32 In other
words, this is to control our ‘control over [our] control of control’ (CP, 5.533).
This is the highest degree of self-control that Peirce considers in the passage we
are discussing. This final grade is instructive because it involves highly complex
experimentation in the imagination. In order to control ourselves in this way
we must be able to imagine at least the following: a wide array of possible situ-
ations, possible ways of responding to them, possible ways of evaluating those
responses, what the consequences of various ways of responding would be, and
what our evaluation of those consequences would be.
However, even this demanding variety of self-control still follows the gen-
eral model of habit development articulated above. To continue the example of
the bassoonist, imagine that she is attempting to criticise and control her ‘moral
principles’. In this case, the principles she use to evaluate the tone of her playing.
Firstly, this moral principle is itself a habit, a habit of feeling positively or neg-
atively in response to the tonal features of her performances.33 This is the habit
which develops in this process of self-controlled criticism. The environment with
which she is interacting when this habit is in effect consists of her affective re-
extended meaning (e.g. EP2, p. 377).
32For Peirce’s discussion of esthetic ideals see: EP2, p. 201; p. 377.
33Peirce uses an analogous example when discussing the evaluation of our conversational
habits (EP2, pp. 246–8).
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sponses to her playing, and of the environment, physical and cultural, in which
she is playing. So, for instance, over time it might become clear to her that there
is some problem with the tone of her playing in general. This realisation is the
surprise. At this stage we may have a more or less clear hypothesis in mind about
what has caused the surprise and how to prevent it in future. Perhaps, for in-
stance, she is not introducing enough tonal contrast between sections. Inquiry
will follow, different ways of playing will be experimented with in imagination
and in concrete practice. Perhaps she will also inquire by asking around for ad-
vice. Eventually she will, we hope, determine how her tonal habits can be adjus-
ted to more closely satisfy her esthetic ideals.
In all of the varieties of habit development mentioned above, we are con-
strained. At the most basic level, when our biological drives come into con-
tact with the external world, all the way to the highest level, when we engage in
our most conscious and articulate reasoning about how we should live. In fact,
Peirce’s distinction between the ‘outer world’ of physical action and the ‘inner
world’ of imagination is purely a matter of the constraint involved in each. The
former responds far less to our acts of will than the latter. In the outer world we
have partial control over our limbs, in the inner world we have much more liberty
to change things. In both cases there is constraint, but in the outer world it is of
a far more robust variety (EP2, p. 151).34 I can freely imagine, for instance, that
there is a hot cross bun on my desk, but I cannot make one actually appear by
force of will. But the imagination is not completely free, I cannot, for instance,
imagine a round square. Peirce claims that this distinction is merely one of de-
gree (PM, 109-110). It is primarily through the ‘inner world’ that we are influ-
enced by ideas, and through the ‘outer world’ that we are influenced by things.
But in both cases we are interacting with our environment, and the same ‘habit –
surprise – disruption – experiment – habit’ cycle of habit development applies.
34The analogy between inner and outer world compulsion is drawn out instructively by Misak
(e.g. ‘A Peircean Account of Moral Judgements’, pp. 44–5; ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, pp. 154–8).
Chapter 2
Peirce’s Conception of Practice
2.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the task of constructing a Peircean account of theory and
practice from the ground up. The previous chapter laid the groundwork for this
task by detailing Peirce’s most basic conception of an entity’s interaction with its
environment: his theory of habits and their development. We now turn to the
task of articulating a Peircean conception of human practice. This conception
prepares the ground for the defence of the two main claims of this thesis:
1. that Peirce prioritises practice to theory, and
2. that Peirce maintains the autonomy of both theory and our other practices.
These two tasks will determine the organisation of this chapter. It divides into
two sections, which deal in turn with the relevant aspects of Peirce’s conception
of practice for the defense of each claim. We will see that the defense of the first
depends on the Peirce’s thesis that we can not transcend what he variously calls
the ‘instinctive mind’ (EP2, p. 241), or our ‘occult nature’ (EP2, p. 347). This di-
mension of our practical lives, part of what I will call the ‘background’ of our
practices, will be the topic of Section 2.2. The defence of the second claim de-
pends on the thesis that our practices are directed to deliberately adopted pur-
poses. This is a thesis about what I will call the ‘foreground’ of our practices,
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which will be the topic of Section 2.3.1 Before turning to the details of the two
sides of human practice I will provide a brief summary of Peirce’s overall con-
ception of human practice. This will give us an overall view within which the
distinction between foreground and background can be understood.
Peirce conceives of the human agent as a bundle of integrated habits embed-
ded in an environment which itself has a vast body of habits.2 The habits which
constitute the agent have taken their current form as a result of many ongoing
processes of habit development. In large part their form is determined by the
history of our species, that is, by biological evolution. The form that these largely-
instinctive habits take is also greatly affected by our own history of interactions
with both our physical and cultural environment. Yet even the bulk of these in-
teractions are not to be understood as deliberately controlled by us. Rather, they
are pre-deliberate and in many cases below the level of consciousness. Such in-
teractive processes include childhood conditioning and the development of our
instinctive physical and social capacities. Borrowing one of Peirce’s phrases from
a slightly different context, we can describe those aspects of our body of habits
that we can control as the ‘mere blossom of a vast complexus’ (EP2, p. 241).3 It
is through the comparatively small domain in which our deliberate self-control
functions that we direct ourselves towards our deliberately adopted purposes.4
But for all this, it is important to emphasise that, on this view, even though we
are highly constrained by our complement of habits and by our environment, it
1This way of using the terms ‘background’ and ‘foreground’ is due to Vincent Colapietro (HCP,
p. 351).
2It might be better to describe the agent as largely consisting in such a bundle (c.f. CP, 6.228).
It is, at any rate, clear that Peirce thinks of things in general as consisting of bundles of habits
(CP, 1.218; 4.157; 5.431). For interpretation and commentary on Peirce’s account of the self see:
Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self ; Midtgarden, ‘Peirce on the Notion of Self and Personal
Identity’; Short, ‘Hypostatic Abstraction in Self-Consciousness’.
3Peirce is here describing those aspects of our thought that we can control, and the primary
example of that which we cannot control that he is considering is our perceptual judgements.
However, his comments can be easily extended to the wider context considered in this chapter.
We simply have to recall that, according to Peirce’s pragmatism, ‘logical self-control is a perfect
mirror of ethical self-control’ (EP2, p. 337). Throughout this chapter I will move from Peirce’s
discussion of features of logical self-control to features of ethical self-control. If the move is a
straightforward one I will not explicitly note it.
4This idea is brought out well in Potter, Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals, pp. 126–7. See
also: EP2, pp. 40–41.
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is this constraint that enables our deliberate action.5 In sum, on this view we
are constituted by a vast body of habits which shifts in response to experience
and, in small measure, in response to our deliberate self-control. That which we
can control can be thought of as the foreground of our practical interaction with
the world, which appears against the vast background made up of that which we
cannot control.6
It is worth considering how this conception of practice makes sense of a con-
crete case. Imagine another bassoonist, this time one in the first stages of tak-
ing up the instrument. They will come to this task in possession of a vast body
of habits, including basic physical competencies and, hopefully, some inchoate
musical abilities. These habits will be in effect when the novice first picks up
the bassoon and blows into the reed. They will determine, amongst many other
things, how the novice manages their breathing, how they position their hands,
and their expectations about the tone that the instrument should be producing.
Many of these habits will need to be developed if the novice is to become an ex-
pert, and if all goes well they will develop with experience. We can imagine that
the novice bassoonist, or more likely their teacher, has noticed some particular
problem with the novice’s playing.7 Let’s say that by failing to completely cover
one of the finger holes they are making an undesirable high-pitched shriek when
attempting to play a certain note. The novice then focuses on deliberately con-
trolling where they are positioning their finger. After much practice they will be
able to play the note reliably; they will have developed a more satisfactory habit.
Now, according to the conception of practice that I am attributing to Peirce, the
substance of this deliberately developed habit is in large part outside of the con-
5This point was introduced in our discussion of self-control in the previous chapter and will
be considered in more detail in sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.
6Other metaphors are possible here and Peirce offers a few. We have already see that he calls
that which we have controlled a ‘mere blossom’. He also refers to what I am calling the foreground
as the ‘surface’ and the background as the ‘the soul’s deeper parts’ (EP2, pp. 40–1), or the ‘depths
of our nature’ (EP2, pp. 347–8). This last metaphor has the important proviso that we are not to
think of the surface as a ‘separate tissue’ overlying the ‘deeper parts’. The difference is one of
degree rather than kind (EP2, p. 347).
7Of course, in almost all respects the novice will be deficient but these problems can only be
deliberately dealt with singly or in small groups.
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trol of the bassoonist. The novice bassoonist consciously desires that their finger
reliably cover the hole, but the specific set of habitual mechanisms by which this
situation comes about are largely outside of the conscious awareness, and thus
control, of the bassoonist. That the bassoonist now reliably covers the finger hole
is a result of their deliberate self-control, but the vast bulk of the details on which
this achievement depends are a matter of the background.8 Finally, it is import-
ant to note that while the bassoonist deliberately cultivates their fingering of a
particular note all of the habits associated with this will be being put into effect
and thus into the kind of interaction with the environment which allows for habit
development. Thus while our bassoonist has deliberately mastered this particu-
lar fingering they have likely also attained better breath control, more stamina,
and, of course, manual dexterity which can be applied to other fingerings.9 We
will return to this example throughout the chapter.
As already mentioned, this chapter will consider the background and the fore-
ground of our practices in turn. We begin, in Section 2.2, with the background of
our practices. This section has three tasks. The first is to put forward the way
in which I am distinguishing the background and foreground from one another
(Section 2.2.1). This discussion considers a few different ways in which the dis-
tinction could be drawn and notes the emphasis that Peirce places on self-control
rather than self-consciousness. The next two sections are primarily devoted to
articulating the role of instinct in the background of our practices. Together they
defend the claim that our instincts are the main source of our pre-deliberate at-
tunement with the world.10 On this view our instincts are the result of innate
tendencies to develop in certain ways in response to experience. Consequently,
8In this connection Peirce suggests that deliberate control is often a matter of our giving some
feature of our behaviour whose general form we have determined a ‘stamp of rational approval’
(CP, 2.183). In many cases the unconscious and uncontrolled operation of our habits is like a
lawyer producing a contract, and, says Peirce, ‘what books [the lawyer] looked into in choosing
his verbiage is no concern of the person who signs, provided he knows what the paper binds him
to doing’ (CP, 2.183).
9This is how the Peircean account of practice captures the familiar observation that practice
of a specific skill often results in global improvements.
10This use of the word ‘attunement’ is also derived from Colapietro (HCP, pp. 351; 359; 364). It
is also used in a similar way by Railton (‘Practical Competence. . . ’, p. 106).
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we can approach them from two angles. The first (taken up in 2.2.2), is to char-
acterise the habits which arise in the course of normal human experience as a
result of these innate tendencies. The second (taken up in 2.2.3), is to consider
the non-deliberate processes of habit development by which these instincts find
their form in the course of the experience of a particular agent. Finally, Section
2.2.3 also takes up the other processes by which the background changes over
time.
The second half of this chapter (Section 2.3) concerns the foreground of our
practices and the importance of deliberately adopted purposes within it. Whereas
Section 2.2 was largely concerned with characterising what the background con-
sists of, Section 2.3 is concerned with the activity associated with the foreground,
namely, the deliberate control of our actions. It divides into three sections.11 The
first (Section 2.3.1) offers Peircean arguments for the claim that the deliberate
control of our activity is best understood as forms of habit development. This
is, in part, a decision to privilege a different set of examples than that privileged
by much recent work in the philosophy of action. It is also a thesis about what
it is that we can control. The second (Section 2.3.2) answers why Peirce thinks
that our deliberate control of our activity requires us to have a purpose in view.
Finally, in Section 2.3.3, we widen our subject to a more general consideration of
the role of purpose in our practices. In particular, we consider how our purposes
change over time, how we might be mistaken about our purposes, and how the
background can be understood as embodying purposes.
11I note in passing that the three-way divisions in this chapter are a coincidence rather than a
reflection of Peirce’s propensity for trichotomies. Peirce’s three-way divisions are grounded in his
three categories, the divisions in this chapter have nothing to do with the categories.
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2.2 The Background of our Practices
2.2.1 Distinguishing the Background from the Foreground
We will begin our consideration of the background by articulating the distinction
between the background and foreground. This is particularly important as there
are a few appropriate ways that the distinction might be drawn, and we need to
avoid sliding between them. One way to take up this task is to consider the kinds
of example that initially motivate the distinction.12
We have already seen one such example in this chapter, namely, the novice
bassoonist. Other examples that could be articulated in a similar way include
learning how to drive a car, the activities of a master chef, the ability to read and
respond to the feelings and thoughts of others. Some of these examples focus
attention on the familiar observation that mastering a skill often allows us to de-
ploy it without conscious attention. So our bassoonist need not focus attention
on the position of his fingers once he has mastered the note that was causing him
trouble. A more familiar example of the same principle is that one who has suf-
ficiently developed their driving abilities can devote almost all of their attention
to carrying out a complex conversation with their passenger rather than to their
driving. The same examples can often be turned around to suggest that atten-
tion to these mastered skills, especially mentally consulting relevant rules, can
be crippling.13 These examples suggest that to master a skill is, in some sense, to
put it into the background. Other examples focus on what we bring along with us
whenever we approach a new situation. In the example of the bassoonist I em-
phasised the instincts and physical abilities that the novice applies from the mo-
ment that they first pick up the instrument, and that I suggested were required in
order to begin learning. Descriptions of normal human social interactions sug-
12This has the added advantage of suggesting some ways that Peirce’s account of practice is
different from similar philosophical projects.
13Hubert Dreyfus discusses the example of the baseball player Chuck Knoblauch to make this
point. Knoblauch was a star pitcher who suddenly lost his pitching ability. According to Kno-
blauch’s descriptions, his problem was that he started thinking about the task at hand, and ceased
to be able to perform it (Dreyfus, ‘The Return of the Myth of the Mental’, p. 354).
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gest a similar conclusion. We need not, normally anyway, expend energy divining
the motives and feelings of our fellow humans by logical argument, rather, our in-
stinctive abilities allow us to do this automatically. These examples suggest that
there is a ‘background’ of usually unattended to abilities that allows us to get by
in the world.14
Considering examples like those introduced above, one might be tempted to
latch on to the distinction between that in our practices which is consciously
apprehended and that which is not. However, Peirce focuses on what can and
cannot be deliberately controlled; he is interested in self-control rather than self-
consciousness. That said, it is certainly the case that much of the background of
our practices is unconscious and on Peirce’s view the relationship between self-
control and consciousness is not accidental. According to Peirce any process of
deliberate self-control will be a conscious process (EP2, p. 348). He also holds that
it is very likely a machine with the power of self-control would be conscious (EP2,
p. 387). But this relationship does not go both ways, that is, we can be conscious
of things that we cannot control. For instance, Peirce claims that we are unable to
doubt, and thus unable to control, the belief that there is some regularity in the
world.15 But since he is drawing our attention to it we can certainly be conscious
of it (CP, 5.542).16
14Examples like the ones mentioned in this paragraph are considered in the work of many
philosophers. For instance, Peter Railton analyses the example of learning to drive a car. He refers
to an agent that has developed skills to the point where they need not be consciously attended to
as possessing ‘fluent agency’ (Railton, ‘Practical Competence. . . ’). Other philosophers who ana-
lyse examples like this include: Dreyfus (‘Overcoming the Myth of the Mental’), Ryle (The Concept
of Mind, pp. 25–61), Pollard (‘Habitual Action’), and Noë (‘Against Intellectualism’). Merleau-
Ponty approaches similar topics by, instead, considering how disabilities reveal this background
(e.g. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 93–5).
However, for all that this thought has been ignored in much philosophy of action. Much of
contemporary philosophy of action is committed to the idea that ‘actions are bodily movements
that are caused and rationalized by an agent’s desire for an end and a belief that moving her
body in the relevant way will bring that end about’ (Hornsby, ‘Agency and Actions’, p. 2). These
beliefs and desires are often conceived of as psychological states. This set of general working
assumptions is clearly set out by Michael Smith, who calls it the ‘standard story of action’ (Smith,
‘The Structure of Orthonomy’). For contemporary criticism of this and related views for ignoring
the habitual dimension is provided by Bill Pollard (Pollard, ‘Habitual Action’; Pollard, ‘Explaining
Actions with Habits’).
15The claim that we cannot control beliefs that we cannot doubt will be considered in detail in
Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.
16Vincent Potter explains Peirce’s position on the relationship between consciousness and con-
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But having concluded that we should draw the distinction between back-
ground and foreground in terms of self-control, our choice is still not completely
constrained. One might define the foreground as those aspects of our body of
habits which have been controlled, as those which can be controlled, or as those
which will be controllable at some point. Alternatively, one might conceive of
the foreground as a collection of habits which have been in some measure con-
trolled, or can be controlled, or will be controllable at some point. Each of these
ways of distinguishing the foreground from the background might have some
philosophical value. However, the distinction that I am interested in can be stated
as follows:
The background of our practices consists of those aspects of our body
of habits that we cannot subject to deliberate self-control. The fore-
ground of our practices consists of those aspects of our body of habits
which we can subject to deliberate self-control.
In other words, the foreground is that in our practices which we can control and
the background consists of that in our practices which we cannot control.17
In order to understand this distinction it is necessary to understand what
Peirce means by ‘deliberate self-control’. This can be made clear by recalling our
discussion of the degrees of self-control in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.2). There we
considered Peirce’s list of ‘degrees of self-control’, which led from less to more ad-
vanced forms of self-control. The first three degrees of this list (‘[i]nhibitions and
coördinations that entirely escape consciousness’, instinctive self-control, and
‘control by means of external training’), are not forms of deliberate self-control.
These forms of self-control, which could even be referred to as proto-self-control,
are characteristic of the background.18 It is the more advanced forms of self-
trol slightly differently, but comes to the same conclusion about their relationship to one another
(Potter, Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals, pp. 129–30).
17It should by now be clear to the reader that I am using the words ‘background’ and ‘fore-
ground’ as shorthand for ‘background of our practices’ and ‘foreground of our practices’.
18This is supported by the fact that in most of Peirce’s discussions of self-control he uses the
term ‘self-control’ to refer simply to deliberate self-control (e.g. CP, 2.182; EP2, pp. 190–191; p.
387).
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control, of which the rest of the entries on Peirce’s list are examples, that are at
issue here. The first degree of deliberate self-control on the list is when the agent
becomes ‘[its] own training-master’. For example, I am engaging in deliberate
self-control of this rather unimpressive sort if I uncritically take some advice from
a friend and put it into action. Perhaps he says to me that I should not walk un-
der ladders, or suggests some other small superstitious habit and I set myself to
developing it. This is deliberate because by making a conscious effort to develop
this habit in myself I am taking responsibility for my future behaviour. As the de-
grees of self-control increase in complexity we take ownership of the criteria by
which we evaluate certain habits, and even of our highest ideals. These are all
decisions about our future behaviour in a way that having training imposed on
us from outside is not. So the defining characteristic of deliberate self-control is
that we choose some form of future action, feeling, or thought for ourselves.
We are now in a position to briefly pause over one of the reasons why Peirce
holds that there is such a background. Aside from the kind of motivating ex-
amples which introduced this section, Peirce holds that there must be such a
background because of his account of deliberate self-control. When we con-
sidered Peirce’s account of self-control in the previous chapter one of the central
claims was that all forms of self-control depend on some constraint; something
not itself controlled. Now only some of the constraints that we considered in the
previous chapter are relevant in our current context. Some of the constraints we
considered are constraints on the background as much as they are constraints on
the foreground. For instance, the constraint imposed by our environment. But
these were not the only constraints. One of the degrees we considered, control
of a moral rule by means of a moral principle, depended on some possibly vague
and inchoate moral principle. This principle, provided it has not been subject to
some other process of self-control, is part of the background. But we can only
carry out a finite number of self-criticisms of this sort, so at some point, thinks
Peirce, we will bottom out at something uncontrolled (c.f. EP2, p. 169; CP, 5.157).
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2.2.2 Instinctive Habits
We now turn to the task of characterising the aspects of our body of habits that
make up the background. In particular, we will be considering Peirce’s account of
human instincts. According to Peirce we have innate tendencies to develop cer-
tain capacities in response to experience. These tendencies, and the processes
by which they are expressed in our habits, are not the result of deliberate self-
control. This suggests two complementary sides from which Peirce’s thought in
instinct can be considered. The first, a general characterisation of those capacit-
ies which the normal course of experience produces in a human being, that is,
their instincts. The second, a consideration of the non-deliberate processes of
habit development by which those instincts take their form in the life of a partic-
ular individual. This section is dedicated to the first of those tasks, in Section 2.2.3
we will turn to the second.
Peirce offers a few definitions of ‘instinct’ (e.g. CP, 1.118; 7.738). One of his
clearest is in his late (1913) essay drafts entitled ‘An Essay toward Improving Our
Reasoning in Security and Uberty’ (EP2, pp. 463–78). There he suggests that an
instinct is:
‘a way of voluntary acting prevalent almost universally among other-
wise normal individuals of at least one sex or other unmistakable nat-
ural part of a race (at some stage, or during recurring periods of their
lives), which action conduces to the probable perpetuation of that race
. . . ’ (EP2, pp. 464–5).19
Instinct is thus a biological notion and our instincts are a biological inheritance.20
By adding the word ‘voluntary’ here, Peirce is distinguishing instinctive forms
of behaviour from other kinds of biologically determined behaviour. So, for in-
stance, on this definition my heart’s continued beating, or the secretion of insulin
19We need not follow Peirce in thinking that there are any major instinctive differences between
the genders or between ethnic groups. It will be suggested in Chapter 4 that, in fact, Peirce’s
conception of theory and practice provides a strong argument against the Social Darwinism that
was popular in his day.
20Peirce describes them as inherited habits (CP, 2.170).
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by my pancreas, are not instincts.
However, in concrete cases it is probably impossible to find a pure expression
of instinct. In an adult human our instincts will be mixed up with those aspects of
our behaviour that we have controlled, and with our particular cultural circum-
stances. For instance, my tendency to have takeaways for dinner on Thursdays is
in part the expression of my instinct to eat with a certain degree of regularity, but
it also tied up in my particular cultural environment, and my history of deliberate
self-control. I could certainly decide to never buy takeaways on Thursdays, and I
would still possess instincts connected with eating. The same point applies when
we consider our novice bassoonist, their instinctive capacities to handle solid
objects are in play, along with instinctive social capacities required by their rela-
tionship with their teacher, and perhaps some natural musical instincts. These
will each be hard to disentangle from the contribution of the novice’s deliberate
self-control and their cultural context.
One can then ask how we gain a conception of these instincts. The problem
can be put forcefully when we consider that all we have experiential access to is
the actual behaviour of ourselves and our fellows in which culture, experience,
and instinct are all intermixed.21 Peirce’s answer is that our conception of our
instincts is an abstraction from the behaviour of ourselves and our fellow hu-
mans (EP2, p. 473).22 Our claims about instincts are able to be tested against our
observations of humans in general.23 It is important to stress that Peirce holds
21This is not the question of whether there are instincts. I take it as given that we have instincts
of some form. The question is how we gain a conception of what those instincts are.
22This is an example of the class of abstractions that Peirce calls ‘hypostatic’. A hypostatic ab-
straction takes some feature of a thing and turns that feature into an object for study in its own
right. Truth claims about abstract objects (of whatever sort) are evaluated by considering the be-
haviour of the things initially abstracted from. A simple example of the way this works is Peirce’s
suggestion that mathematical lines should be understood as abstracted from the path of particles.
Here claims about the abstract object–the line–are referred back to claims about the behaviour
of the particle that defines that line (PM, pp. 73–5). There is a significant secondary literature on
Peirce’s account of abstraction (e.g. Shin, ‘Peirce’s Two Ways of Abstraction’; Short, Peirce’s Theory
of Signs, pp. 263–74; ).
23Peirce offers an example of how we approach the question of whether some specific candid-
ate for an instinct is really an instinct: he considers the claim that the prohibition against suicide
is an example of an instinctive moral belief, and concludes that it is not sufficiently widely shared
to be instinctive (EP2, p. 350).
36 Peirce’s Conception of Practice
to a strong realism about abstractions. In Peirce’s system something’s being an
abstraction is no bar to its being real (CP, 2.428).
The result of our abstracting instincts away from the concrete behaviour of
individuals will be a conception of instincts as vague and highly general habits.
They will be general in so far as they will have to comprehend a wide variety
of cases. For instance, if I were to claim that humans have an instinct to avoid
snakes, this would be a suggestion that humans will in some highly general class
of circumstances where there might be snakes, try to get away from them, or will
feel great terror. The conception will also be vague in so far as it involves clauses
that start with phrases like ‘in some sense’.24 So, to continue the example of the
instinct to avoid snakes, we might decide that a more vague conception is better,
and say that there is an instinct to respond negatively to snakes ‘in some sense’,
which might take various cultural forms. This would allow the behaviour of, for
instance, the snake-handling churches of Appalachia to be, in part, a manifesta-
tion of the instinct to avoid snakes, since it is the instinctive fear of snakes which
motivates the practice of handling them as a sign of devotion to God. This prac-
tice would not work if the participants did not have to overcome some negative
disposition towards snakes.
These vague and general conceptions of human instinct aim to capture those
aspects of our developed habits which are the result of the development of innate
tendencies in response to experience. This contribution of instinct to our body
of habits will often manifest itself in habits that are subject to our deliberate self-
control (as in the examples considered above), but the input of instinct to those
deliberately cultivated habits is not the result of deliberate self-control. So the
vague and general habits which make up our conception of human instincts are
an aspect of the background of our practices.
We are now in a position to hazard a Peircean characterisation of the main
24According to Peirce’s definition a sign is vague if it reserves further determination for some
other sign, generally a further sign from the utterer (EP2, p. 351). ‘In some sense’ clauses are a
straight forward example.
The Background of our Practices 37
forms of human instinct. Peirce often divides out instincts into two main classes:
those connected with the need for nutrition, and those connected with repro-
duction (CP, 1.118; 6.500; 7.378; EP2, p. 51). The first is primarily a matter of an
implicit understanding of physical forces, that is, a set of physical capacities; the
second is primarily a matter of social capacities. I will consider each in turn, be-
fore arguing that these two classes of instinct are quite highly interrelated, so that
this division is by no means a clean one.
Peirce describes the instincts associated with the need for nutrition as ‘virtual
knowledge of space and of force’ (EP2, p. 51). All living things need to solve the
problem of how to find sustenance. Under this head, for humans, we can include
the capacity to, in some sense, handle and consume various common kinds of
food. This presumably includes habits of action that allow us to chew food and
drink fluids without breathing them in, and perhaps also the integrated habits
of action and feeling which make us avoid rotting meat. But Peirce’s formula-
tion, that these habits are associated with space and forces, and make us ‘applied
physicists’ (EP2, p. 51), suggests a wider set of habits. These include a capacity to
handle physical objects in general, and presumably for piloting our way around
physical environments as would be required in the early history of mankind to
both track prey and find plant-based food sources.
These general instincts connected with our physical environment, what we
might call an ‘attunement’ with the physical world, manifest themselves through-
out our body of habits. For instance, the instincts which the novice bassoonist
brings to his attempts to learn the instrument, and develop in response to his
increasing experience.25 Colapietro refers to this portion of our instincts as a set
of ‘basic physical competencies’, and cites the same kind of example: those basic
dispositions which allow us to act in the world including the physical competen-
cies underlying our consumption of food and our handling of solid objects (HCP,
p. 352).
25This claim about the role of instincts in our development of physical competencies will be
taken up again in Section 2.2.3.
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If the instincts associated with feeding go to make us ‘applied physicists’, the
instincts associated with the need to reproduce make us ‘applied psychists’ (EP2,
p. 51).26 That is, if the former give us capacities to interact with our physical en-
vironment, the later give us an ability to interact with our social environment.
All living things must solve the problem of how to reproduce themselves. This
problem is, in the human case, tightly linked with the navigation of various kinds
of pair bonds, and the understanding of the feelings of others. Presumably what
Peirce is getting at here is our ability to treat others as fellow beings. It also sug-
gests that we have some instinctive capacities associated with the rearing and
training of children. More generally, this division includes the instincts which un-
derlie our interactions with our social environment in general. These will prom-
inently include dispositions to have appropriate feelings in response to various
social situations: that is, to feel empathy for people in pain, or anger at people
who you see as cheating. Peirce holds that these habits of feeling will embody
fairly thick evaluative dispositions, for instance, he frequently claims that the
moral prohibition against incest is grounded in this kind of instinct (EP2, pp. 32;
349–50).
It is important to stress that this way of dividing up our instincts is not a ri-
gid division and many examples can be adduced in order to blur it. For instance,
even in primitive circumstances the task of finding sustenance will require com-
plex social capacities. Both hunting and foraging require a great deal of social
coordination; not to mention the need for social competencies after the arrival
of agriculture. On the other hand, a great many physical capacities are required
in order to rear a child. This is true even of the task of keeping track of the child.
Consequently we should expect the various instincts characterised above to be
closely integrated.
This discussion of our instincts can be summarised by the saying that we
have innate tendencies to develop an instinctive attunement with our physical
26Peirce uses the word ‘psychics’ to refer to the sciences of the mind and of human society. See
his classification of the sciences at CP, 1.180–9.
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and social environment which can be characterised by a collection of vague and
general habits which we call instincts. This is sensibly called an ‘attunement’ be-
cause it allows us to act deliberately in a world made up of physical objects and
fellow agents. It prepares us with the basic capacities required for action, which
could not be expected to be derived from scratch by any process of deliberate
self-control. This claim will be defended in Chapter 3, where it forms a large part
of the rationale for claiming that practice is prior to theory.
2.2.3 The Dynamics of the Background
This section characterises the ways that the background changes over time. On
Peirce’s account our background habits develop in response to experience. One
mode of this development has already been alluded to, namely, the development
of instinct in the life of an individual agent. According to Peirce, we have an in-
stinctive ability to respond appropriately to the course of our experience. After
articulating this idea I turn to examples of background development that are not
exclusively instinctive. In particular, I consider how a part of the background can
become a part of the foreground. In some cases the force of experience can shake
a previously uncontrollable habit or belief, and require some deliberate response.
Examples of this sort serve to show that the distinction between foreground and
background is blurry at the edges.
Peirce characterises experience as the ‘enforced element in the history of our
lives’ (EP2, p. 47), and the ‘forcible modification of our ways of thinking’ (EP2,
p. 370).27 The main feature of the characterisations is their emphasis on com-
pulsive force; experience forces changes in our body of habits. It is through ex-
perience that the instinctive behaviour considered in the previous section devel-
ops, and it is through experience that it continues to develop. Peirce expresses
this claim by saying that ‘just as reasoning springs from experience, so the devel-
opment of sentiment28 arises from the soul’s inward and outward experiences.
27Moreover, he describes these ways of thinking as a ‘garment of . . . habituation’ (EP2, p. 370).
28Here ‘instinct’ can be substituted for ‘sentiment’. In this text Peirce uses them interchange-
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Not only is it of the same nature as the development of cognition; but it chiefly
takes place through the instrumentality of cognition. The soul’s deeper parts can
only be reached through its surface’ (EP2, pp. 40–1).
The interaction between agent and environment that this characterisation of
experience picks out is active from the moment the agent comes into the world.29
But it is important to to note that, while experience enforces changes, it does not
determine exactly what those changes will be. Within the cycle of habit devel-
opment experience produces the element of surprise or disruption.30 What the
response to this disruption will be depends on the experimental phase.
Earlier I described our instincts as the result of innate tendencies to respond
to experience in certain ways. According to Peirce these tendencies are active
in the experimental phase of the cycle of habit development. Peirce, speaking
somewhat figuratively, speaks of these tendencies as the power to generate ap-
propriate hypotheses. For example, Peirce suggests that a chicken need not ‘rum-
mage through all possible theories until it lights upon the good idea of picking
up something and eating it’ (CP, 5.591).31 That is, the chicken’s instincts mani-
fest themselves in an ability to appropriately respond to the compulsive force of
experience; they are confronted with a problem which they cannot ignore (the
need for nutrition), and have an innate ability to respond to this problem ap-
propriately (by ‘picking up something and eating it’). The human case is similar.
Understood from this side our instincts manifest themselves in our ability to re-
spond appropriately to the problems forced on us by experience. Over the course
of our early life this process results in the development of instinctive habits suited
to the physical and cultural environment that we find ourselves in. For instance,
ably (c.f. EP2, p. 32)
29Perhaps it would be best to be more careful with the title ‘agent’ here. The cycles of habit
development that we are considering could then be said to be part of the process by which an
infant, understood as an unruly bundle of habits, develops into an agent. However, given how
loose I have been with the term in the previous chapter I will not follow this path.
30Peirce frequently links experience and surprise in his writings. This is most prominent in
the 1903 Harvard Lectures, where Peirce explicitly analyses experience in terms of surprise (EP2,
p. 154).
31This example is also discussed at CP, 6.416.
The Background of our Practices 41
the master musician will have, over the course of their experience, developed
a great many instinctive physical capabilities.32 This suggests a further way in
which our instincts can be described as a form of ‘attunement’; they allow us act
appropriately within our environment.
This conception of human instinct is compatible with that offered in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. In this section we have been discussing the development of instinct
in an individual agent, as a result of their particular history of interaction with
the world. These histories will be distinct for each agent, but they will be broadly
similar enough that we can describe the resulting instinctive habits in the highly
vague and general ways that we did in the previous chapter. The conceptions of
our instincts considered in Section 2.2.2 are abstracted away from the behaviour
of agents who have undergone the processes of habit development considered in
this section.
As I have mentioned above, although our instincts are the most important
feature of the background for the purposes of this essay, they do not make up the
whole background. For the rest of this section I will be discussing ways in which
the background as a whole can change over time.
We have already seen how our instincts develop in response to experience.
This is true of the background as a whole. Even a single experience, if sufficiently
traumatic, can cause a radical change to the background. Consider someone
who receives a strong electric shock. This kind of trauma could cause all kinds
of habit change that is not deliberately endorsed. After receiving the shock the
victim’s whole relationship with their environment might change. For instance,
they could suffer a major change to their orientation to the world: they might
go from being confident to extremely tentative. Alternatively, and probably more
likely, the background will be changed at a smaller scale. Perhaps the victim will
develop an aversion to electrical appliances. In both cases the change is not de-
32According to Peirce’s conception of the innate, something can be innate which only manifests
itself in response to a long history of experience (PM, p. 111). That is, the innate can be under-
stood as potential habits (CP, 5.504).
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liberately endorsed, and is unlikely to be deliberately controllable.
One of the main ways in which the background changes over time is that what
cannot be controlled at one point might be controllable at a later time. In the
context of belief revision he says ‘logical criticism is limited to what we can con-
trol. In the future we may be able to control more but we must consider what
we can now control’ (EP2, p. 240). Thus something can go from being uncon-
trollable to controllable; something can go from the heart of the background to
the foreground. This will likely be the result of some surprising experience that
breaks the course of our usual habitual activity, but unlike the example just con-
sidered it will allow for some deliberate response. For example, consider a man
with deeply homophobic beliefs. Perhaps he thinks that homosexuals are out to
destroy the moral fabric of the nation. These beliefs are, lets say, at this point un-
able to be shaken; they are part of the background of his activity. Now imagine
that his son comes out to him as a homosexual. Often, of course, this kind of situ-
ation goes very badly. But we can imagine that, in this case, the man is surprised
and thrown into doubt. He knows that his son is not out to destroy the moral
fabric of the nation, in fact, his son seems to be an exemplary person. This line
of thinking might set into process a line of inquiry that results in a whole new
set of beliefs. The man could not help his homophobic beliefs before, but this
experience has allowed him to deliberately cultivate and adopt new ones.33
The fact that parts of our body of habits can go from the background into
the foreground and vice versa suggests that the demarcation between the two
will be blurry. Peirce agrees, holding that ‘anti-synechistic thinkers wind them-
selves up in a factitious snarl by falsifying the phenomena in representing con-
sciousness to be, as it were, a skin, a separate tissue, overlying an unconscious
region of the occult nature, mind, soul, or physiological basis’ (EP2, p. 347).34
33Presumably this can go the other way as well. Perhaps there is a certain window in which
major changes to our orientation to the world are possible, after which our habits ossify. This
seems to be implicit in the way many of us treat uncomfortable views in, say, older relatives.
Granddad’s expressing racist or sexist views is often treated very differently that the expression of
those views in a younger person.
34Now, here Peirce is explicitly talking about consciousness, but his overall topic in the sur-
The Background of our Practices 43
On Peirce’s view the background is not cleanly demarcated from the foreground.
There are other reasons to expect this given the account of self-control that we
considered in Chapter 1. There Peirce claimed that self-control comes in degrees
and that even our most advanced forms of deliberate self-control are continuous
with what we might call our animal interaction with the world. This should lead
us to suspect that the division between deliberate self-control and other forms of
habit-development is one of degrees.
One important consequence of the tight integration between background and
foreground is that when we deliberately cultivate some habit we allow the back-
ground to develop as well. Any deliberate act will put both foreground and back-
ground aspects of our body of habits into effect. Consequently, deliberate activity
will provide affordance for the non-deliberate development of the background.
Recall the example that introduced this chapter. When the novice bassoonist is
attempting to correct their fingering of a certain note they are putting into prac-
tice all sorts of habits, including their tendencies to breathe at certain times, to
hold the instrument in certain ways, to evaluate their tone etc. All of these will be
subject to non-deliberate forms of habit-development at the same time that the
novice is focusing their deliberate attention on the position of one finger. One of
the most important of these non-deliberate processes will be the development of
instincts, of the form that we considered above, connected with the playing and
handling of the instrument. One might expect and even more global adjustment
to the player’s attunement with the world. For instance, in some cases learning
a new skill imbues people with a general sense of confidence which might carry
over to all of their actions in the physical and social environment. This is cer-
tainly not the result of deliberate habit-development. It is a response of a whole
suite of habits to some course of experience.35
rounding text is self-control. The issue here is consciousness in so far as it is related to self-
control, that is, consciousness as the site of deliberate self-control. So his point is applies directly
to our question as well.
35As an aside: this opens up the possibility for a form of control of the background that is not
deliberate as such. You might have some phobia that you have tried to deal with directly, say, a
phobia to insects. This may have been immune to processes of deliberate control–no amount
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2.3 The Foreground of our Practices and the Role of
Purpose
The foreground of our practices consists, as claimed above, in ‘those aspects of
our body of habits which we can subject to deliberate self-control’. In this section
we are primarily concerned with the activity of deliberate control, rather than
with determining what makes up the foreground itself. That is, we are concerned
with the activity that takes place in the foreground rather than with the contents
of the foreground. The first issue that needs to be considered is why one should
think of all of our deliberate activity as the development of habits. This discus-
sion is largely carried out by applying material developed in Chapter 1. It requires
us to consider what we should take to be paradigm instances of human activity
when we take up the task of philosophising about it. It also makes use of Peirce’s
account of what it is that we actually have control over. The second issue to con-
sider is why we should think of our deliberate activity as being carried out ‘in or-
der to achieve purposes’. This, again, has to do with Peirce’s particular account of
what it means to have deliberate control of something. It also involves a discus-
sion of Peirce’s analysis of what it is to have a purpose, which, it turns out, directly
implies that deliberate self-control is purpose-directed. Finally I consider some
more general issues about the purposes of our practices (Section 2.3.3). For in-
stance, purposes, like the background of our practices, are dynamic. We must
consider the ways in which our purposes can develop over time, and the extent
to which we can be sure of our own purposes.
2.3.1 Foreground Activity as Habit Development
When Peirce discusses deliberate human activity, whether in the context of eth-
ical evaluation, the control of our activity, practical rationality, or for merely de-
of consideration of reasons, or of imagining situations could shake it. One might then try a kind
of exposure therapy, whereby you deliberately expose yourself to situations with various insects
in the hope that, while deliberate control has failed, your instinctive habits, that might develop.
This kind of case is not, as far as I am aware, considered by Peirce.
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scriptive purposes, he turns to a discussion of habits and their development (e.g.
EP2, p. 337; pp. 347–8; pp. 412–3). This is because he conceives of deliberate hu-
man activity as directed to the development of habits.36 This orientation might
seem strange if you share some assumptions with much of modern philosophy
of action. Within the philosophy of action it is common for philosophers to
consider actions, understood as particular events, and to ask what distinguishes
those events from events which are ‘mere behaviours’.37 So, to take an example
from a random introductory philosophy of action text, we are to imagine someone
sitting in their office, thinking that the room is too stuffy, and then opening the
window to let some fresh air in (e.g. Mele, ‘Introduction’, p. 13). We might then be
asked what it is about this event that makes it an action, at which point different
understandings of the psychological antecedents of the event are considered as
possible criteria.38 Rather than focusing on particular events and their psycho-
logical antecedents, Peirce looks to habits and their history. It is worth spending
some time to understand the reasons Peirce takes this approach. The first that I
will consider concerns what we take as a paradigm of human activity. Peirce is
concerned with the activity of theoretical inquiry and other complex social prac-
tices, where the focus is on cultivating and developing certain forms of action and
thought, rather than singular actions like a person’s opening a window. Secondly,
it is connected with a thesis about what we can deliberately control–namely, the
future form of our behaviour. So our agency, on Peirce’s view, is best understood
in terms of our control over future forms of our actions, i.e. habits.
36This interpretation of the role of habit in Peirce account of human activity is, broadly speak-
ing, shared by Kilpinen (‘Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Action’), Potter (Charles S. Peirce on
Norms and Ideals), and Shapiro (‘Peirce’s Theory of Habit’). Kilpinen suggests that this orient-
ation is shared between Peirce and the other pragmatists, and that it represents an ‘Copernican
revolution’ in the philosophical understanding of action (Kilpinen, ‘Pragmatism as a Philosophy
of Action’, p. 9).
37This distinction is that between those events which we are responsible for and those which
are simply things like reflexes; you might say it is the distinction between those events that are re-
flective of our agency and those that are simply things that your body has done (c.f. Stout, Action,
pp. 2–4).
38Including the popular view that what is required is a desire for the room to be less stuffy in ad-
dition to a belief that opening the window will make the room less stuffy. This would be the ana-
lysis offered by the ‘Standard Story of Action’, referred to in Smith, ‘The Structure of Orthonomy’
and Hornsby, ‘Agency and Actions’.
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Peirce, as I have just mentioned, does not take particular actions to be the
central concept for the understanding of human activity. Rather, Peirce looks to
the cultivation of general ways of acting, that is, to the deliberate, self-controlled,
development of habits. This is largely a result of his account of rationality and
self-control, which we will look to in a moment, but the point can also be made
out by considering what kind of activity we want to be the central examples from
which our philosophical work will begin. We have already seen one example of
the kind of activity that is often considered paradigmatic of human activity: a
person opening a window. On the other hand, Peirce’s most frequently returned
to example of successful human agency is the activity of investigation in the the-
oretical sciences. Peirce’s primary interest in human activity is in our gradual
development of general forms of action in response to experience. This orient-
ation seems to me to capture what is most significant about human practices:
that they are carried out across time and directed to the development of certain
abilities. So, aside from the development of beliefs and methods in science, the
development of virtues attempted by ethical and religious traditions,39 the de-
velopment of technique in manual tasks, the development of technologies, and
the cultivation of artistic traditions are all central examples of human activity.
The second reason that Peirce understands human activity as habit develop-
ment is his account of rationality and self-control. Peirce holds that ‘future con-
duct is the only conduct that is subject to self-control’ (EP2, p. 340).40 At some
points he says that we are not in control of the ‘very instant the operation of self-
control is commenced’ (CP, 8.320), and at others he holds out the possibility that
we have some minor control over present action (EP2, p. 245).41 The relevant con-
sequence of this for us is that future conduct is potential, rather than actual, and
that means that it can only be controlled in terms of general conceptions of the
39This is not a question of the success of failure of those traditions. Rather, it is a claim about
what they are directed to.
40Peirce makes a similar point at: (CP, 5.461; 8.320; EP2, pp. 245; 337).
41This raises questions about Peirce’s account of human freedom. These are beyond the scope
of this thesis.
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behaviour that we desire. Consequently, the only actions we can determine to be
our responses to some foreseen general situation are themselves general. That
is, self-control works by the development of dispositions to behave in generally
describable ways in generally describable circumstances: habits.
This same point can be approached from a slightly different angle. Peirce
links rationality tightly with self-control, so that, according to Peirce, the ability
to control one’s future thoughts and action is the distinguishing characteristic of
a rational being (EP2, p. 337). This has the consequence that all rational deliber-
ation about action, even if it is being carried out in order to overcome a particu-
lar problem situation, will be tied up in general habits of acting. To solve some
particular problem is to endorse similar activity in similar circumstances. On
Peirce’s framework then, whenever we reason about future action we are dealing
with habits rather than single actions.42
In his 1903 Lowell Lectures Peirce suggests an example that illustrates these
points well (EP2, pp. 247–8). We are to imagine that Peirce has to speak to a man
later that day, and that his purposes will be best served by speaking to that man
in a certain way.43 Peirce divides the deliberate preparation for this conversation
into two parts. The first is the formation of a resolution, which he describes as
somewhat like a diagram, or general mental formula. This is the general con-
ception of the way that the conversation should go. We might imagine (although
Peirce does not say), that a certain deference is required, or some other general
characteristic. The next part is what Peirce calls ‘determination’, it is the process
by which this resolution becomes efficient. Peirce does not think that we under-
stand this process very well, and the language he uses to describe it is figurative.
He says for instance, that it is ‘hidden in the depths of our nature’ (EP2, p. 246),
42It is a further question how general the habits in question are. It might be that they only apply
to a very narrowly circumscribed set of cases.
43Given the extent to which Peirce relied on benefactors for his well-being at this point it is
likely that he had to be very careful about the way he spoke to people. This is not to mention the
many debt collectors he had to avoid throughout his life as well, who would also require a certain
degree of careful conversational handling. For more details on Peirce’s biography the standard
text is Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life.
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and that it is the process by which an action is given a ‘[stamp] of approval’ by the
soul (CP, 5.538).44 So the preparation for his conversation consists in making a
general form of action into ‘a really efficient agency’ (EP2, p. 246), in other words,
to make it such that he will act in certain generally describable ways on gener-
ally describable occasions. The preparation for this singular act consists in the
formation of a habit, albeit a small scale one. Peirce then describes the aftermath
of the conversation. He suggests that, if the resolution and determination were
successful, there will be a feeling of satisfaction accompanying our judgement
that it was satisfactory. He then sets this judgement up as a platform from which
deeper and more general criticism of conduct can occur (EP2, p. 248). That is, this
individual act is used as a impetus for more general habit cultivation. The agent
can ask themselves whether such actions accord with their ‘ideals of conduct’, or
whether these ideals should be changed.45
At his most general, he describes the purpose of human activity as ‘to embody
general ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition’
(EP2, p. 443; c.f. CP, 2.763); and that we are ‘putting our shoulders to the wheel
for an end that none of us can catch more than a glimpse at — that which the
generations are working out. But we can see that the development of embodied
ideas is what it will consist in’ (CP, 5.402n2). Note that to embody an idea is to
make a general take effect in the world, that is, again, to develop a habit. This
thesis about the highest purpose of human activity can be seen as a poetic re-
description of the claim that deliberate human activity is to be understood as
habit development. It is to Peirce’s thought on the purposes of human activities
that we now turn.
44Peirce refers to this ‘stamping with approval’ as ‘resolve’. However, From the context it is clear
that he is talking about what he refers to as ‘determination’ a year later at (EP2, p. 246).
45This example has the further virtue of showing that Peirce’s habit-based approach to action
can accommodate the kind of examples that usual philosophy of action is motivated by. We could
say that for Peirce, these individual actions, and reasoning about individual actions, is a some-
what degenerate case of habit development. On the other hand philosophers of action, if they
discuss habits at all tend to derive them as consisting of a collection of particular actions. This
is what Kilpinen is getting at by calling the habit-based understanding of agency a ‘Copernican
Revolution’. In it ‘basic concept and residue change place’, that is habits and actions swap explan-
atory roles (Kilpinen, ‘Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Action’, p. 9).
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2.3.2 Foreground Activity as Purpose Directed
The next issue to consider is why Peirce thinks deliberate human activity is best
understood as directed towards purposes. There are, as far as I can see, two clear
ways to make this out. The first is to return, yet again, to Peirce’s account of de-
liberate self-control. This time we will have to add details about the role of ideals
in self-control. The second way is to consider Peirce’s account of what it is to
have adopted a purpose. This account, unsurprisingly, relates the possession of
a purpose to the possession of a particular kind of habit.
Peirce holds that for control to be deliberate it must be control with a view
to making your action conform with a purpose, ideal, or standard (EP2, pp. 376–
7). In a similar vein he says that ‘approval cannot be deliberate unless it is based
upon the comparison of the thing approved with some idea of how such a thing
ought to be’ (CP, 2.186). This is consonant with the discussion of self-control in
Chapter 1. We can see that, at each level of deliberate self-control the agent has
some purpose in view. Consider the first degree of deliberate self-control: when
the agent becomes their own training master. In that case the agent is attempting
to develop and habit of which they have a more or less conscious conception.
They set themselves to developing this habit, and for this reason will know when
they have achieved it. They have a conception of the way their behaviour ‘ought
to be’, or what they want their behaviour to ‘conform with’. To achieve this is the
purpose that they have set for themselves. The same is true of the higher degrees
of deliberate self-control. In these higher degrees our purposes simply become
more general and more deep lying. For instance: to control our beliefs so as to
maximise expectation and minimise surprise.46
Peirce also offers an interesting account of what it is to have a consciously
apprehended purpose.47 In one of his final accounts of pragmatism (c. 1907) he
says that for an agent to have a purpose is for them to have a conception of a
46This is one of Peirce’s most general descriptions of the goal of the theoretical sciences. It is
quoted in (Hookway, Peirce, p. 67).
47This example is discussed, from a slightly different angle, in HCP, pp. 365–7.
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particular habit (in particular, to understand the general kind of behaviour it will
lead to and what the results of that behaviour will be) and to have deliberately
adopted the habit. In slightly different words which come to the same thing, he
describes having a purpose as having an ‘idea of a possible general regarded as
desirable together with a sense of being determined in one’s habitual nature . . . to
actualize it’ (EP2, pp. 383–4).48 This account has the strength of connecting the
having of a purpose with some real tendency for the agent that has the purpose
to act towards that purpose in certain ways on certain occasions. If there is no
conceivable situation such that the agent would act in a way that they expected
would attain their purpose then it seems strange to say that they have that pur-
pose. Now to be deliberately developing a habit is, by definition, to have a con-
ception of that habit, including a conception of the what kind of behaviour the
habit will tend to produce. It is also to deliberately adopt that habit. So, simply
by Peirce’s definition of what it is to have a purpose, we can see that deliberate
habit-development is directed to purposes.
2.3.3 Purpose and Human Practice
Since the character of a practice largely depends on the purpose it is directed to-
wards, it is worth examining the characteristics of purposes on Peirce’s account.
In particular, in the following chapter we will need a general idea of the way pur-
poses function in human practice when we consider the theoretical sciences as
the practice dedicated to a very peculiar purpose: truth. The first task for this sec-
tion will be to deal with some terminological confusions, in particular, in dealing
with Peirce’s distinct use of the terms ‘purpose’ and ‘final cause’. We then con-
sider the ways in which the purposes of our practices are dynamic. First, Peirce
holds that our purposes, and the means by which we work towards those pur-
poses, can develop over time. Second, I consider some of the ways in which we
might be mistaken about what our purposes really are. Finally, I consider in what
48Another characterisation in this vein is that a purpose is an ‘operative desire’ (EP2, p. 118).
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sense we might be able to attribute purposes to sets of background habits. That
is, I suggest that there a sense in which we can have purposes without being con-
sciously aware of, or deliberately choosing, those purposes.
Peirce usually reserves the word ‘purpose’ for the consciously apprehended
purposes of an agent. He also speaks of ‘final causes’. According to Peirce ‘we
must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according
to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespect-
ive of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way’ (EP2,
p. 120). Peirce suggests, in the same text, that a purpose is simply the most famil-
iar example of a final cause for us, and that we should not equate the two notions
(EP2, p. 120). A purpose is a final cause that is consciously adopted.
T. L. Short argues against this way of dividing up the terminology, and I will
follow his usage for the rest of this section. He suggests that this privileges Des-
cartes-inspired philosophical language rather than everyday usage. The philo-
sophical baggage that inspires the usage is given up by Peirce, so Short holds that
we should return to to what he thinks is the ordinary usage of the terms (Short,
Peirce’s Theory of Signs, pp. 110–11). I will follow Short by using the word ‘purpose’
to refer to final cause in general, and, when I need to refer to those purposes that
are consciously apprehended by an agent I will note it. This will allow the points
made in the remainder of this section to be expressed more easily.
Purposes are dynamic in a few ways. It is an important feature of Peirce’s
account of practice that our purposes and our conception of those purposes de-
velop over time. The most prominent instance of this is that experience can in-
duce us to alter our purposes. Peirce offers a perspicuous example (EP2, p. 431).49
We are to imagine a man setting out to decorate his house. He first consciously
takes on the purpose with some conception of the general plan he will follow in
order to carry out the task, and this general plan is efficient, that is, it has some
real habit backing it up. This might be put into effect in various ways. Peirce sug-
49This example is also discussed by Colapietro (HCP, p. 366).
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gests that the man ‘actually made decorations in his inner world’ (EP2, p. 431).
That is, he imagined possible furnishings for the room. But we can also ima-
gine that this is done in the room itself, say by trying various configurations of
the furniture or something of that sort. In any case, these actions are a form of
experimentation. After each attempted action, Peirce suggests that the man will
evaluate the results of these actions (this could be, as Peirce suggests, simply by
following the feelings he has on the completion of each attempted action), and
then repeat the kind of action that he has evaluated positively and stop perform-
ing the actions he has evaluated negatively. By these experiments ‘a habit was
produced’, that is, like all experimental processes this is an example of habit de-
velopment. Peirce holds that in processes of habit development our purposes
themselves are developed. In this case, the most obvious way in which the pur-
pose has been developed is to make it more specific, the man now has a far more
precise conception of how he wants the room to look, that is, his purpose has
changed by being precided.50
There are other ways that a purpose might develop along similar lines. You
might have a definite conception of some particular task that you have set for
yourself. Perhaps some smell in your kitchen is offensive and so you set yourself
to the purpose of cleaning your kitchen on a given morning. It turns out that the
smell is a dead rat in the wall, which in turn is a sign of some wider problem:
your house is infested with rats. Thus, one’s purpose is expanded. In attempting
to achieve the purpose of making the kitchen cease to smell bad you have de-
veloped a wider purpose: ridding your house of rats. The gap that these examples
uncover between our purposes and what our purposes will be after they have
been diligently developed and considered will be important in the next chapter,
since it is a major part of Peirce’s account of our theoretical investigations that
the same dynamics apply.
Note, as well, that in this process the means by which we achieve our pur-
50The term ‘precide’ was coined by Peirce and means ‘to render precise’ (EP2, p. 352).
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poses can be adjusted as well. In fact, it is a defining characteristic of purpose-
governed behaviour that it is directed to general kinds of result ‘quite irrespective
of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way’ (EP2, p. 120).
However, to take something up as a purpose, is, we have seen, to be ‘determined
in one’s habitual nature’ (EP2, p. 384); there must be some form of action that
we would attempt given the correct circumstances in order to achieve that pur-
pose. We need to have some vague idea of the sort of action that would help
us to achieve our purposes, and this can develop as we work towards our pur-
poses. To take a very down-to-earth example: perhaps I desire to eat a banana,
and while attempting to peel it from the stem end the stem breaks off and the
banana remains unpeeled. Without any particular thought in mind I turn the ba-
nana around and attempt to peel it from the other side and discover that it works
remarkably well. I then adjust my general method of pealing bananas so that I
now peel them from the bottom; the means by which I attain my purpose have
been developed. In Chapter 3 we will see that this is also a feature of the activity
of theoretical inquiry.
Finally, having adopted Short’s usage of the word ‘purpose’, we can under-
stand features of the background as directed to purposes. Since these are fea-
tures of the background we need not have a clear conception of these purposes
to which they are directed. In fact, this is provides a way in which we might be
wrong about our purposes. Our consciously available conception of our pur-
poses might be self-deception covering for some more instinctive purposes that
we need not be fully aware of, or that we need not endorse even if we did know
about. For instance, the examples of human behaviour that evolutionary psy-
chologists have a tendency to cite can be understood in this way. These are gen-
erally examples of instinctive purposes operating under the level of conscious
awareness. So a recovering smoker might convince themselves that they are go-
ing down to the dairy simply in order to get some milk, but underlying this is a
strong unacknowledged desire to buy a new packet of cigarettes.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have introduced a Peircean account of human practice. Accord-
ing to this picture the agent is a bundle of integrated habits embedded in an en-
vironment. The habits which make up this bundle are only determined in part
by the deliberate control of the agent. In particular, many of the details of the
agent’s habits have been determined by their innate biological tendencies, and
by the interaction of those tendencies with the environment in the history of the
particular agent. Moreover, these non-deliberate interactions continue through-
out the agent’s life. These features of human practice, called the background of
our practices in this chapter, are not entirely constrictive. In fact, on this picture
of human practice they are one of the conditions for coherent action. Those as-
pects of our practices which are within the scope of our deliberate self-control
were called the foreground of our practices.
This chapter has introduced key features of both the foreground and the back-
ground of our practices. It considered the role of our instincts and their develop-
ment over time in the background of our practices, suggesting that these instincts
can be described as a form of ‘attunement’ with our environment. It also con-
sidered the importance of purposes for the task of deliberate self-control. It em-
phasised the idea that our practices are directed towards the cultivation of gen-
eral forms of behaviour, and that this cultivation depends on a non-deliberate
attunement with the world.
Both of these features manifest themselves in Peirce’s account of our prac-
tice of theoretical inquiry. That, on this conception, all practices rely on a non-
deliberate attunement with the world, is the key to the claim that practice is prior
to theory. That our practices are directed to purposes, and in the case of the the-
oretical sciences, to truth, will allow us to see how the theoretical sciences are
distinct from our other practices. It is to the task of articulating these arguments
that we now turn.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Inquiry and the Priority
of Practice
3.1 Introduction
This chapter completes the ‘ground up’ articulation of Peirce’s prioritisation of
practice to theory. It shows that, on Peirce’s view, theoretical inquiry is a form of
deliberate practical interaction with the world, which, like all such interaction,
depends on a vast background of uncontrolled and uncontrollable habits.
In the previous chapter I developed a Peircean account of our practical inter-
action with the world. According to that account we direct our body of habits
in order to achieve our purposes by means of the small domain of that body
over which we can exercise deliberate self-control. What is within the domain
of deliberate self-control is, Peirce says, the ‘mere blossom of a vast complexus’
(EP2, p. 241). I called the aspects of our body of habits which we cannot control
the ‘background’, and the aspects which we can control the ‘foreground’. This
chapter is also organised according to that distinction.
I consider the foreground of theoretical inquiry in Section 3.2. The foreground
of any practice is characterised by a purpose and by the variety of deliberate habit
development by which that purpose is sought. According to Peirce the purpose
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of theory is the discovery of truth, and its method is the ‘method of science’. Un-
der the method of science we develop our beliefs, which are a form of habit, by
putting them into contact with the environment in experiments. Truth is then
understood as the ultimate harmony between an agent’s beliefs and their envir-
onment.
In Section 3.3 I consider the background of theoretical inquiry. The back-
ground is characterised by those features of our body of habits that are necessary
for theoretical inquiry but are outside the domain of our deliberate self-control.
I will consider two constituents of the background, the first, background beliefs;
the second, our ability to generate explanatory hypotheses. The need for back-
ground beliefs is a consequence of Peirce’s account of habit development. On
that account, for a habit to be subject to genuine development it must clash
with the agent’s environment. Beliefs are no exception. Those beliefs that have
not clashed with the environment are not subject to theoretical inquiry; they
are background beliefs. Peirce places particular emphasis on a set of ‘common-
sense’ background beliefs, which, he claims, are instinctive. Our ability to gener-
ate explanatory hypotheses is a special case of our instinctive ability to respond
appropriately to experience.1
The main features of this account of inquiry are visible in the example, con-
sidered in Chapter 1, of my failed expectations about the moon. In this example
we are to imagine that it is around sunset and I am leaving my flat for the evening.
Upon leaving my flat I have a vast number of beliefs, some of which are related to
the behaviour of the moon. These include, for instance, that the moon orbits the
earth at a regular rate, that it is roughly the same angular size as my thumb when
1Note that this account of theoretical inquiry involves very familiar Peircean claims which have
been discussed at length in the secondary literature. For instance: that inquiry requires a genu-
ine clash with experience (e.g. Misak, ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, pp. 152–3), that truth is the
purpose of theoretical inquiry (e.g. Hookway, Peirce, pp. 41–79; Misak, Truth and the End of In-
quiry), and that we have a set of indubitable ‘common-sense’ background beliefs (e.g. Anderson,
‘Peirce’s Common Sense Marriage of Religion and Science’; Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism, pp. 84–
108; TRP, pp. 198–222). The contribution I am making is not to provide new and better versions of
these claims, but to place them within the wider framework developed in the previous chapters
of this thesis.
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I fully extend my arm, and that it appears greyish-white in most circumstances.
I also have more basic beliefs about the behaviour of physical objects, including
the belief that they persist over time, that there is some regularity in their beha-
viour, and that two of them cannot be in the same place at the same time. But
the most important belief for the purpose of this example is that, because of a
tide chart that I read in the newspaper a few hours ago, I believe that the moon
is full tonight. As a result I also believe that the moon will appear on the horizon
around sunset. This belief is manifested in a habit of more or less unconscious
expectation.
Once I have made it outside I am surprised to find that the moon is high in
the sky in first quarter; my expectation has clashed with reality. Many of the be-
liefs that led to this expectation are now subject to doubt. My doubt will likely
be strongest for the beliefs that are only related to this particular expectation,
less strong for my beliefs about the moon’s behaviour in general, and extremely
unlikely to touch my most basic beliefs about the behaviour of physical objects.
In any case, this doubt motivates experimental inquiry. According to Peirce the
first step in an experiment is to consider an explanatory hypothesis: perhaps I
fancifully entertain the hypothesis that the moon has been shifted along its orbit
by some external force. The second step is to deduce some experiential con-
sequences of this hypothesis: I deduce from my initial hypothesis and my back-
ground beliefs, that the truth of this hypothesis would require the moon to have
been subjected to an incredible force and that this should have left some very
prominent evidence. The evidence would be likely to include, for instance, re-
ports of an extreme explosion, widespread panic, or visible scarring on the moon
itself. The final step in experimental inquiry, induction, is to consider whether
this evidence obtains: I look for it but find none, so I reject the hypothesis. I then
consider another hypothesis: perhaps I read the wrong newspaper this morning.
I deduce that, if the hypothesis is true and I return to my house and look at the
date on the newspaper, then I will find that it is not today’s edition. It turns out
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that this hypothesis is validated when I return home and see that I have a three-
week-old newspaper on my desk. This brings my doubt to an end, and corrects
the flaw in my beliefs, in this case the flaw was my belief in the appropriateness
of the chart I read in the newspaper.
On Peirce’s model of theoretical inquiry we use this kind of reasoning in or-
der to discover the truth. However, there is a major difference between every-
day cases of inquiry like the one just considered and genuine theoretical inquiry.
In theoretical inquiry we actively look for experiences that will engender doubt
where ever they can be found. We do not simply wait for some expectation or
habit of action to clash with the environment; we take on a habit of disrupting
our habits.2
I conclude, in Section 3.4, by briefly reflecting on an important consequence
of Peirce’s prioritisation of practice to theory. Namely, that anyone in a position
to take up theoretical inquiry must already be engaged in non-theoretical forms
of practical interaction with the world.
3.2 The Foreground of Theoretical Inquiry
This section articulates the foreground of theoretical inquiry. The foreground of
a practice consists of a purpose and a form of habit development by which that
purpose is attained. In Section 3.2.1 I introduce Peirce’s claim that truth is the
purpose of theoretical inquiry. Peirce analyses truth in the language of beliefs
and their development in experimental inquiry. The former is considered in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, and the latter in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Truth as the Purpose of Theoretical Inquiry
In order to show that Peirce makes truth the purpose of theory, I must link my
vague use of the word ‘theory’ with Peirce’s own philosophical terminology. The
2The phrase ‘habit of disrupting our habits’ was suggested to me by Cathy Legg.
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best match for ‘theory’ within Peirce’s system is what Peirce refers to as the ‘the-
oretical sciences’.3 Peirce’s characterisation of the theoretical sciences is to be
found within his attempts to build a natural classification and hierarchy of the
sciences.4 In his 1902 Minute Logic Peirce claims that natural classifications are
classifications according to final causes (EP2, p. 125).5 Consequently, he classifies
the sciences according to their purposes. But, before Peirce takes up this task he
offers an account of the purpose of science in general.
According to Peirce, science is to be characterised according to the guiding
purpose of its practitioners. In the Minute Logic Peirce claims that someone be-
comes a scientific investigator by ‘their being seized with a great desire to learn
the truth, and their going to work with all their might by a well-considered method
to gratify that desire’ (EP2, p. 130).6 In an often-quoted passage Peirce says that
‘science consists in actually drawing the bow upon truth, with intentness in the
eye, with energy in the arm’ (EP2, p. 131). Later, in 1906, he defines ‘science’ as the
activity of ‘seeking such truth as seems to [the scientist] highly worthy of life-long
devotion, and in pursuing it by the most critically chosen methods’ (EP2, p. 372).
As Kent notes, Peirce shifts between a strict and a lenient use of the word ‘sci-
3Peirce uses the term ‘theoretical sciences’ in a few places (CP, 1.239; 5.13; 7.58; EP2, pp. 28–
29). This seemingly sparse use of the term is misleading. It hides the fact that Peirce refers to
‘theoretical science’ using a large variety of terms. For instance, ‘heuretic science’ (EP2, p. 372). A
full list of Peirce’s synonyms for ‘theoretical science’, including terminology from Peirce’s unpub-
lished manuscripts, is provided by Kent (Charles S. Peirce, p. 205).
4The project of classifying the sciences was popular in the 19th century. Peirce cites similar
work by Humboldt, Comte, and Spencer (EP2, pp. 258-9). That this kind of work was prominent
at the time is quite strikingly evidenced by the fact that Peirce can cite a contemporary text that
contains 146 distinct classifications of the sciences (EP2, p. 115). This aspect of Peirce’s work is
considered in great detail in Kent’s Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences.
Kent makes out Peirce’s ordering of the sciences as an attempt to provide a pragmatic clarification
of the nature of logic, that is, to show the practical consequences of logic for the other sciences
(Kent, Charles S. Peirce, pp. 17–9; Ch. 5). This shows that Peirce’s classificatory project is not
simply a throwback to outmoded intellectual fashions, but is deeply connected to his pragmat-
ism.
5This is in contrast to his earlier efforts, starting at least as early as 1866, to classify the sci-
ences by means of the kinds of reasoning employed in them, and to other methods he attempted
in the intervening time. For a detailed discussion of the development of these systems see (Kent,
Charles S. Peirce, pp. 90–114). It should also be noted that the 1902 classification was not the
final form of the classification. For instance, it does not include aesthetics as a normative sci-
ence (Kent, Charles S. Peirce, pp. 117–8). However, the later versions of the classification are all
attempts at a natural classification in the sense just mentioned (Kent, Charles S. Peirce, p. 114).
6Recall from Chapter 2 that Peirce defines a purpose as an operative desire (EP2, p. 118). So, to
go to work to gratify a desire is to have a purpose.
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ence’ (Kent, Charles S. Peirce, pp. 81–2). In the strict sense it applies only to the
pursuit of truth without ulterior motive, that is, to the theoretical sciences. In the
lenient sense it applies to all forms of inquiry, even if they have ulterior motives.
Peirce calls these forms of inquiry ‘practical science’ (CP, 1.243; EP2, p. 372). For
instance, it might be valuable to determine truths about the acoustic properties
of various woods in order to make better bassoons. On this conception such an
inquiry is carried out in order to discover the truth, but this purpose is subordin-
ate to the purpose of making bassoons. Peirce’s characterisations of science are
primarily directed at the theoretical sciences, with the practical sciences as an
afterthought.7 It is clear that the characterisation of the purpose of science in the
previous paragraph is about ‘science’ in the strict sense.8
It is important to note that equating theory with what Peirce calls ‘theoret-
ical science’ is not an endorsement of scientism. By scientism I mean the claim
that either the methods of the natural sciences or the objects discovered by the
natural sciences are the only legitimate elements of inquiry (c.f. Blackburn, The
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 344). To accuse Peirce of scientism is to mis-
understand what he means by ‘science’ and the ‘method of science’. Peirce does
not equate ‘science’ with the ‘natural sciences’ (Haack, Manifesto, p. 49; TRP,
pp. 76–7; Misak, ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, p. 154). This is clear from an ex-
amination of the classification of the sciences. In the classification Peirce dis-
tinguishes between philosophy and the ‘special sciences’ (EP2, p. 259).9 Both
are ‘sciences’ according to Peirce, but each have their own methods and sub-
ject matter. Philosophy is concerned with what can be inferred from ‘common
7In the middle of one of Peirce’s discussion of the classifications of the sciences he turns to the
practical sciences, lists some, and claims to be ‘utterly bewildered by its motley crowd’, before
turning back to the theoretical sciences (CP, 1.243).
8That ‘theory’ should be equated with Peirce strict use of the word ‘science’ is further sup-
ported by the few times that Peirce himself uses ‘theory’ as an abstract noun. For instance, in
the 1898 Cambridge Conferences Lectures ‘theory’ is equated with ‘science’, and Peirce uses the
phrase ‘pure theoretical knowledge, or science’ (EP2, p. 33). He makes similar remarks in other
writings. For instance, in 1904 he, in passing, equates the ‘theoretical’ with the ‘purely scientific’
(EP2, p. 328).
9Moreover, the special sciences include more than the natural sciences. Peirce includes tradi-
tional humanities disciplines like history and literary criticism amongst the special sciences (EP2,
pp. 261–2).
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experience’, while the special sciences are ‘occupied with the accumulation of
new facts’ (EP2, p. 259). The sense in which these various forms of inquiry share
a method is simply that their practitioners endeavour to test and improve their
claims against experience; they are all forms of experimental inquiry.
Having seen that Peirce thinks the purpose of theoretical inquiry is the dis-
covery of truth, we need to consider his account of truth.10 In Chapter 2 we saw
that our purposes cannot be separated from the forms of habit development by
which we work towards them. On this view, if we are to understand truth we
must consider the methods by which we attempt to attain it. This is exactly what
Peirce does. As Hookway has argued, Peirce offers a ‘pragmatic clarification’ of
the notion of truth rather than a new definition of truth (Hookway, ‘Truth, Real-
ity, and Convergence’, pp. 146–7). The Peircean ‘theory of truth’ is not a theory of
the same sort as say, the correspondence theory, or the coherence theory. Rather,
Peirce articulates the consequences of asserting that something is true within our
practices of inquiry.11 Pragmatic clarification of the concept of truth is necessary
because we cannot step outside our practices of inquiry to check that our beliefs
correspond with reality. According to Peirce ‘[we] only puzzle [ourselves] by talk-
ing of this metaphysical “truth” and “falsity,” that [we] know nothing about’ (EP2,
p. 336). We only ‘have any dealings with [our] doubts and beliefs, with the course
of life that forces new beliefs upon [us] and gives [us] the power to doubt old be-
liefs’ (EP2, p. 336). Consequently, we must define truth and falsity in terms of our
beliefs, doubts, and the course of experience (EP2, p. 336).
10Of course, Peirce’s theory of truth is one of the most salient features of his philosophy and has
been widely discussed. I do not intend to consider this secondary literature in any detail. I will
stick to claims that are fairly uncontroversial amongst Peirce scholars. Important discussions of
Peirce’s account of truth include: Misak, Truth and the End of Inquiry; Hookway, ‘Truth, Reality,
and Convergence’; Wiggins, ‘Reflections on Truth and Inquiry’.
11The question of whether Peirce accepts the correspondence theory or not is controversial. On
one hand, he claims that ‘[t]ruth is the conformity of a representamen to its object’ (EP2, p. 380).
This is cited as evidence of Peirce’ acceptance of a correspondence account by Haack, who notes
as well that, even if he does accept it he does not think that it is particularly informative (Haack,
‘Introduction: Pragmatism, Old & New’, pp. 25–6; c.f. Haack, Manifesto, p. 33). On the other hand,
Misak argues that Peirce’s arguments against the metaphysical view of truth that I have just cited
count as arguments against the correspondence theory (Misak, ‘Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–
1914)’, pp. 6–7). We need not pursue this question further.
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Peirce argues that a true belief is a belief which would ultimately prevail if
inquiry were to be carried out sufficiently far (EP2, p. 457).12 In 1901 Peirce char-
acterises truth by saying that a ‘[t]rue proposition is a proposition belief in which
would never lead to. . . disappointment’ (CP, p. 5.569), where disappointment is
understood as a clash with the world. I was disappointed in this sense when
my expectation of a full moon went unfulfilled. These characterisations of truth
can be straightforwardly transposed into the language of habit development. In
Chapter 1 an agent’s habit was described as in greater harmony with the agent’s
environment the less it led to clashes between the agent and their environment.
According to the account of truth we have just considered a belief is true if there
is no possible way for it to clash with experience. In other words, for a belief to
be true is for it to be completely in harmony with experience.
Finally, before turning to a more full articulation of the experimental method,
it is important to note that on Peirce’s account theoretical inquiry is not simply
aimed at finding some truths. Finding one belief that would never be overthrown
by experience would not satisfy the hopes of theoretical inquiry. Rather, the
theorist aims to find as much truth as possible. Peirce expresses this clearly in
Reason’s Conscience (1904) where he characterises the goal of theoretical inquiry
as: ‘the maximum of expectation and the minimum of surprise’ (R693, p. 164 via.
Hookway, Peirce, p. 67). To maximise expectation is, as we will soon see, to max-
imise belief; to minimise surprise is to maximise truth.
3.2.2 Beliefs as Habits
According to Chapter 2 the foreground of a practice consists, in part, of a form of
deliberate habit development. In theoretical inquiry we develop a particular kind
of habit, beliefs, by subjecting them to experimental test. This section articulates
12In the passage just cited Peirce is concerned to head off some tempting misinterpretations
of, and errors in, his earlier pragmatic elucidations of ‘truth’. This is why in later writings Peirce
emphasised the modal aspect of his characterisation of truth. In other words, in his account
of truth he is not prophesying the end of inquiry as an actual event in the future. Other late
characterisations of truth agree with the one just cited (e.g. EP2, p. 87; p. 336; p. 380).
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the relevant features of Peirce’s conception of belief.
One of the most consistent features of Peirce’s philosophy is his application
of something like Alexander Bain’s definition of belief as ‘that upon which a man
is prepared to act’ (EP2, p. 399).13 This leads to the claim that a belief is a habit of
action.14 For example, the novice bassoonist’s belief that bassoons should be re-
turned to their cases after they have been played is to be understood as a habit of
action such that, if she is behaving deliberately, she will return her bassoon to its
case when she has finished playing it, and will, perhaps, criticise her fellow bas-
soonists if they fail to put their instruments away. Peirce also claims that beliefs
are habits of expectation.15 My belief that there will be a full moon tonight an-
swers more closely to this description. For instance, the belief implies that I will
expect that the moon will appear on the horizon when I leave my flat at sunset. I
will return to the roles of action and expectation in belief in a moment.
Peirce does not claim that all habits are beliefs. For a habit to be a belief it
must be ‘deliberately satisfied’ (EP2, p. 12; NM4, p. 39) and active in imagination
(NM4, pp. 39–40; CP, 2.148).16 A deliberately satisfied habit is one which we are
aware of, and that we do not struggle against (NM4, p. 39).17 This clause cap-
tures the fact that beliefs structure our deliberate behaviour. For instance, the
novice bassoonist really does act according to her belief that bassoons belong in
their cases when she is acting deliberately. If she genuinely struggled against the
habit she would not put the bassoon in its case when acting deliberately. This
13Peirce even claims that pragmatism is ‘scarce more than a corollary’ of this definition (EP2,
p. 399).
14This and similar claims can be found throughout Peirce’s writings (e.g. NM4, p. 39; CP, 5.538;
EP1, pp. 114–5; pp. 129–30; p. 201; EP2, p. 12; p. 33; pp. 139–41; p. 312; p. 418).
15This and similar claims can also be found throughout Peirce’s writings (e.g. CP, 2.148; 5.539;
7.115; 8.270; EP2, p. 235; p. 441)
16In some writings Peirce says instead that a belief is a habit that is ‘controlled and contented’
(EP2, p. 312), or that a belief is a ‘self-controlled’ habit (CP, 5.480). These characterisations seem
to be in tension with Peirce’s claim, considered in Section 3.3.1, that we have a set of uncontrol-
lable instinctive beliefs. I think that these tensions are superficial, but for simplicity’s sake I will
avoid these formulations.
17Recall from Chapter 1 that awareness of a habit does not imply complete awareness of all the
ways it might cause us to act. A belief, since it is a habit, cannot be captured by a ‘momentary
mode of consciousness’ (EP2, p. 336). We might only have a vague and barely-articulate under-
standing of the habit, but this is awareness nonetheless.
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clause also allows us to understand how, say, an alcoholic can genuinely believe
that alcohol is killing them and that they do not want to harm themselves, while
continuing to drink. Their condition prevents them from acting deliberately (c.f.
EP2, p. 12).
There are two senses in which beliefs are active in imagination. First, they
structure our imaginary consideration of what would happen in hypothetical cir-
cumstances. Using one of Peirce’s examples, ‘if I believe that fire is dangerous,
and I imagine a fire bursting out close beside me, I shall also imagine that I jump
back’ (CP, 2.148). This is not true of many of our habits. For example, Peirce sug-
gests that he probably has a habit of putting one leg in his trousers before the
other, but if he imagines putting them on he ‘shall probably not definitely think
of putting the left leg on first’ (CP, 2.148). In this case he has a habit of action but
it is not a belief. This clause captures the fact that our beliefs structure our condi-
tional expectations. The second way that beliefs are active in the imagination is
that they can be developed by imaginary experimentation; we can imagine pos-
sible future scenarios and come to beliefs about what would or should happen in
those scenarios (NM4, pp. 39–40; CP, 2.148). We have already considered a strik-
ing example of this: Herbert Peirce’s imaginative preparation for the possibility
of a dress catching on fire at the dinner table.18
One might think that the above conditions are too lenient. For instance, we
all have a habit of eating with which we are, for the most part, deliberately sat-
isfied. It is also active in the imagination; I can, for instance, imagine future
meals. It seems to satisfy the above conditions, but it might seem bizarre to call
it a belief.19 This worry is relieved if we describe the case more carefully. On
Peirce’s view our bare habit of eating with a certain regularity is not a belief. But
whatever structures our conditional resolutions and expectations about eating
is. This conditional structure is what Peirce is trying to capture with the criteria
just mentioned. If I believe that I eat three times a day I will expect that if I count
18This example was considered in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.2).
19This objection was suggested to me by Cathy Legg.
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up the times that I have eaten at the end of the day they will add up to three. This
is a belief about me. If I believe that I should only eat three times a day, then I
will, for instance, resolve not to buy snacks from the vending machine. This is a
belief about how I should act in the future. In neither case is my habit of eating
in and of itself a belief.
Another way to put this is in terms of ‘propositional form’. Peirce holds that
‘[e]very belief is belief in a proposition’, and that a proposition requires a subject
and a predicate (CP, 5.542). To have conditional expectations about the beha-
viour of some entity is to ascribe some way of acting, a predicate, to that thing, a
subject. Merely having a habit of eating does not apply a predicate to a subject;
it is not about anything. But if I have conditional expectations about my future
eating behaviour, then I am applying a predicate to a subject. For instance, the
predicate ‘. . . is a thing that eats’, to the subject ‘me’.
I noted above that Peirce refers to beliefs as both habits of action and habits
of expectation. The relative roles of action and expectation in belief was a ma-
jor issue for Peirce. For instance, the tension between the two led him to posit
two categories: ‘theoretical beliefs’, which are primarily habits of expectation;
and ‘practical beliefs’, which are primarily habits of action (CP, 5.538–45). We are
now in a position to understand the different roles of action and expectation. In
so far as they structure our conditional expectations all beliefs are habits of ex-
pectation. Further, it is only by causing expectations that they can be subject to
theoretical inquiry. Like all forms of habit development, theoretical inquiry re-
quires that our habits clash with the environment in some way. For a belief to
clash with the environment is for it to cause an expectation which goes unful-
filled. This as true for ‘practical beliefs’ as it is for ‘theoretical beliefs’ (CP, 5.540).
Take the ‘practical belief’ that coffee keeps you awake. This belief clashes with my
environment when it to causes me to fail to achieve my purposes. For instance,
if drinking coffee did not allow me to stay awake for another hour when I desired
to. But this implies that I expect the coffee to keep me up for another hour. This
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expectation is what clashes with the environment; without expectations we can-
not be surprised. Consequently, this chapter is primarily concerned with beliefs
as habits of expectation.20
At the end of Section 3.2.1, I suggested that to maximise expectation is to max-
imise belief. We are now in a position to see why. To maximise expectation is
to maximise our habits of expectation. That is, we have maximised expectation
when we are such that any particular set of antecedent conditions leads us to ex-
pect as many things as we can given those conditions. If we expect every possible
event given any set of conditions then we have every possible belief. Of course,
this is not the goal of theoretical inquiry. In theoretical inquiry we must also min-
imise surprise. In other words, theoretical inquiry attempts to discover every true
belief.
Finally, it is important to note that beliefs are features of deliberate activity
and that deliberate activity is continuous with and depends on non-deliberate
forms of activity. An entity must develop a large amount of behavioural compet-
ency before it can have beliefs. To believe, for instance, that there are biscuits
in the biscuit tin requires ‘animal’ competence with foodstuffs, spatial naviga-
tion, and temporal orderings. This suggests that beliefs cannot be taken as prim-
itive features in an account of human activity. To account for human activity
requires us to account for the background on which the foreground of beliefs
and desires builds, and with which it is continuous. This is why Peirce’s un-
derstanding of the role of beliefs in action goes deeper than that offered in the
‘Standard Story of Action’ (considered in Chapters 1 and 2). It is also why Peirce
could not agree with recent attempts to argue that knowledge-how is a variety
of knowledge-that (e.g. Stanley and Williamson, ‘Knowing How’; Stanley, Know
How). To have knowledge-that, that is, to have successful beliefs, we must already
have developed a vast amount of background competencies. That is, we must
20All habits of expectation are also, from another angle, habits of action (c.f. CP, 5.539). They
would affect our conduct if we were in a situation where they are practically salient.
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have a great deal of ‘know how’.21 To fully engage with these arguments would
take us far from the present task.22 But one further remark is appropriate. Stanley
and Williamson claim that someone knows how to ride a bicycle ‘if and only if,
for some relevant way w which is a way for [that person] to ride a bicycle, [they]
know that w is a way for [them] to ride a bicycle’ (‘Knowing How’, p. 426). On the
view I am attributing to Peirce, the ability to point to something as an enduring
object, let alone to point to a ‘way’ of doing something, builds on this prior ‘an-
imal’ engagement with an environment. In other words, recognising something
as a ‘way to do something’ already depends on the know-how embedded in our
background attunement with the world.
3.2.3 Experimentation as Deliberate Habit Development
I now turn to the development of beliefs by means of experiment.23 The exper-
imental method is a form of deliberately self-controlled habit development. In
this section we we will consider the method in skeletal form. More details will be
introduced as needed in subsequent sections.
Deliberate experimentation is not the only way that beliefs develop. Beliefs
are habits and the forms of habit development considered in the previous chapters
also apply to them. In particular, they are subject to ongoing processes of non-
deliberate habit development. Examples of the effect of these processes were
introduced in Chapter 2. For instance, the case of radical change in someone’s
habits as a result of their being electrocuted. I will expand on that example. It is
easy to imagine that after the electrocution the person’s expectations about the
risk involved in the use of various household appliances, and their resolutions
about their future action involving those appliances, radically changed. If so,
21Colapietro makes a very similar argument which focusses on what is necessary for the pos-
session of concepts (HCP, p. 360).
22In particular, Stanley and Williamson’s arguments depend on a vast amount of linguistic the-
ory. A full Peircean response would thus require us to consider his account of language, and the
relationship between language and beliefs. This would be well outside the scope of this thesis.
23For reasons of space I cannot go into Peirce’s defense of the experimental method as the only
means by which truth can be attained. This was a theme throughout his work, but it is most
prominent in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (EP1, pp. 109–123).
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then on Peirce’s account their beliefs have changed. Note that these need not be
rational changes. Let’s say that this person has developed an extreme aversion to
using the toaster, and that they claim that toasters should not be used because
they are incredibly dangerous. In this case it seems natural to say that their be-
liefs have been changed non-deliberately in response to their electrocution. Less
dramatically, Peirce holds that our deepest beliefs are not directly developed in
any particular case of self-controlled habit development. Rather, the develop-
ment of our deepest ideals is not something we ‘[sit] down to do and have done
with’. Instead they are ‘digested first . . . in the depths of our reasonable being’,
and ‘[t]he results come to consciousness later’ (EP2, p. 248).
In Chapter 1, I generalised Misak’s account of the cycle of belief development
in inquiry, her original statement can now be reintroduced. In inquiry beliefs
develop according to a ‘belief – surprise – doubt – inquiry – belief’ cycle (Misak,
‘Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)’, p. 11). Like all forms of habit development,
the development of beliefs begins in a clash with the environment; a surprise.
My expectation that the moon will be on the horizon fails, or perhaps I get lost
on my way to the park. I am left in a situation where I do not know how to con-
tinue. I can’t make sense of the moon’s position and I can’t decide which road I
should take to get to the park. This, says Peirce, is doubt and doubt is not a habit,
rather, it is ‘the privation of a habit’ (EP2, p. 337). This doubt provides affordance
for experimental inquiry.24 Without genuine doubt, doubt generated by an ex-
periential clash with the environment, we cannot take up experimental inquiry.
Once we have genuine doubt we can begin to experiment. Experimentation
has three phases: abduction, deduction, and induction.25 In the first stage, ab-
duction, we generate an explanatory hypothesis. In the second stage, deduction,
we deduce some experiential consequence of the truth of that hypothesis. In the
final stage, induction, we attempt to determine if the deduced consequences ob-
24It provides affordance for other responses as well. For instance, we could bury our heads in
the sand. I am not concerned that kind of strategy here.
25This division of forms of reasoning into three is one of the central features of Peirce’s logic. It
appears in his earliest published works (e.g. EP1, pp. 33–7) and his latest (EP2, pp. 441–2).
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tain. This stage might take the form of making special observations. For instance,
we might need to build an instrument to expose ourselves to a new form of ex-
perience, or we might need to perform a complex task with pre-existing scientific
instruments. This is a common form of experimentation in the natural sciences,
and is most dramatically illustrated by the construction of massive experimental
apparatuses like the Large Hadron Collider. Experiment can also take the form of
imagining some future situation which I need to prepare for (doubt). I consider
various possible responses to the situation (hypotheses), and reflect on whether
those responses are desirable (induction and deduction). The example of Peirce’s
preparation for an interview, considered in Chapter 2 is of this sort.
Having determined whether the consequences derived from the hypothesis
obtain or not we must decide how to respond to the result. This response will
depend on the particular circumstance of the experiment. If the hypothesis failed
one might adjust it to satisfy the new observation or one might reject it entirely. If
the hypothesis succeeded one might move on to another question, or one might
devise further tests for the same hypothesis. The status of our original beliefs at
the end of this cycle will also depend on the circumstances of the experiment.
Perhaps we will conclude the cycle with new and better beliefs; beliefs more in
harmony with our environment. Alternatively, it might be that our inquiry fails
and we are left without the beliefs that we started with. We might become stuck
testing new hypotheses indefinitely, never developing a new belief.
The experimental method might not look like a form of deliberate self-control
in the sense introduced in Chapter 1. In that chapter I suggested that the distin-
guishing feature of deliberate self-control was that we take responsibility for the
resulting habits. Yet experimental inquiry is set up so that our beliefs are not
just the result of a decision to believe one thing rather than another. In inquiry
we want the world to determine our beliefs rather than ourselves; we want our
beliefs to match an ‘external permanency’ (EP1, p. 120), rather than the shifting
standards of fashion (EP1, pp. 119–20), or the dictates of authority (EP1, pp. 117–
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8).26 But this is consistent with the account provided in Chapter 1. Recall the least
sophisticated example of deliberate self-control that we considered: becoming
one’s ‘own training master’ (CP, 5.533). There we took responsibility for develop-
ing a a habit that we did not create ourselves. The case of experimental inquiry
is analogous. If experimental inquiry is operating correctly we do not determine
what our beliefs will be, but we take responsibility for our holding them.
This account of experimentation applies outside of strictly theoretical inquiry.
For instance, the same basic method applies in what I called the ‘practical sci-
ences’ above. I conclude this skeletal account of experimental inquiry by noting
two features of its application in specifically theoretical inquiry. First, recall that
in theoretical inquiry we actively look for doubt, Peirce holds that the theoreti-
cian must engage in the ‘eager pursuit’ of doubt (CP, 5.520). This is not to say that
we introduce ‘paper doubts’. Rather, we open ourselves up to as much experience
as possible in order that we might attain genuine doubt; we look for clashes with
the environment. Second, note that in any finite span of time our experimental
inquiry might be chasing up a blind alley. Perhaps some new experimental result
will force us to throw away huge amounts of work. Consequently, if theoretical
inquiry is to achieve its goal, truth, it must open itself up to an indefinite future.
Theoretical inquiry works on the hope that, in the long run, any errors in our be-
liefs or hypotheses will be uncovered; it is only by opening ourselves up to the
indefinite future that we can hope for ultimate harmony between our beliefs and
the world.27
3.3 The Background of Theoretical Inquiry
In Chapter 2 I defined the ‘background’ as that in our body of habits which is not
subject to deliberate self-control. Theoretical inquiry, like all of our deliberate
26These citations are from ‘The Fixation of Belief’, one of Peirce’s early defenses of the experi-
mental method.
27This and other things that distinguish theoretical inquiry from our other practices will be
considered in more detail in Chapter 4.
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practices, depends on this background. This section articulates two forms of this
dependence. First, our background beliefs (Section 3.3.1), and second, our ability
to generate explanatory hypotheses (Section 3.3.2). According to Peirce both of
these are instinctive. We will see that they correspond to the two forms of instinct
considered in Chapter 2.
3.3.1 Background Beliefs
According to Peirce theoretical inquiry depends on a set of instinctive and in-
dubitable background beliefs.28 He introduces these beliefs as part of his ‘Crit-
ical Common-Sensism’.29 The argument for their existence can be introduced
through his account of experimental inquiry. On this account all experiments
rely on beliefs that are not directly tested in that experiment. That is, beliefs that
are in the background relative to that experiment. These beliefs might them-
selves be subject to deliberate self-control, but they are not subject to it in the ex-
periments for which they are the background. On Peirce’s account our ‘common-
sense’ beliefs are beliefs that are in the background of any experiment that we can
currently perform. That is, in our current condition we cannot subject them to
genuine experimental inquiry.30
According to Peirce an experiment is ‘a question put to nature’ (EP2, p. 215),
which relies on a definite purpose and a plan (EP2, pp. 339–40). Questions, pur-
poses and plans always depend on ‘background’ beliefs. On one side of the ex-
periment, when formulating a plan we rely on certain conditions holding. On the
other, the result of an experiment does not interpret itself; ‘background’ beliefs
are required for the ‘recognition of the teaching of the experiment’ (EP2, p. 340).
The reliance of experiments on this ‘background’ is most prominent in the de-
28Strictly speaking, all of our deliberate practices depend on these background beliefs, but I am
only concerned with theoretical inquiry here.
29Peirce’s sustained discussions of Critical Common-Sensism are to be found at EP2, pp. 346–
59, and CP, 5.497–537.
30Henceforth I will put ‘background’ in scare-quotes when it refers to beliefs that are in the
background with respect to a particular experiment, as opposed to beliefs that in the background
in the sense defined in Chapter 2.
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ductive and inductive phase.
These dependences are clear in the moon example, which I will expand here.
When I was first confronted with my failed expectation I considered a few hypo-
theses. The first hypothesis was that the moon had radically shifted in position.
When developing a plan to test this hypothesis I had to rely on ‘background’ be-
liefs about the moon and its movement. In particular, I relied on the belief that
the moon is a massive object, that it orbits the Earth due to the force of grav-
ity; more deeply, I relied on the belief that the moon is one object that endures
over time, and that the object that I am observing is actually the moon. Given
these beliefs I concluded that, if the moon has radically changed position, then
it must have been subjected to a massive force. Having concluded this, I needed
to determine whether it actually obtained. This also required ‘background’ as-
sumptions. For instance, that any such force would have observable effects, for
instance, a large flash. It also relied on the thought that any such event would
have been widely noticed by my fellow humans. These together suggested a plan
for testing the hypothesis, which was to look for signs that my fellow beings had
witnessed such a shocking event. Finally, to interpret the results of my observa-
tion required assumptions about what surprise in others looks like. For instance,
that such an event would completely dominate broadcast media.
Peirce suggests an example from chemistry. Let’s say that a chemist has some
hypothesis about the behaviour of a certain molecule in relation to other mo-
lecules and that they want to test it. They decide to use diagrams of the structures
of the relevant molecules. This strategy depends on the belief that, for instance,
the diagrams are representative of all molecules of those types, and that the rules
for manipulating the diagrams correspond sufficiently closely to their actual be-
haviour (c.f. PM, pp. 80–81).
The beliefs in the ‘background’ of a particular experiment need not be in the
background in the sense defined in Chapter 2. Recall that the background is, in
this more involving sense, any feature of our body of habits that is not subject to
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deliberate self-control. The beliefs in the ‘background’ of a particular experiment
are possibly within the scope of deliberate self-control. Many of the ‘background’
beliefs that I listed in connection with the moon example are the result of previ-
ous inquiry or could be subjected to further inquiry. For instance, my beliefs
about what would be required for the moon to radically shift in position are the
result of previous scientific inquiry. Similarly, in the case of the chemist, Peirce
holds that their diagram can only be used as a representation of all molecules
of that type because of previous experiments which have convinced the chemist
that all of the relevant molecules have the same structure (PM, p. 81).31
Peirce holds that some beliefs, our ‘common-sense’ beliefs, are not subject to
deliberate self-control. Some of these beliefs are in the background of all action,
for example, the belief that there is some regularity in the world. Since it is as-
sumed by all experiments, testing it by means of experiment would be as futile
as ‘adding a teaspoonful of saccharine to the ocean in order to sweeten it’ (CP,
5.522). Others are more specific, for instance: that fire burns (CP, 5.498), and
that incest is wrong (EP2, pp. 349–50).
One reason that Peirce thinks we have these beliefs is the general principle
that all deliberate self-control depends on something uncontrolled. So that, if we
consider an experiment, and then attempt to inquire into its ‘background’ be-
liefs, and then into the ‘background’ beliefs of that inquiry, and so on, we would
never succeed in testing them all, or we would come to beliefs that we could not
control. Peirce holds that the latter is the case.
These beliefs are not subject to inquiry because they do not clash with ex-
perience, and thus are not subject to genuine doubt (EP2, pp. 347–8). They are
distinct from those beliefs which we have simply not put enough effort into in-
vestigating. Some beliefs that we don’t currently doubt could easily be doubted
if we looked for disconfirming instances. The ‘common-sense’ beliefs are beliefs
31Another way to think about this would be to return to Peirce’s hierarchy and classification of
the sciences. The hierarchy is organised according to the idea that more fundamental sciences
‘provide principles’ to less fundamental sciences (EP2, p. 258). To rely on the principles provided
by another science is to use those principles in the ‘background’ of your experiments.
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that cannot be genuinely doubted no matter how much effort we put in (c.f. EP2,
p. 337). A consequence of this is that to declare a belief indubitable we must put
into practice ‘a plan for attaining to doubt’, which ‘may involve a solid month of
hard work’ (EP2, p. 353). Only after going through this kind of systematic process
can an inquirer pronounce a belief to be indubitable (EP2, p. 353). But note that,
in accordance with his fallibilism, Peirce holds that these beliefs might conceiv-
ably clash with experience in the future (EP2, p. 348).
Peirce holds that our indubitable beliefs are ‘invariably vague’ (EP2, p. 350).
To say that there is some regularity in the world is not to say that, for instance,
the universe is entirely made up of atoms in mechanical interaction with one
another, nor is to to claim that there is absolute regularity, or to assent to some
particular collection of broad regularities. Each of these beliefs could easily be
doubted. However, the vague belief that there is some regularity in the universe
is not subject to doubt. Similarly, to say that fire burns is not to endorse any
specific claims about how hot the fire has to be, or what it burns. Each specific
claim of that form is open to doubt.
Our indubitable ‘common sense’ beliefs are instinctive (EP2, p. 349). In Chap-
ter 2 I argued that, on Peirce’s view, our instincts are to be understood as innate
tendencies to respond in certain ways to experience; tendencies which them-
selves develop in response to experience. One way of gaining a conception of
these instincts is to consider the habits which they generate in a sufficiently nor-
mal course of experience.32 Our ‘common-sense’ beliefs are instinctive in this
way; they are beliefs that will arise in any human being given a sufficiently ordin-
ary course of experience. Further, this is why they are vague. Just as the vague and
instinctive habit of eating has developed into many culinary cultures; so there are
many ways of believing that there is some regularity in the world.
32This way of looking at our instincts was introduced in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.
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3.3.2 Hypothesis Generation
In Section 3.2.3 we saw that one of the phases of experimental inquiry is hypo-
thesis generation. I did not consider where these hypotheses come from. Why,
for instance, did I hit upon the idea that I might have read the wrong newspaper
when I was surprised by the position of the moon?
Peirce frequently describes our power of generating hypotheses as instinctive
(e.g. EP2, p. 108; pp. 217–8; p. 250; pp. 443–5.). Moreover, Peirce suggests that
this ‘guessing instinct’ is correct more often that sheer chance would suggest.
Following Galileo, he calls it ‘il lume naturale’ (EP2, p. 32; p. 55; pp. 444–5).33
He claims that if we did not have this power we would not be able to discover the
truth (EP2, p. 108; p. 444; CP, 2.753). In this sense science is ‘but the development
of our inborn animal instincts’ (CP, 2.754).34
These claims can be linked to the account of instinct offered in Chapter 2. I
have just mentioned that instinct can be understood as the development of in-
nate potentials in response to experience.35 These potentials and their develop-
ment represent a form of ‘attunement’ with the world; they allow us to respond
appropriately to experience, both surprising and familiar. In our discussion of
this way of looking at instinct we saw that Peirce used the language of hypothesis
generation. For instance, in his claim that it is ridiculous to think that ‘every little
chicken, that is hatched, has to rummage through all possible theories until it
lights upon the good idea of picking up something and eating it’ (CP, 5.591).
An analogy will help to make this point. Peirce considers the position of two
different inquirers with respect to a United States Census Report. One of the in-
quirers is an alien entity from a radically different environment. The other is
an American social scientist. The alien has no background familiarity with the
33‘Il lume naturale’ is Italian for ‘the natural light’.
34Peirce also offers a statistical argument to the conclusion that if we did not have some inbuilt
sympathy with nature then we could never hope to develop an adequate explanatory hypothesis
(see e.g. CP, 5.591). The number of options of possible theories is so vast that it dwarfs the num-
ber that would be adequate explanations, let along true. I will not go into this argument.
35This is the analysis of instinct in terms of its development in the course of an individual run of
experience. The analysis of instinct in the previous section was a vague conception of the results
of this development in a sufficiently normal course of experience.
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kind of information recorded in the census. Consequently, the alien is forced to
try to find random correlations between different bits of data. For instance, he
might begin by ‘comparing the ratio of indebtedness to deaths by consumption
in counties whose names begin with the different letters of the alphabet’ (CP,
2.752). Even if the alien manages to hit upon a significant correlation it would
not be able to make much of it. It might discover, for instance, ‘that in places that
are drier in January there is, not always but generally, less illiteracy than in wetter
places’ (CP, 2.752). But having no familiarity with the effect of rainfall on things
like agriculture, the wealth of a region, and illiteracy, there is no obvious way for
the alien to proceed. The American is in a different position; he is already attuned
with the circumstances of life in his country. As a result he has the ability to gen-
erate plausible hypotheses about the relations between different features of the
census information. In particular, he will not have to thrash about randomly in
order to find possible relationships between January rainfall and illiteracy.
In this example the American’s background familiarity with his environment
need not be instinctive. He might have had a previous career as a farmer for in-
stance. Peirce’s claim about instinctive hypothesis generation is that for us to
be able to achieve knowledge of nature in general we must pre-deliberately at-
tuned with it. According to Peirce, ‘if men had not come to [nature] with special
aptitudes for guessing right, it may well be doubted whether in the ten or twenty
thousand years that they may have existed their greatest mind would have at-
tained the amount of knowledge which is actually possessed by the lowest idiot’
(CP, 2.753). Our instincts make our relationship with the universe analogous to
the American’s relationship to the United States Census Report rather than the
Alien’s.
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3.4 Conclusion: The Priority of Practice
Peirce prioritises practice to theory by showing that theoretical inquiry is a form
of practical interaction with the world. Having systematically developed this
claim in the first three chapters of this thesis, it is worth pausing to reflect on
what it entails. I want to make one of these consequences explicit. Namely,
that anyone in a position to take up theoretical inquiry must already be engaged
in other practices; theoretical inquiry can only be taken up by agents that are
already practically engaged with a world.
On Peirce’s account, theoretical inquiry depends on abilities developed in our
other forms of interaction with the world. This includes those practical abilities
that are the result of deliberate habit development. We use techniques developed
in our other practices in order to advance theoretical inquiry. Examples of this
sort are prominent in the natural sciences. For instance, Peirce suggests that La-
voisier made a major contribution to logic by showing that thinking is something
to be done ‘by manipulating real things’, and that he ‘[made] of his alembics
and cucurbits instruments of thought’ (EP1, p. 111). For this to happen Lavois-
ier relied on techniques of, for instance, glass blowing and heat control that had
already been developed to a high level; Lavoisier’s theoretical inquiry depended
on the prior development of other practices.
The dependence of theoretical inquiry on other forms of practical interac-
tion with the world can be made out in a more principled way by reflecting on
the dependence of theoretical inquiry on the background. One aspect of this de-
pendence is that to achieve the purpose of theoretical inquiry, the discovery of
truth, we must rely on instinct. In particular, instinct is required in order for us to
generate explanatory hypotheses and in order that we might avoid inauthentic
forms of inquiry generated by paper doubts.
These are, as we saw in Section 3.3, particular manifestations of more gen-
eral instincts. Hypothesis generation is a special case of our ability to respond
appropriately to experience, and our ‘common-sense’ beliefs are manifestations
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of our instinctive potential in response to an ordinary course of experience. In
Chapter 2 we saw that our developed instincts are not the result of deliberate
self-control; they come about over a history of non-deliberate interaction with
our physical and cultural environment. Consequently, anything in a position to
take up theoretical inquiry must already have such a history of practical interac-
tion with an environment.
Throughout this thesis I have used the ‘attunement’ metaphor to describe the
background. It should now be clear why it is apt. The background is the tuning
of an instrument; our particular forms of deliberate activity are the performance
of melodies. The success of the latter depends on the former. So another way
to make the above claim is to say that the theorist must already be attuned to a
particular physical and cultural environment.
Chapter 4
The Autonomy of Theory and
Practice
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter I argued that, according to Peirce, theoretical inquiry is a form
of practical interaction with the world. I called this Peirce’s prioritisation of prac-
tice to theory. This claim brings theory and our other practices together. How-
ever, Peirce also holds that theory and our other practices are importantly dis-
tinct. Some commentators have suggested that this distinction is a radical du-
alism and is inconsistent with an understanding of theory as a practice.1 In this
chapter I argue that, rather than being inconsistent with Peirce’s prioritisation
of practice, Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice is a consequence of
it. As argued in Chapter 3, theory is the practice devoted to the discovery of truth
without ulterior motive. It is the special character of truth that requires us to care-
fully mark the distinction between theory and our other practices, and to ensure
their autonomy from one another.2
1My use of the phrase ‘theory and our other practices’ in this paragraph already signals that I
disagree. If these commentators are correct then Peirce cannot hold that theory is a practice.
2Similar interpretations have been suggested by Colapietro (‘Experimental Logic’), Migotti
(‘The Key to Peirce’s View of the Role of Belief in Scientific Inquiry’), and Skagestad (The Road of
Inquiry). Colapietro claims that Peirce’s aim when distinguishing theory from practice is to dis-
tinguish ‘one array of experimental practices from another’, practices with an ‘integrity of their
own’ (Colapietro, ‘Experimental Logic’, p. 47). Skagestad describes his interpretation is one which
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In Section 4.2 I introduce Peirce’s most extreme formulations of the distinc-
tion between theory and practice. These formulations appear in his 1898 Cam-
bridge Conferences Lectures and drafts towards those lectures.3 In the lectures
Peirce argues that theory and practice should not ‘mingle’. For theory and prac-
tice to mingle is, he claims, dangerous for both. If we carry out theoretical in-
quiry in order to satisfy practical needs and desires we can be thrown off the path
of truth. On the other hand, if we let theoretical results affect our practices then
we can suppress long-developed and reliable instinct in favour of highly-fallible
reason. In the course of this argument Peirce appears to make two radical claims
that are worth naming now. The first, the ‘no-belief thesis’, is that there are no
beliefs in theoretical inquiry. The second, the ‘no-instinct thesis’, is that instinct
has no place in theoretical inquiry. At face value these comments set up a hard
dualism between theory and practice, and contradict the work of the previous
chapters. In particular, the claim that theoretical inquiry is directed to the devel-
opment of beliefs and that it depends on instinctive features of the background.
In Section 4.3 I argue that the conflict between Peirce’s 1898 statements and
the account of theory and practice already developed in this thesis is mostly su-
perficial. I consider the no-belief thesis and the no-instinct thesis in detail. In
both cases the appearance of conflict is defused when we examine Peirce’s un-
derlying arguments. In Section 4.3.1 I take up the no-instinct thesis. According
to Chapter 3, one instinctive aspect of theoretical inquiry is our ability to gen-
erate explanatory hypotheses. But Peirce acknowledges this in the 1898 lectures
themselves, so he cannot be arguing for a strict version of the thesis. I argue that
Peirce is best understood as holding that instinct is a necessary input to theor-
etical inquiry, but that it must not determine the eventual results of theoretical
attempts to ‘reconcile the conflicting claims of science and non-scientific knowledge, while pre-
serving the integrity and autonomy of each’ (Skagestad, The Road of Inquiry, p. 195). He notes that
this kind of interpretation is not original with him; an early version is provided by Gaille (Peirce
and Pragmatism, p. 89). My debt to Migotti will be noted in sections 4.3.2 and 4.4.1.
3The Cambridge Conferences Lectures have been published in their entirety in Reasoning and
the Logic of Things (RLT). The two lectures in which he discusses the distinction between theory
and practice are published in the second volume of The Essential Peirce (EP2, pp. 27–56). Draft
versions of first lecture can be found in the Collected Papers (CP, 1.649–677).
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inquiry.
I consider the no-belief thesis in Section 4.3.2. In the 1898 lectures Peirce uses
the word ‘belief’ to refer to that ‘upon which we are willing to act’ (EP2, p. 33).
But, he claims, theoretical inquiry has nothing to do with action. He argues for
this by distinguishing the ‘attitudes’ that practice and theory take towards exper-
ience. In theoretical inquiry we treat the force of experience as an opportunity
to learn, whereas in our other practices the force of experience is something we
must anticipate in order to achieve our various goals. Peirce’s later account of ex-
perimentation, which was articulated in part in Chapter 3, led Peirce to abandon
the claim that acceptance of a proposition in the context of theoretical inquiry
has nothing to do with our conduct. That is, the no-belief thesis itself must be
abandoned. However, the spirit of the underlying argument can be maintained;
theory and our other practices can be distinguished by the attitudes they take to-
wards experience. These attitudes are determined by their respective purposes.
Section 4.4 articulates a positive account of Peirce’s distinction between the-
ory and practice in terms of the framework already developed in this thesis. The
first task, taken up in Section 4.4.1, is to translate Peirce’s distinction between
the theoretical and practical attitudes into this framework. In Chapter 2, we saw
that all practices are characterised by a purpose and the deliberate forms of habit
development by which that purpose is achieved. In Chapter 3 we saw that the-
oretical inquiry has a very special purpose, namely, truth. In theoretical inquiry
we aim at the long-run fixation of belief; we are working towards the eventual ac-
quisition of deliberate habits that create a maximum of expectation, and a min-
imum of surprise.4 The theoretical attitude is to treat experience with this goal in
mind.
On the other hand, in our non-theoretical practices we are attempting to
4It might be that there are a wider class of practices with this character. One might understand
the search for goodness and beauty in similar terms. Perhaps this is behind Peirce’s later attempts
to understand truth as a particular mode of the ‘summum bonum’ (e.g. CP, 1.191; EP2, p. 377; p.
388). This aspect of Peirce’s thought is explored in detail by Potter (Charles S. Peirce on Norms and
Ideals).
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achieve some purpose within a finite time; we are working towards the acquis-
ition of habits which put us into sufficient harmony with the world that we can
satisfy certain desires within some relevant set of circumstances. This distinction
can be expressed compactly by saying that theory and our other practices have
a different relationship to time, instinct, and doubt. In the former we are not
temporally constrained, our instinctive expectations are always subject to fur-
ther test, and we actively search for situations where our beliefs will clash with
experience. In the latter we need to act within a finite time-frame, we can rely on
our instincts, and we only consider a narrow range of relevant cases.
The second task, taken up in Section 4.4.2, is to reintroduce Peirce’s warnings
against ‘mingling’ theory and our other practices in light of this new framework.
According to Peirce if we miss the distinction between theory and practice we
might let needs and desires from out other practices affect the course of our the-
oretical inquiries; we risk introducing the constraints of the practical attitude into
our theorising. At worst we might ‘block the path of inquiry’, at best we can take
ourselves off the most efficient path to the truth. For example, we might focus
our attention on objects which we already expect will be useful to us at the ex-
pense of currently-useless objects that might teach us more.5 On the other hand,
the special character of theoretical inquiry means that we must be very careful
about allowing it to influence practice. In particular, without marking the dis-
tinct roles of instinct within the theory and practice we might allow what seem to
us to be very good theoretical reasons for some policy overrule strong instincts
to the contrary. Instincts, as we saw in Chapter 2, are not arbitrary. They are the
result of sustained, non-deliberate, habit development, and consequently have
5It is more clear today than it was in Peirce’s time that even the most seemingly useless ob-
ject can likely be made useful. One well-known case of the rapid and unpredictable shift from
useless to useful can be illustrated by G. H. Hardy’s remark that, as a special case of their gen-
eral uselessness, ‘[n]o one has yet discovered any warlike purpose to be served by the theory of
numbers or relativity’ (Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology, pp. 140–1). This comment was first
published in 1940. Within five years nuclear weapons had been developed using relativity theory,
and within the same period number theory became the foundation of cryptography. That this
shift often happens does not affect Peirce’s claims about what should motivate pure theoretical
inquiry. This will become clear in Section 4.4.2.
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a great deal of experience and ‘virtual reasoning’ behind them. For instance, a
bassoon teacher might miss this distinction and adopt a theory of teaching at the
expense of their long-developed, instinctive, attunement with the needs of their
bassoon students. While this ‘virtual reasoning’ is not appropriate for the fixa-
tion of our views in theoretical inquiry, Peirce argues that it is highly appropriate
in practical situations.
4.2 Peirce on Vital Matters and Practical Utilities
Peirce opened his 1898 Cambridge Conferences Lectures with a confession to
his audience. Having argued that the majority of Ancient Greek philosophers
thought philosophy should deeply affect conduct, and noted that in this regard
Aristotle was an exception, Peirce continues: ‘Now, Gentlemen, it behooves me,
at the outset of this course, to confess to you that in this respect I stand before
you an Aristotelean and a scientific man, condemning with the whole strength of
conviction the Hellenic tendency to mingle Philosophy and Practice’ (EP2, p. 29).
In the quote just given Peirce contrasts philosophy with practice, but his claim
is more general. Philosophy is not to be mingled with practice because theory is
not to be mingled with practice. I will divide Peirce’s claim into two and consider
each part in turn. First, I consider why he thinks that theory should not affect
practice. Second, I consider why he thinks that practice should not affect theory.
Peirce articulates both of these positions by pointing to the distinct relationship
theory and practice have to our beliefs and instincts. Practice, Peirce seems to
say, relies on instincts and beliefs. In theoretical inquiry, on the other hand, there
is no role for instinct or belief.
Peirce argues that practice should not influence theory. He divides the cases
where practice might influence theoretical inquiry into ‘vital matters’ and ‘prac-
tical utilities’. Vital matters are issues that have momentous impact on us as in-
dividuals (CP, 1.673). Vital matters demand full commitment and immediate ac-
tion from an agent (EP2, p. 33); they are cases upon which the agent’s life is risked
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(EP2, p. 29). Peirce’s primary examples of vital matters are our most fundamental
ethical and religious commitments.6 Here Peirce seems to be saying that we can-
not inquire into matters of ethics and religion. These are some of the most central
questions of philosophy as traditionally construed. So, if Peirce really means this,
then he is making a radical claim.7 On the other hand, a practical utility is some-
thing which helps us to achieve our desires. According to Peirce, in theoretical
inquiry practical utilities must be ‘put out of sight’ (EP2, p. 34). He acknowledges
that the temptation to inquire for the sake of practical utilities is a strong one;
there are theoretical results which are ‘almost immediately applicable to human
life’ (EP2, p. 29). He cites engineering and surgery as sciences that are particularly
susceptible to this kind of temptation (CP, 1.671). Peirce does not think of engin-
eering and surgery as non-science, or even as not theoretical, but in so far as they
are theoretical sciences they are not carried out for practical ends; they still have
a ‘divine spark’ (CP, 1.671). Peirce seems to be claiming that the value of engin-
eering is not in the fact that it helps us to, for instance, build bridges. Moreover, if
this is right we should not take up the science of engineering in order to achieve
our goal of building bridges. To do so would be to ‘obstruct the advance of the
pure science’ (EP2, p. 29).
Peirce also seems to argue that theoretical inquiry should never influence
practice. We should, says Peirce, rely on instinct and sentiment in practical mat-
ters rather than theoretical reason (EP2, pp. 32–33). According to Peirce our in-
6That Peirce thinks of these as vital matters is clear from his suggestion that ‘the man who
would allow his religious life to be wounded by the sudden acceptance of a philosophy of religion
or who would precipitately change his code of morals, at the dictate of a philosophy of ethics,. . . ,
is a man whom we should consider unwise’ (EP2, p. 32). Later he refers to this kind of change as
a ‘vital change’ (EP2, p. 34). These are decisions on which an individual life is risked because they
deeply affect the character of that life.
7Misak has interpreted Peirce’s comments on vital matters in this way. She makes the further
inference that, since Peirce defines truth in terms of inquiry (as argued in Section 3.2.1), Peirce
must hold that there is no truth or falsity about matters we cannot inquire into. Consequently,
if we cannot inquire into ethics and religion then there cannot be any truth about those mat-
ters. Misak thus connects Peirce’s comments on ‘vital matters’ to the question of cognitivism
in ethics (Misak, ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, pp. 149–52; Misak, ‘A Peircean Account of Moral
Judgements’, pp. 39–40). I will challenge Misak’s interpretation in Section 4.4.2. I argue that vital
matters are defined by the degree of commitment that they require, rather than any particular
subject matter.
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stincts are unlikely to lead to mistakes in everyday life; they are the result of ‘in-
duction[s] summarising the experience of all our race’ (EP2, p. 32). That is, in-
stinct embodies the long-developed wisdom of the human species and of our
particular culture. As such, it is to be relied on in the everyday cases in which
it developed. In the case of vital matters, Peirce suggests that they must be left
entirely to instinct (EP2, p. 33). He is less strict regarding practical utilities. As we
have already seen, he allows that there are theoretical results which are ‘almost
immediately’ applicable. However, the application of these results requires more
than theoretical reason. It relies on the kind of instinctive wisdom that Peirce
thinks we require in all of our practical life.
One of the most striking claims that Peirce makes here is that ‘[t]here is. . . no
proposition at all in science which answers to the conception of belief’ (EP2,
p. 33). This claim has been called the ‘no-belief thesis’.8 In this lecture Peirce
defines a belief as that which we are willing to act on (EP2, pp. 32–3). If theory
has nothing to do with action, then it has nothing to do with beliefs.9 Peirce also
says that he ‘would not allow to sentiment or instinct any weight whatsoever in
theoretical matters, not the slightest’ (EP2, p. 32). I will call this the ‘no-instinct
thesis’. According to the most extreme reading of this thesis instinct plays abso-
lutely no role in theoretical inquiry. It is clear that this reading is not compatible
with the claim, defended in Chapter 3, that theoretical inquiry depends on our
instinctive attunement with the world.
Many commentators hold that Peirce’s 1898 position results in a radical split
between theory and practice, and that this is a very uncomfortable place for a
pragmatist to be in. This line of thinking has been forcefully put by recent Dewey-
influenced pragmatists such as John Stuhr and Larry Hickman. Stuhr suggests
that there is a ‘fundamental dualism of theory and practice in much of Peirce’s
8The terms ‘no-belief thesis’, ‘no-belief doctrine’, or similar are used in the work of many com-
mentators (e.g. TRP, p. 24; Misak, ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’; Migotti, ‘The Key to. . . ’; Boyd,
‘Levi’s Challenge’).
9It is important to note that the no-belief thesis encapsulates one aspect of his distinction
between theory and practice. It is not an argument for the distinction between theory and prac-
tice. We will see in Section 4.3.2 the Peirce argued for it as a consequence of the distinction.
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philosophy’ (Stuhr, ‘Rendering. . . ’, p. 9). He thinks that this dualism is dangerous,
in particular, he claims that leaving practice to instinct rather than reason results
in ‘ignorance, prejudice, absolutism, isolation, frustration, and conflict’ (Stuhr,
‘Rendering. . . ’, p. 11).10 Hickman, in response to Peirce’s claim that the theorist
must keep the usefulness of their results out of sight, holds there is a ‘chasm’ in
Peirce’s thought between theory and practice (Hickman, ‘Why Peirce Didn’t Like
Dewey’s Logic’, p. 181). He goes on to imply that this chasm means that Peirce
cannot think of theory as a kind of practice.11 Maryann Ayim cites the 1898 com-
ments (amongst others) as representing Peirce’s ‘rigid distinction’ between the-
ory and practice. She claims that ‘the underlying tendencies of Peirce’s philo-
sophy cry out against the type of rigid distinction he tried to draw between the-
ory and practice’ (Ayim, ‘Theory, Practice. . . ’, p. 51). Each of these commentators
highlights the fact that there is a tension between, on the one hand, distinguish-
ing between theory and practice as Peirce seems to in 1898, and holding that
theory is a variety of practice. I now turn to arguing that, properly understood,
Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice is in fact a consequence of the
way that he makes theoretical inquiry a mode of practical interaction with the
world.
4.3 Instinct and Belief in Theoretical Inquiry
4.3.1 The No-Instinct Thesis
The strong form of the ‘no-instinct’ thesis takes Peirce’s claim that ‘he would not
allow to sentiment or instinct any weight whatsoever in theoretical matters’ to
exclude any influence of instinct in theoretical inquiry. I argue that, when we
examine Peirce’s claim and the arguments for it in more detail, the strong inter-
10I will return to this claim in Section 4.4.2. I will argue that this complaint depends on a static
view of instinct and misses Peirce’s account of practical inquiry.
11Hickman cites Dewey’s claim that ‘the conduct of scientific inquiry. . . is a mode of practice’
as a ‘radical’ contrast with Peirce’s ‘dualism of science and “vital affairs”’ (Hickman, ‘Why Peirce
Didn’t Like Dewey’s Logic’, p. 186).
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pretation is untenable. Rather than excluding instinct from theory in toto, Peirce
argues that instinct should not determine the ultimate results of theoretical in-
quiry. Further, I argue that this is consistent with Peirce’s claim that theoretical
inquiry depends on our instinctive attunement with the world. If so, then the
no-instinct thesis does not conflict with the claims about instinct and theory de-
fended in the previous chapters of this thesis.
That Peirce aims to prevent instinct from determining the results of theor-
etical inquiry is clear from the examples that he considers. For instance, in the
1898 lectures, Peirce singles out metaphysics as particularly susceptible to this
form of influence from instinct. The traditional metaphysical questions, as Peirce
uses the term ‘metaphysics’ in this lecture, concern issues such as life after death
and the existence of God.12 These matters are not experientially tractable in the
same way that, for instance, questions about the motion of solid bodies are. Con-
sequently, Peirce claims, metaphysicians frequently adopt reasonings because
they are ‘impressed that [they are] sound’ (EP2, p. 30). This is an appeal to in-
stinct. This suggests that the form of influence of instinct on theory that is in-
appropriate is the form of influence which makes theory unresponsive to exper-
ience (EP2, pp. 32–3). That is, allowing our instincts to determine our views pre-
vents us from determining our views according to something external to us. This
point does not need to be made by considering the methodological problems of
metaphysics though. One need only consider the reception that a physical sci-
entist would receive at a conference if they defended their conclusions by simply
saying that they ‘have a hunch’.
It is clear from these very lectures that Peirce is not concerned about instinct
providing some form of grounding for theoretical inquiry. In the first lecture he
says that ‘reason. . . comes down upon its marrow-bones to beg the succor of in-
stinct’ (EP2, p. 32). Peirce refers here to the role of instinct in hypothesis gener-
12Peirce explicitly cites the example of life after death in this lecture (EP2, p. 30). In other writ-
ings from the 1890’s Peirce characterises the traditional questions of metaphysics as ‘God, Free-
dom, and Immortality’ (CP, 5.382fn.1).
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ation (EP2, pp. 31–2). This is also clear in a later lecture, where Peirce says that
‘[science] is driven in desperation to call upon its inward sympathy with nature,
its instinct for aid’ (EP2, p. 55). Since these hypotheses are, as far as theoretical in-
quiry is concerned, guesses, they must be tested against experience (EP2, p. 32).
It is the test of experience that determines whether our hypothesis is maintained
or not. In other words, the hypothesis is generated by instinct, but its survival
is determined by experience. Consequently, my appeal to instinct as the ground
of our ability to generate explanatory hypotheses does not fall afoul of the no-
instinct thesis.13
According to my account, theoretical inquiry is also grounded in a set of in-
stinctive common-sense beliefs (Section 3.3.1). Since Peirce had not yet formu-
lated his critical common-sensism in 1898, he does not mention these beliefs
in the lectures. However, we can test them against the principle that instinct can
play a role in the method of theoretical inquiry but must not determine its results.
Our common-sense beliefs, while they are indubitable for now, do not determine
the eventual result of theoretical inquiry. While these beliefs, by definition, can-
not be genuinely inquired into at the present time, they are subject to change in
response to experience (EP2, p. 349). According to Peirce’s definition of truth, if
one of these beliefs is false then there will be some external regularity with which
it clashes, although we cannot now conceive of what that clash would look like.
In the long-run this clash will be experienced, the belief will cease to be indubit-
able, and will either be replaced or adjusted.14 If the belief is true, then it will
be sustained. In both cases the belief’s being the ultimate result of inquiry is de-
termined not by instinct, but by the force of experience.
In sum, the starting point of theoretical inquiry does not determine the res-
ults of theoretical inquiry. Theoretical inquiry uses our instincts in order that we
13Misak provides a similar analysis (Misak, ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, pp. 159–60).
14The claim that the clash will be experienced is a consequence of Peirce’s later articulations of
the ‘long run’. Simply, if there is an experience to be had which clashes with a given belief, and we
have not yet come across that clash, then we have not yet exhausted inquiry with respect to that
belief (c.f. EP2, p. 457).
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might determine our beliefs according to, in the words of ‘The Fixation of Be-
lief’, ‘some external permanency’ (EP1, p. 120). Consequently, the account of the
role of instinct in theoretical inquiry defended in Chapter 3 is not challenged by
Peirce’s 1898 lectures.15
4.3.2 The No-Belief Thesis
The no-belief thesis has been taken in a very strong form by some commentat-
ors. This has led to claims that Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice
is inconsistent. For instance, Misak claims that Peirce vacillates between saying
that belief has no place in science and that it does ‘in the same breath’ (Misak, ‘C.
S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, p. 164). She comes to this conclusion by taking Peirce’s
claim that there are ‘propositions to which no competent man today demurs’ in
science to imply that there are beliefs in science (Misak, ‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Mat-
ters’, p. 164). Hookway notes that, when dealing with the no-belief thesis, we can
be misled by Peirce’s various uses of the word ‘belief’ (TRP, pp. 24–5).16 Strong in-
terpretations of the no-belief thesis, like Misak’s, take his use of ‘belief’ to mean
‘any kind of holding for true’.17 However, in this series of lectures Peirce clarifies
that he is referring to ‘what is properly and usually called belief ’ (EP2, p. 33).18
Peirce sheds light on what he means by this in a later lecture from the same series
15One further piece of evidence from these lectures that supports this idea that instinct and
sentiment ground theoretical inquiry is Peirce’s insistence that the metaphysician who determ-
ines the result of their inquiry by means of instinct is failing to be the ‘genuine, honest, earnest,
resolute, energetic, industrious, and accomplished doubter that it is his duty to be’ (EP2, p. 31).
One could argue on the basis of this that theoretical inquiry must be grounded in the instincts
and sentiments of the inquirer that embody those virtues. To make this out would require further
work of the sort carried out by Savan (‘Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion’) and Hookway (TRP,
pp. 223–45).
16Peirce worried about his use of the terms ‘belief’ and ‘doubt’ from early on in his published
writings. For instance, in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, he suggests that the words are normally
used only in ‘religious and other grave discussions’ (EP1, p. 128). He goes on to say that his wide
(in that article) use of the words suggests ‘a temper which is uncomfortable to the verge of insan-
ity’ (EP1, p. 128). It is my impression that the connotations that these words have for Peirce have
changed quite markedly since his time. The idea that ‘belief’ should apply to any kind of ‘holding
for true’ seems to be more in line with contemporary usage. This is perhaps in the background of
some of the more extreme responses to Peirce’s supposed no-belief thesis.
17As Peirce himself does in later writings (e.g. NM4, p. 39).
18The same point, regarding Misak’s interpretation, is made by Boyd (‘Levi’s Challenge’, pp. 58–
9), and Migotti (‘The Key to. . . ’, p. 45).
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called ‘The First Rule of Logic’. There Peirce claims that ‘belief’ is only appropri-
ately used to refer to ‘practical holding for true’, rather than ‘theoretical holding
for true’ (EP2, p. 56). That is, it only applies to action-guiding acceptance of a pro-
position (c.f. Migotti, ‘The Key to. . . ’, p. 51). One consequence of this is that the
mere fact that I referred to the habits under development in theoretical inquiry as
‘beliefs’, does not directly put my account in tension with the no-belief thesis.19
Taking ‘what is properly and usually called belief ’ to be equivalent to ‘prac-
tical holding for true’, we can turn to Peirce’s argument for the no-belief thesis.
His argument concerns the relationship between theoretical inquiry and action.
Pure theoretical inquiry has, says Peirce, ‘nothing at all to do with action’ (EP2,
p. 33). If so, then it has nothing to do with beliefs. This argument is most clear
in ‘The First Rule of Logic’, where Peirce explicitly distinguishes between the at-
titude that theory and practice take to ‘facts’ (EP2, pp. 54–5). Here we are to un-
derstand a ‘fact’ as that in our experience which cannot be wished away; facts
are things that have compulsive power over us.20 According to Peirce, ‘[s]cience,
when it comes to understand itself, regards facts as merely the vehicle of eternal
truth’ (EP2, p. 55).21 This is just to say that theory is carried out for the purpose
of the discovery of truth; ‘to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach it’
(EP2, p. 54). This means that theory constantly opens itself up to the compulsive
force of facts. Practice, on the other hand, is not directed to truth. Peirce holds
that ‘[f ]or Practice, facts are the arbitrary forces with which it has to reckon and
wrestle’ (EP2, p. 55). When taking the practical attitude we have to act in the world
in order to achieve our ends. Facts are simply that which we must master in or-
der to achieve of those ends. Peirce confines the term ‘belief’ to commitment to
a proposition whilst taking the practical attitude towards the world. That is, to
19I used ‘belief’ to mean any kind of holding for true in Section 3.2.2.
20Peirce links compulsion and facts in a few places (EP2, 182; CP, 1.358; 7.659). He defines a
‘fact’ in terms of his categories as ‘the Secondness which consists between anything and a pos-
sibility, or Firstness, realized in that thing’ (EP2, p. 271). Secondness is, from one perspective,
identical with compulsion.
21As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1), we can equate ‘science’ with ‘theory’ here.
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‘practical holding for true’.22
The spirit of this distinction can be maintained consistently with the frame-
work developed in previous chapters. However, it cannot be drawn quite as starkly
as Peirce did in 1898. This is simply because theoretical inquiry requires action,
namely, experimental action. Peirce admits this in later writings, where he says
‘[scientists] are particularly given to thinking of their results as affording possible
conditions for new experiments . . . [t]his shows that regarding a truth as purely
theoretical does not prevent its being regarded as a possible determinant of con-
duct’ (EP2, p. 372). In other words, theoretical results are used in the construction
and prosecution of experiments, and experiments are deliberate actions carried
out for the purpose of the discovery of truth. Consequently, there is action when
we take up the theoretical attitude, and this action is guided by our theoretical
results. If so, then we cannot maintain the no-belief thesis.23 However, we can
maintain the underlying distinction between the theoretical and practical atti-
tudes.
4.4 The Distinction Between Theory and Practice
4.4.1 The Theoretical and Practical Attitudes
Having shown that Peirce’s distinction between theory and practice is not in deep
contradiction with the framework developed in this thesis, I can now provide a
positive account of Peirce’s distinction within that framework. The heart of the
distinction between theory and practice is the distinction between the theoret-
ical and practical attitudes to experience. So the first task of this section is to
translate that distinction into the language of habits and their development. It
will then be possible to list the distinguishing characteristics of theory and our
22The interpretation offered in this paragraph is inspired by Migotti’s, although I equate ‘what
is properly and usually called belief ’ with ‘practical holding for true’, rather than with ‘full belief’
(c.f Migotti, ‘The Key to. . . ’, pp. 49–50).
23This interpretation is consonant with Hookway’s eventual conclusion regarding the no-belief
thesis, namely, that it is a provisional response to the issue of distinguishing theory and practice
that he later overcomes with his account of the ‘practice of theoretical science’ (TRP, p. 42).
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other practices, namely, their distinct relationship with time, instinct, and doubt.
As noted above, Peirce distinguishes between the theoretical and practical
attitudes according to their relationship to ‘facts’. For the former, facts offer af-
fordances for the discovery of truth. For the latter, facts are something which we
must overcome in order to achieve our ends. In Chapter 3 I argued that a true be-
lief is one that is in perfect harmony with experience. Using that account of truth
we can characterise the theoretical attitude as the attitude in which we treat the
compulsive force of experience as providing opportunities for the eventual de-
velopment of perfect harmony between our belief-habits and the widest possible
environment.24 For example, if I take the theoretical attitude towards my exper-
ience of the moon, I will open myself up to the correction of my expectations
about its behaviour in as many ways as occur to me. I might, for instance, at-
tempt to determine how its craters developed, or what it would look like if I were
to be transported there, or whether it behaves in a similar way to other moons.
I might even ask what would happen in highly implausible cases, for instance, I
could ask how the moon’s behaviour would change if there were another moon
of the same size also orbiting the Earth. When taking on the theoretical attitude
I have no aim apart from the discovery of truths about the moon and its actual
and potential relationships with other things.
The practical attitude is then the attitude in which we attempt to overcome
the compulsive force of the experience in order to achieve some desire. When we
are prevented, we engage in habit development in order to be able to satisfy the
given desire or goal. When taking up the practical attitude we attempt to attain
habits sufficiently in harmony with our environment for us to achieve our desires
in some relevant set of circumstances. If I take up the practical attitude towards
my experience of the moon I might ask how I can use it to navigate, to plan a
fishing trip, or to make sure that I don’t get caught out by high-tide when walking
along the coast. When taking up the practical attitude all that matters is that my
24Or, habits which grant us ‘the maximum of expectation and the minimum of surprise’ (R693,
p. 164 via: Hookway, Peirce, p. 67).
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habits are in sufficient harmony with the behaviour of the moon for me to attain
my various purposes. For example, say that I have a habit of avoiding walking
along the coast around midnight when I know that it is a full moon and that this
is the full extent of my practical use of the moon. I might then get caught out by
high tide at some other time of the day when the moon is in a different phase.
This surprise might set habit development in motion. I might, for instance, dis-
cover that I should avoid walking along the coast when the moon is high in the
sky. In this case I only develop my expectations about the moon to the extent that
they help me to plan my coastal walks.
According to Chapter 2, a practice is defined by a purpose and a form of de-
liberate habit development. Consequently we can understand the distinction
we have just drawn in terms of habits and their development as a distinction
between the practice directed to truth, namely, theoretical inquiry; and practices
directed to other purposes. The distinction between theory and practice thus
depends on the distinction between truth and other purposes.
I suggested above that the pursuit of truth puts us into a distinct relationship
with time, instinct, and doubt. It is now time to articulate these differences. The
three distinctions in question are:
1. unlike other practices, theoretical inquiry has no temporal constraints;25
2. in the pursuit of truth our instincts provide provisional guesses for further
testing, in other practices we must rely on instinct to determine our action;
and
3. in the pursuit of truth we actively seek out clashes with experience wherever
they can be found, in the pursuit of other purposes we need only anticipate
plausible cases in which we might need to achieve those purposes.26
25This distinction, not necessarily using exactly this terminology, has been emphasised by Sk-
agestad (The Road of Inquiry, p. 208) and Ayim (‘Theory, Practice. . . ’, pp. 48–9).
26Note that these three distinctions are not independent. For instance, the inapplicability of
instinct in theoretical inquiry is a result of the fact that, according to Chapter 2, our instincts
develop within a circumscribed environment. Since we extend ourselves into unfamiliar territory
in theoretical inquiry we cannot trust our instincts. That is, since we look as widely as possible
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According to Peirce, truth is a long-run goal. He says, for instance, that theor-
etical inquiry has ‘an indefinite future before it; and what it aims at is to gain the
greatest possible advance in knowledge in five centuries or ten’ (CP, 7.606). This
is a consequence of Peirce’s definition of truth in terms of belief and doubt, and
ultimately in terms of habit. No matter how long a habit has survived we have no
guarantee that it won’t clash with experience tomorrow. This is as true for beliefs
as it is for any other habit. External time constraints do not enter into theoret-
ical inquiry. When taking up the theoretical attitude towards the moon I hope
to contribute to the long-run settlement of beliefs about its behaviour. When I
take up the practical attitude I need my beliefs about the moon to be sufficiently
reliable that I can plan my coastal walks. Every clash between my habits and my
experience of the moon while taking the theoretical attitude opens me up to the
possibility of improving my beliefs, and so is desired. On the other hand, a clash
between my habits and my experience of the moon when on a coastal walk might
end with me swept out to sea. This is not desired – in this kind of case I need my
habits to be in sufficient harmony with my environment now.27
Theoretical inquiry and our other practices have different relationships with
instinct. In Chapter 3 I argued that hypothesis generation is a special case of
our more general instinctive ability to respond appropriately to novel situations.
When attempting to attain some practical purpose I must rely on my instinctive
responses in the moment. In theoretical inquiry on the other hand my instinct-
ive beliefs and hypotheses are always provisional. Moreover, when taking up the
theoretical attitude we attempt to bring our beliefs under our control as much
as possible. We want to be fully aware of what is going on in our environment.
Another way to put this is that in theoretical inquiry believing something simply
because it is instinctive is a sign that there is further work to be done. This is not
the case in our other practices. If our instincts allow us to achieve our ends we
for doubt, instinct cannot be relied on to determine our views.
27Migotti draws this distinction in terms of ‘provisionality’. Our theoretical results are always
provisional, but our beliefs are not; they must be acted upon in the now (Migotti, ‘The Key to. . . ’,
pp. 50–51).
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need not criticise them. It is fine to rely on my instinctive, and otherwise non-
deliberately developed, beliefs about the moon if they help me to successfully
plan my fishing trips. In theoretical inquiry, on the other hand, I want to under-
stand why these beliefs are true.
Finally, in theoretical inquiry we attempt to develop habits which would be
in perfect harmony with experience in any conceivable circumstance. Conse-
quently, in theoretical inquiry we attempt to find any possible way that our be-
liefs might clash with experience. In the language of Peirce’s critical common-
sensism, we strive to attain ‘genuine doubt’ (CP, 5.514; 5.520). That is, we open
ourselves up to the force of facts, trying to learn whatever they have to teach us
(EP2, p. 55). For instance, it is a failure in my theoretical understanding of the
moon if I cannot predict what would happen if another moon was inserted into
the Earth-Moon system according to some given parameters, and if I realise that
I do not know the answer to this question it will cause genuine doubt. However
when taking up the practical orientation we need only consider the possibilities
for experiential clash which we think might plausibly prevent us from attaining
our goals.28 Perhaps I realise that for some practical purpose I need to know what
phase the moon is in when it is clouded over for long periods of time. This case
is thus brought within the practically relevant cases that I need to consider.
4.4.2 The Dangers of Mingling Theory and Practice
I can now reintroduce Peirce’s worries about the ‘mingling’ of theory and our
other practices in terms of the distinction between the theoretical and practical
attitudes developed in the previous section. More specifically, Peirce’s concerns
can be understood in terms of the different relationship theoretical inquiry and
our other practices take to time, instinct, and doubt. I begin by considering
28Peirce makes a very similar point when he distinguishes ‘logical’ and ‘moral’ self-control. He
holds that ‘in the logical process [of habit-development] the imagination takes far wider flights,
proportioned to the generality of the field of inquiry, . . . while in the moral process we consider
only situations that may be apprehended or anticipated’ (EP2, p. 347). That is, when deliberately
controlling our action we need only consider a narrow set of cases, whereas in theoretical inquiry
we must consider as many cases as possible.
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Peirce’s worries about the influence of other practices on theoretical inquiry. Here
Peirce’s overarching worry is that this influence introduces external constraints
which can divert us from the pursuit of truth.29 As we will see this worry mani-
fests itself slightly differently in the case of vital matters and practical utilities. I
then turn to Peirce’s claim that our other practices should not be influenced by
the results of theoretical inquiry. This claim rests on the different roles on instinct
in each. According to Peirce, while instinct cannot be relied on when we take up
the theoretical attitude, it is our surest guide in our other practices.
It is easy to misinterpret what Peirce means by a ‘vital matter’. When he refers
to vital matters he is not picking out a particular subject matter, rather he is
pointing to a certain kind of commitment that is sometimes necessary within
the practical attitude. We have already seen, in Section 4.2, that vital matters
are those commitments on which an agent’s life is risked. Some of these com-
mitments endure over a long period of time. For example, a commitment to the
existence of human rights, to the care of your children, or to a particular religious
tradition. Others examples are confined to particular moments. We can imagine
the captain of a ship, stuck in a storm, and faced with the possibility of being
dashed against the rocks (c.f EP2, p. 156). The captain must immediately decide
whether to turn hard left or hard right. If he makes the wrong choice he will not
survive; his life, and the lives of his crew, are risked on the decision. Further, once
the decision has been made he must be absolutely committed it. He cannot de-
cide to turn left having already put the decision to turn right into effect. Upon
making this decision, his commitment to turning right is a vital matter.
In the language developed in the previous section, a vital matter is a response
to a certain kind of situation that can arise when taking on the practical attitude.
In particular, these situations require a decision within a tight time-frame; and
29Note that the characterisation of theoretical inquiry offered in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1)
means that any practice which is not solely devoted to truth is not theoretical inquiry. One might
argue that by definition theoretical inquiry cannot be pursued for practical ends. Strictly speak-
ing, this section deals with the consequences of failing to mark this distinction.
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once the decision is made there is no further room for doubt.30
According to Peirce, we cannot take up theoretical inquiry into vital matters
because we are already committed to a particular outcome. In vital matters there
is no room for doubt, whereas theoretical inquiry requires us to honestly sub-
ject our beliefs to the force of experience. Take, for example, someone who is
committed to the belief that the universe was created in seven days. Now, this
idea is, presumably, perfectly fine as a hypothesis to be tested. However, in the
case of this would-be inquirer, the belief is part of a wider religious commitment
by which they hope to attain salvation; it is a belief that they risk their life on.
Given that, their attempts at inquiry consist of looking for arguments for their
pre-determined conclusion and ignoring evidence to the contrary.31 As another
example, perhaps I have thought a long time that I am the person who is going to
cure cancer. Being consumed by this idea I find myself, perhaps unconsciously,
falsifying my results.
It should now be clear why Misak’s attempt to interpret Peirce’s comments on
vital matters as a challenge to cognitivism is not appropriate.32 Firstly, we have
just seen that vital matters are not a particular kind of subject matter (c.f. Misak,
‘C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters’, pp. 151–2). A matter is vital relative to a particular
agent. Just because I cannot genuinely inquire into some subject about which
I am vitally committed does not mean some other inquirer can’t.33 If inquiry is
possible into some subject then, on Peircean principles, there might be a truth of
the matter about that subject. That is, Peirce’s thought on vital matters does not
30I will return to this claim when I consider Peirce’s argument that our other practices should
not be influenced by theoretical inquiry.
31Of course, the claim that such a process is going on in someone’s work is a serious one. One
can even imagine such a charge being made against someone who is, instead, on the cutting
edge of science. This does not affect the underlying claim that if one has a vital commitment,
then genuine theoretical inquiry into the subject of that commitment is impossible.
32See fn.7 of this chapter.
33Peirce also allows that we might be able to inquire into a previously vital matter by means of
‘self-abnegation’ (EP2, p. 33). That is, if take on a sufficiently detached attitude towards our own
life we can take up theoretical inquiry on the matter in question. For example, imagine a cancer
researcher who also suffers from the particular cancer that they studying. On Peirce’s model this
researcher is only a genuine inquirer if they can, when inquiring, put the possibility that this
research might solve their own condition out of mind. They must have made their own survival
of the cancer, in some sense, no longer vital.
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challenge cognitivism.34
One might challenge Peirce’s claim that we cannot inquire into matters that
are vital to us by arguing that inquiry is a group activity that can happily accom-
modate a few dogmatists within its ranks. For instance, one might think that it
is not a problem if someone vitally committed to the truth of some theory and
articulates the best possible arguments for it. Surely this person could be seen as
making a positive contribution to theoretical inquiry. For instance, we can ima-
gine an astronomer for whom Einstein’s general relativity is a vital matter. This
person might contribute to the working out of details in the theory, or to artic-
ulating current arguments for the theory. Peirce’s account does not exclude this
kind of case. There are at least two things a Peircean should emphasise though.
On one hand, this person’s ability to contribute to theoretical inquiry is a result
of luck. They have been lucky to hitch themselves to a theory that is considered
within the bounds of possibility in the current state of theoretical inquiry. They
are not attempting to argue for, say, Ptolemaic astronomy. We should also note
that theoretical inquiry could not survive if the majority of investigators behaved
in this way. This astronomer’s position is parasitic on the existence of genuine
inquirers. If there were only dogmatists, then the only possible change in the-
ory over time would be the death of ‘theorists’ with one set of arbitrary doctrines,
and their replacement by younger ‘theorists’ with some other set of arbitrary doc-
trines.
One further qualification needs to be made before turning to practical util-
ities. Peirce is not suggesting that we should not think about our deep com-
mitments, or that we should not consider various options before making major
decisions. Peirce’s claim is that we cannot genuinely inquire into matters that
are already vital to us. Before taking up such a commitment we might have a
chance to perform some rough-and-ready practical inquiry. For instance, per-
haps the captain of the imperilled ship has fifteen seconds to consider which
34Further, in the 1898 lectures Peirce explicitly mentions ethics and philosophy of religion as
legitimate fields of inquiry (EP2, p. 29).
The Distinction Between Theory and Practice 99
way to turn.35
A ‘practical utility’ is, as we saw in Section 4.2, something that helps us to
achieve one of our desires. Consequently, to inquire for the sake of practical util-
ities is to seek truth with an ulterior motive. It to be engaged in what Peirce later
called the practical sciences.36 Peirce’s acknowledgement of these as forms of in-
quiry shows that he doesn’t think the are necessarily bad. But it is clear that he
thinks there are major risks to the integrity of theoretical inquiry if one misses
the distinction between the theoretical and practical sciences.37
In the language of the previous section practical inquiry is a way of taking
up the practical attitude. Consequently, to let practical utilities affect the course
of theoretical inquiry is to risk introducing external time-constraints, undue re-
liance on instinct, and insufficient openness to doubt. These risks can be illus-
trated by considering the objects that we will choose to study when attempting
to create practical utilities. For instance, if I am investigating practical uses of
chemistry I might focus on substances like iron. But if I am looking for deep and
general knowledge of the behaviour of chemicals for its own sake, I might invest-
igate a rarer element like erbium (c.f. CP, 1.45). In the theoretical case I generalise
my beliefs about chemical elements and so open myself up to a wider range of
experiential clashes. In other words, in theoretical inquiry if I stick to the particu-
lar objects that I think might be useful I am insufficiently open to doubt. This can
35In correspondence with William James, Peirce agrees with James that theoretical inquiry is
not an appropriate way to determine whether to marry a particular person or not. This is, once
the decision has been made, a vital matter. However, he holds that in the time available before a
decision is needed it is wise to gain as much relevant information as one can (cited in Skagestad,
The Road of Inquiry, pp. 209–10).
36I introduced the practical sciences in Section 3.2.1.
37It would be misleading for me to pass by Peirce’s occasionally disdainful remarks about the
practical sciences. In some places he appears to say that inquiring for the sake of practical util-
ities is an ethical failure (e.g. EP2, p. 29). These remarks can be, in part, chalked up to Peirce’s
historical context. Skagestad has clearly detailed the historical reason’s for Peirce’s emphasis on
the importance of pure theoretical inquiry. Peirce was reacting against ‘those who would make
science subservient either to religious dogma or to technological or political goals’ (Skagestad,
The Road of Inquiry, p. 200). There were many such thinkers active in 19th century intellectual
life. One striking example is the eugenics movement, which was popular at the time. In this
connection Peirce explicitly challenged one of its most prominent figures, Karl Pearson, who ar-
gued that the only true purpose of inquiry is ‘social stability’ (EP2, pp. 57–8). Peirce held that such
an aim is not general enough be maintained as an ‘ultimate end’ (EP2, p. 60). However, Peirce’s
opposition to those thinkers down not imply he wants to abolish the practical sciences.
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be thought of in terms of time-constraints as well. Lets say that I have taken up
inquiry into the properties of iron with the desire to make train tracks. In order to
achieve that desire I must cease inquiry and act on my beliefs within some finite
time. To hold off on my plan of action so that I can investigate whether some
property of iron also holds for erbium would likely be to ignore these constraints
and put my track-building at risk.38
Peirce holds that the people of his time would know a great deal more about
chemistry if the most practically useful compounds had not received as much
attention as they had, and a great deal less if the rare elements and compounds
had not been investigated (EP2, p. 24). As a general principle there is no reason
to expect that the objects that we antecedently expect will be practically useful
are the same as the objects that are likely to lead to the most valuable theoretical
results in the long run. That is, the purposes of pure theoretical inquiry, and of
the practical sciences, diverge.
On this account working towards a cure for cancer can be acknowledged as a
valuable task. If you succeed you will help a lot of people and you will probably
learn a lot of new truths. However, there is no reason to think that these will be
the deepest and most theoretically fruitful truths that you could have discovered.
You might have saved lives, but you were not the theorist you might have been.
In so far as Peirce thinks that theoretical inquiry is the most worthwhile human
occupation, it would be a tragedy if all inquiry was of this form.39
Peirce holds that our other practices should not be directly influenced by the-
oretical inquiry. His argument for this concerns the distinct roles of instinct in
theory and our other practices. When taking the practical attitude we develop
habits which will allow us to achieve some set of goals within a relevant set of
38Perhaps, on the other hand, I will ‘[receive] a deep impression of the majesty of truth, as that
to which, sooner or later, every knee must bow’ (EP2, p. 58). In which case I will give up my desire
to make train tracks and become a genuine theoretical inquirer.
39As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, one of the limitations of this study is that it cannot
consider Peirce’s account of the value of theoretical inquiry. That he thinks theoretical inquiry is
the most worthwhile human occupation is clear from comments like: ‘and what is man’s proper
function if it be not to embody general ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoret-
ical cognition’ (EP2, p. 443).
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circumstances. In this project instinct, and, more generally, our background at-
tunement with the world, is highly valuable. We can rely on these background
habits since they are the result of long experience, both ours and the experience
of our forebears, in the kind of environment in which we need to act. In other
words, they embody a great deal of ‘virtual reasoning’ (CP, 2.176).40 For instance,
a bassoon teacher will have, in the course of learning the bassoon themselves,
and of teaching it to others, made their habits subject to a vast amount of non-
deliberate habit development. She will probably be unaware of all the reasons
that her thought that a particular intervention would help a student is appropri-
ate. On Peirce’s model much of what she is doing will be outside of her deliberate
control, but she is wise to rely on her background habits. Since habits of this sort
enable us to achieve our practical goals our reliance on them requires no further
defense.
There are at least two related reasons why theoretical inquiry cannot rely on
instinct in the same way. Firstly, theoretical inquiry attempts to bring everything
it can into the foreground. That is, in theoretical inquiry we constantly push for
more control over our beliefs; we want to know why we should believe what we
do believe. For this reason appeals to instinct without the promise of further
testing are not appropriate in theoretical inquiry. Secondly, in theoretical inquiry
we test our beliefs in regions of experience alien to those in which the bulk of
our instincts have developed. We do not, for instance, have a great deal of prac-
tical experience in the world of quantum mechanics. Peirce holds that there is
no reason to trust our instincts outside of the circumstances in which they de-
veloped (EP2, p. 349). Consequently, if we directly apply theoretical results in our
other practices we unnecessarily disconnect ourselves from our instincts.41
Where our other practices rely primarily on instinct, theoretical inquiry re-
40That is, the large amount of habit development embodied in our background attunement
with the world makes it as though we have done a great deal of reasoning already.
41It is important to emphasise again that theoretical science depends on instinct. As argued in
Section 4.4.1, theory and our other practices have distinct relationships with instinct. It is not the
case that theory does not depend on instinct while our other practices do.
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lies primarily on reason. According to Peirce it is very easy to overemphasise the
latter, and very easy to underemphasise the former (EP2, p. 31). Reason is ‘su-
perficial and fallible’, whereas instinct is ‘deep and sure’ (EP2, p. 40). Theoretical
inquiry overcomes the fallibility of reason by being a long-run practice. We ex-
pect that we will make many mistakes, but that if we continue inquiring they will
be corrected. If we miss the fact that theoretical inquiry is a long-run practice, or
think that we have already reached the ‘end of inquiry’, we might miss this fallib-
ility. For example, if I think some newly-developed ethical theory is the last word
on the topic I will have no compunction about applying it at the expense of my
instinctive inclinations. I will be convinced that if they disagree with the theory
they must be false.42
None of this implies that we should never apply the results of theoretical in-
quiry in our other practices.43 Peirce holds that once a theoretical result has been
stable for awhile, it can be relied upon when taking up the practical attitude (EP2,
pp. 55–6). However, he insists that this is not itself a theoretical judgement (EP2,
p. 55).44 The judgement that some theoretical result is applicable, and of how it
should be applied is as much an instinct-guided practical action as any other.
The ability to make such judgements appropriately is well described as ‘wisdom’.
To directly apply theoretical results to our practical life would be a failure of this
wisdom (EP2, p. 34).
Returning to the example of the bassoon teacher, we can see that, on Peirce’s
model, the ‘virtual reasoning’ embodied in her teaching practice has more to re-
commend it in her particular circumstance than would a freshly developed the-
ory of bassoon teaching. The theory will not take into account the long, non-
42These thoughts can be related to the tradition of 20th century intellectual conservatism. In
particular, the worry about theoretical inquirers thinking that they have already reached the end
of inquiry is echoed in a more abstract form in Voegelin’s famous warning against ‘immanentising
the eschaton’ (c.f. The New Science of Politics, p. 120). The affinities between Peirce and this
tradition have been touched on by Short (‘The Conservative Pragmatism of Charles Peirce’).
43Peirce is conservative about his conservatism (EP2, p. 32).
44Ayim and Kent have both suggested that Peirce’s ‘sciences of review’, briefly mentioned in the
last chapter, function as a bridge between theoretical results and practical applications (Ayim,
‘Theory, Practice. . . ’, pp. 51–3; Kent, Charles S. Peirce, p. 188).
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deliberate, processes of habit development by which the bassoon teacher’s teach-
ing practice have developed. Perhaps the theory offers single path which all stu-
dents should be expected to follow, or perhaps it offers a single method for de-
veloping manual dexterity. Let’s imagine that directly applying this theory would
radically reform the teacher’s methods, and thus cut the teacher off from their
long-developed background attunement with the task. As we have seen, Peirce
would reject such a move. However, there is no reason that the teacher should not
consider the new theory, and the experiments by which it has been developed,
and incorporate certain results from it. She might cull those aspects which she
thinks are valuable, test them, and reject those which deeply conflict with her
own experience. If successful, we can describe her success in this task as reflect-
ive of practical wisdom.
Finally, we are now in a position to see why Stuhr’s worries about relying on
instinct in practice are misplaced. Peirce’s refusal to directly apply the results of
theoretical inquiry in practice, and his suggestion that we rely on instinct, need
not result in ‘ignorance, prejudice, absolutism, isolation, frustration, and con-
flict’ (Stuhr, ‘Rendering. . . ’, p. 11). One on hand, this is because Peirce thinks of
instinct as dynamic. On Peirce’s view our instincts develop in response to surpris-
ing experience. So, to follow instinct is not necessarily to be stuck with whatever
prejudices you have now. Moreover, Peirce does not restrict us from inquiring
in practical cases.45 He restricts us from directly applying the results of theoret-
ical inquiry. Practical inquiry does not detach us from instinct in the same way
that theoretical inquiry does. For example, In Chapter 2 I introduced the case
of a previously-homophobic father being confronted by the fact that his son in
gay. The father is put into a state of doubt; his beliefs have clashed with experi-
ence. He considers his deepest commitments, and whether they are compatible
with the hatred of his son. He concludes that they are not. But these deep com-
mitments will not be the result of theoretical inquiry. For instance, the father’s
45Stuhr suggests the contrary by contrasting his position that ‘reason must regularly and richly
reconstruct practice’ with Peirce’s (Stuhr, ‘Rendering. . . ’, p. 12).
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commitment to love his children, and his belief that his son is a decent person.
The father’s reasoning is not theoretical inquiry, but it isn’t blind adherence to
whatever prejudices he began with either. Stuhr’s image of the ignorant instinct-
governed absolutist does not match Peirce’s image of the instinct-guided prac-
tical inquirer.
4.5 Conclusion: Theory and Practice in the Long Run
I conclude by, first, showing the extent to which theory and our other practices
are autonomous. Second, I introduce some suggestive remarks about their long-
run interrelations.
According to the model developed in this thesis, theoretical inquiry is con-
tinuous with our other practices. This is made clear, at a highly abstract level,
when we note that all of our practices operate according to the cycle of habit
development. It is also clear in a more down-to-earth way, when we recall the
specific dependencies of theoretical inquiry on our background attunement with
the world. Theoretical inquiry is a task taken up by agents embedded in, and at-
tuned to, a particular environment. Peirce combines this with an understanding
of theoretical inquiry a highly autonomous practice. We have seen that genuine
theoretical inquiry does not take its marching orders from our other practices. It
selects its own subject matter, and carries out its own experiments, with one aim:
ultimate harmony between our beliefs and the world.
On this model our other practices are also free from direct influence from
theoretical inquiry. In these practices we can rely on our long-developed back-
ground attunement with our environment. That is, in the wide sense, we can
trust our instincts. We need not have an articulate understanding of what we are
doing, or a theoretical framework in which it all fits. We trust instinct, in this
broad sense, because it is the result of long-experience within the environment
in which we seek after our everyday purposes.
However, this autonomy is a short-run phenomenon. In the 1898 lectures
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Peirce offers some highly suggestive comments about the long-run interrelations
between theory and our other practices. While they seem to lead us in differ-
ent directions in in the short run, Peirce expects that they will be unified in the
long run. This is clear in his claim that there is no distinction between ‘practical
truth’ and ‘theoretical truth’. That is, even if there are distinct ways of ‘holding for
true’, there is only one truth (EP2, p. 56). In the short run we can tolerate tension
between our action-guiding beliefs and the results of theoretical inquiry, but in
the long run all of our beliefs must be tested against experience in theoretical
inquiry.46
Peirce makes some even more interesting claims about the development of
the background as a result of our engagement in theoretical inquiry. One of the
main claims in Chapter 2 was that the background is constantly developing in
response to experience. The experience of engaging in theoretical inquiry is no
exception. This development occurs to a small degree in the life of an individual
inquirer, but Peirce speculates that it will be clearly visible in the long-run de-
velopment of the community of inquiry. As we discover more and more of the
truth in theoretical inquiry, our conduct will be, without any deliberate effort on
our part, transformed. Understanding what Peirce envisions as the result of this
development, and evaluating its plausibility, would require a great deal more la-
bour. However, this thesis has covered much of the necessary groundwork for
such a project.
I conclude by quoting one of Peirce’s more poetic expressions of this vision
in full. Having suggested the theoretical sciences are becoming more and more
mathematical, and that pure mathematics is attempting to discover the ‘real po-
tential world’, of which our universe is ‘an arbitrary locus’ (EP2, p. 40), he contin-
ues:
‘But such ideas are only suitable to regulate another life than this.
Here we are in this workaday world, little creatures, mere cells in a so-
46This is also noted by Skagestad (The Road of Inquiry, pp. 210–13) and Potter (Charles S. Peirce
on Norms and Ideals, p. 125.
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cial organism itself a poor and little thing enough, and we must look
to see what little and definite task circumstances have set before our
little strength to do. The performance of that task will require us to
draw upon all our powers, reason included. And in the doing of it
we should chiefly depend not upon that department of the soul which
is most superficial and fallible,—I mean our reason,—but upon that
department that is deep and sure,—which is instinct. Instinct is cap-
able of development and growth,—though by a movement which is
slow in the proportion in which it is vital; and this development takes
place upon lines which are altogether parallel to those of reasoning.
And just as reasoning springs from experience, so the development
of sentiment arises from the soul’s inward and outward experiences.
Not only is it of the same nature as the development of cognition; but
it chiefly takes places through the instrumentality of cognition. The
soul’s deeper parts can only be reached through its surface. In this
way the eternal forms that mathematics and philosophy and the other
sciences make us acquainted with will by slow percolation gradually
reach the very core of one’s being, and will come to influence our lives;
and this they will do, not because they involve truths of merely vital
importance, but because the [are] ideal and eternal verities.’ (EP2,
pp. 40–41).
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